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FBIS-EEU-94-220 *15 November 1994*

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Roundup of Press Reports About Bush Visit

AU1511121694

[FBIS Editorial Report] The Albanian press supplies extensive coverage of the private visit to Tirana by former U.S. President George Bush and Mrs. Barbara Bush on 12 November.

Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian on 12 November carries next to its masthead on page 1 a boxed item with the headline "Welcome," and reading:

"Former U.S. President George Bush, the great friend of Albania and the Albanians, is in Albania today.

"Bush and his administration supported the democratic processes in the former communist countries of East Europe, including Albanian democracy. Bush also closely followed the position of the Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, and it was he who announced to the Serbs that the United States would be prepared to take strong measures if they provoked further conflicts in Kosova.

"Welcome to Albania, George Bush."

The same paper also carries on page 1 a 500-word biography of George Bush by Luljeta Andoni.

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian on 12 November carries on page 1 an unattributed 250-word report under the headline "Former U.S. President George Bush in Tirana." The report summarizes the career of George Bush as "one of the most successful figures in U.S. politics," and concludes, "George Bush's arrival in Tirana today is a sign of a further deepening of U.S.-Albanian relations. The generation that demonstrated in the streets of Tirana with the name of Bush on their lips, at the time when the past was overthrown, will now have the opportunity to see him in Tirana and welcome him."

Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian on 12 November views Albanian-U.S. relations in an 800-word "B.B." commentary, filed as referent item. The commentator considers the Bush visit as "no doubt not a tourist trip," and speculates on its meaning after the failure of the 6 November referendum on the constitution and in connection with the situation in Kosova.

Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE on 13 November carries on page 1 a 1,200-word unattributed report on Bush's visit the previous day, with a photograph of President Berisha and George Bush embracing. The headline reads, "George Bush: 'I Had the Opportunity To See Progress on the Road of Freedom and Democracy.'"

The report cites President Berisha as welcoming George Bush with the words, "The Albanians will always be grateful for what you have done for them. After President Wilson, you are the foremost and most distinguished friend of the Albanians. They are grateful to you and to your administration for the help that you gave to our liberation from dictatorship and the establishment of democracy. History will always remember your outstanding contribution and help to Albania. Your stand, drawing the red line in Kosova, has had a decisive effect in discouraging the aggressor. Albania is totally committed to developing a genuine democracy through the rule of law and a market economy, and we think that this is its great contribution to peace and stability in the region. For this reason, Albania deserves to be helped by all democratic countries. Albania sees in friendship and cooperation with the United States a major opportunity for consolidating the values of democracy and a market economy in Albania. Besides the difficulties connected with the heritage from the past and the regional conflict, Albania also faces various unreasonable blockades and tensions, which we hope will be solved through dialogue."

The report also describes Bush's visit to the Museum of Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbeg at Kruje: "George Bush stood in surprise before many historical documents, including the manuscript of Barleti about Skenderbeg's legendary history and struggle, describing the time when the Albanians took their pledge, and launched their national resistance under their leaders. The 25 years of Arberia were to remain in the memory of the European continent and the world. Recording his visit, George Bush wrote down his impressions, noticing particularly the coincidence of the name of George. It was Gjergj Kastriot who defended Western European culture and civilization, while George Bush, during his years at the head of a great state, contributed to the steps toward democracy in the countries of the East. Mr. George Bush and his wife Barbara were very moved at the gift presented to them by this museum."

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT on 13 November, at the bottom of page 1, carries an unattributed 150-word report on Bush's visit under the headline "Bush Decorated With the Golden Order of Skenderbeg." The report reads:

"Former U.S. President George Bush paid a private visit to Albania for a few hours yesterday. He was welcomed by the president and presented with the 'Golden Order of Skenderbeg,' in recognition of the help that this distinguished U.S. statesman gave to the Albanian people and other peoples in liberating themselves from the communist dictatorship. President Bush called this decoration a big surprise and said that he was pleased.

"At a Bush-Berisha meeting, Berisha expressed his gratitude and the thanks of the Albanians for the help given for their liberation from the communist dictatorship. Berisha also expressed his appreciation of the stand of the Bush Administration over the question of Kosova, saying that 'Your stand, drawing the red line in Kosova, has had a decisive effect in discouraging the aggressor.' Berisha also mentioned various unreasonable blockades and tensions, which we hope will be solved through dialogue. The communique of Berisha's press office does

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not specify which blockade is in question, but implies the chilly relations with Athens. The communique states that Bush said that 'Help for democracy in Albania is in the interests of the United States, and we seek and are proud of relations at the highest level with Albania.' Bush also visited the Skenderbeg Museum in Kruje."

Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian on 13 November carries on page 1 an unattributed 150-word report on Bush's visit, under the headline "Cooperation With the United States—Consolidation of Democratic Values."

Tirana POPULLI PO in Albanian on 13 November carries on page 4 a 400-word Thanas Gjiknuri article, entitled "Changes in the Diplomatic Course," describing recent diplomatic visits to Tirana. Reporting Bush's visit, the article states: "The Albanian press in general, regardless of its position, has expressed the view that the Bush Administration, and George Bush himself with his special sympathy, influenced the development of democracy in Albania, brought our two countries closer together, and gave special help to the Kosova problem."

Tirana DITA INFORMACION in Albanian on 13 November carries on page 3 a 1,000-word Apollon Bace article, entitled "Berisha Remains What He Was." The article, which is highly critical of Berisha's career in general, includes the following passage:

"It seems that Berisha knows the rule of English etiquette, that if a gentleman slips on a banana peel and falls flat on his face, he must stand up and walk on as if nothing has happened. On his preferred medium of the television, Berisha remains what he was. This is the aim of the exercise. Here he is with his first achievements, his charisma, welcoming George Bush, even though NEW YORK TIMES correspondent George Kamm told us yesterday, 'I do not dare write a single line about Bush in my newspaper. Bush is nobody in the United States today. He was in Italy, and President Berisha invited him to lunch.' At any rate, this enters into the program of a gentlemanly president."

'Indisputable Political Importance'

AU1511121294 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 12 Nov 94 p 3

["B.B." commentary: "About the Referendum or About Kosova"]

[Text] According to official sources, former U.S. President George Bush, defeated by Bill Clinton in the most recent elections, will be visiting Albania today at the invitation of President Sali Berisha. However, before meeting the president, he will talk with the new U.S. ambassador in Tirana. The former U.S. President's visit is no doubt not a tourist trip. Such visits have indisputable political importance at all times. However, especially in the present context, after the referendum, the arrival of a former U.S. President will not be without repercussions on the "state of play" later.

In the last two years, U.S. influence has dominated Albanian politics. Ryerson, the U.S. ambassador in Tirana until one month ago, identified himself totally with Berisha's campaign against the opposition in the 22 March [1992] elections. Ryerson's hand was behind many political maneuvers of Berisha's party. The United States has been the country with the greatest influence over Albanian policy toward Kosova and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], to the extent that some countries such as Italy have openly expressed jealousy at U.S. domination of Albania. Some say that even the idea of the referendum came out of "Ryerson's box." Both former President Bush and Ambassador Ryerson were Republicans. However, the foreign policy of such countries as the United States changes very little or not at all, whether the country is governed by Democrats or Republicans. The Albanian Democratic Party [PD] openly expressed its support for Bush's Republicans during the most recent electoral campaign. Eduard Selami then said publicly that the PD would prefer a victory of the Republican Party. The subtext of this statement was and remains clear: The Republican Party greatly influenced and supported the PD, not only with Ryerson's physical presence on the rostrums of the PD's rallies, but with their ideas and political guarantees. Two years ago, these guarantees came out of the cabinet of George Bush, then U.S. President. It was this cabinet that tolerated Ryerson's "attachment" to the PD's rostrums. Meanwhile, shortly before the PD came to power, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker came to Tirana. Baker's appearance at the giant rally in Tirana inspired the PD's slogans, "We govern, the United States helps us," while Baker's visit to the Tirana mosque was Berisha's passport to the Islamic Conference. In contrast to European aid, which has been in the form of food, U.S. aid to Albania has been political aid, but never public, and always behind the scenes. Berisha's cabinet in particular has been nourished on ideas that come from across the Atlantic.

Even George Bush today must be bringing political messages. It is early to speculate whether the former Republican President has been urgently summoned after the failure of the referendum. It is most probable that the visit was planned long ago, when Berisha thought that 7 November would be a day of victory. In the case of a victory, Bush's arrival would have been broadcast as proof of the incontrovertible support that the United States gives to winners, and as support given by the United States to Berisha after the opposition had criticized him for organizing an unlawful referendum. However, now that the constitution has been toppled and a question mark hangs over Berisha's rule, the former U.S. President no longer plays this role for the government's propaganda. Two days ago, the new U.S. ambassador implied at his meeting with the opposition that early elections are the only way out. Before meeting Berisha,

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Bush would hear the same opinion from his own country's ambassador. It remains to be seen whether he will suggest this to Berisha, in the way that the Americans have always done.

Kosova is no doubt the other and perhaps the strongest reason that gives a meaning to Bush's visit. Three years ago, Baker indeed stood up in the Tirana square and supported the new democrats, but he did not come to Albania simply to take a look at the main square of the capital city. The then secretary of state flew into Tirana from Belgrade. At that time, the war in Bosnia had still not begun and the map of Kosova lay on the table. Baker then took a look at the possible future victors in Albania. He measured the PD's pulse regarding Kosova. During its two years in power, the Berisha administration has not disappointed either Bush or anybody else over Kosova. In connection with Kosova, Berisha has remained in the role allocated for him: a sheep abroad and a wolf at home. Berisha has never threatened Belgrade, but has imprisoned and terrorized the opposition at home. As long as Berisha is in power, nobody has expected anything new on the Kosova and Macedonian front.

However, after the referendum results, Berisha's power has entered into a crisis that may extend as far as the borders of Kosova and Macedonia. The Americans and the Europeans have both sensed that the government might change very quickly in Albania. If, before 6 November, they knew and defined Albanian policy toward its neighbors, they must now revise their calculations. During the most recent campaign, the Albanian Socialists implied that they were calling for a change of government not only in Albania but in Kosova. If they have almost achieved the first of these goals, the second still lies ahead.

Berisha Comments on 6 Nov Referendum Result

LD1411193194 Tirana Radio Tirana in English 1900 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Today Albanian President Sali Berisha gave a press conference focused on the analysis of the results of the referendum for the approval of the constitution and the messages this "no" of the referendum transmits to the people.

Berisha said among other things that 6 November this year is not a day of loss but a day of victory to the Albanian democracy. Explaining this, he said that the people showed the highest level of responsibility with their participation in voting. Berisha considered the form of the referendum as the only way for the approval of a constitution in the future, for whose compilation Berisha has presented his proposals to a meeting with the heads of the political parties.

The "no" to the draft constitution in the referendum of 6 November for President Berisha was a disapproval toward the draft presented and an attitude toward the difficulties of the reform. He ensured that the weak links of the government will be a rain forest [as heard] and that the pains caused by the reform will be smoothed down. The deepening of democracy and the constitution remain the key problems which will preoccupy the Albanian public opinion, Berisha said.

Forty-two percent of votes were in favour of the constitution, something which shows that the Albanian locomotive is heading toward the center. Berisha maintained that the draft constitution rejected by the referendum was good in general, without excluding the possibility of a better variant which could have found a greater approval.

Among the reasons of its disapproval, Berisha mentioned the right and left-wing extremism. He said that Albania can adopt a new just constitution according to the model of the constitutions of the member countries of the European Union, not as the combination of some of them, but the content of one of them for which the consensus of political forces and the opinion of the Albanian and foreign specialists of the constitution of justice is needed [sentence as heard].

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Commentary on U.S. Decision on Bosnian Embargo

AU1511113894 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 12-13 Nov 94 p 6

[Commentary by Plamen Kulinski: "Contagious Example"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The "very moderate measure" that Washington has taken by its practical refusal to observe the arms embargo against Bosnia could prompt a not so moderate expansion of the conflict in the former Yugoslav republic, because it encourages those who insist on continuing the war.

With his decision, Clinton demonstrated to his Western allies that he could no longer resist the political pressure to which he was being subjected in Washington. However, this does not exonerate him in NATO's eyes, because the burden of controlling the embargo will now fall onto the shoulders of the Western European allies. Unlike the United States, they have not only sent their "blue helmets" to the region, but also continue to adhere to their determination strictly to implement the resolutions of the UN Security Council. Furthermore, their activity will be even more difficult now, because of the U.S. refusal to convey intelligence information to its allies. This places the U.S. officers in NATO in a very delicate situation.

However, this is the smallest problem. Washington's decision to ignore the violators of the embargo will further task the already shaken unity of the Contact Group on Bosnia and the UN Security Council's authority. The awareness that the example could prove contagious is the most terrifying element in this case.

Top Personnel Dismissed at Interior Ministry

AU1411123994 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 4 Nov pp 1, 2

[DUMA PRESS report: "Dismissals Continue at Ministry of Internal Affairs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Colonel Ivan Batsarov, National Police director, resigned on 3 November. He kept the reasons for his decision secret. According to well-informed sources, he did not want to work in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to other sources in the system, he has been reproached by Interior Ministry Secretary Milcho Bengarski for being too meek. Khristo Gatsov, head of the police at the Veliko Turnovo Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, has been mentioned unofficially as Col. Batsarov's most probable heir.

On 3 November Colonel Angel Trifonov, director of the Sofia directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and his deputy, Colonel Vasil Kalugerov, were dismissed by a ministerial order. They have been replaced by respectively Colonel Georgi Georgiev, director, and Major Kiril Berovski, deputy director, the Press Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs announced. Until now Col. Georgiev was the head of the guard unit of the Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs. Feodor Vladimirov, until now director of the Central Service for Struggle Against Organized Crime, was appointed head of the "Inspectorate" Service at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Minister Chervenkov has appointed Lieutenant Colonel Lyuben Levicharov head of the Central Service for Struggle Against Organized Crime. Until now he was the head of the economic sector of the service.

Well-informed sources claim that Atanas Uzunov, deputy director of the Central Service for Struggle Against Organized Crime, will me dismissed soon. Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Lyubenov, until now acting head of the inspectorate, has been appointed to another post in the ministry.

Lieutenant Colonel Marin Aleksiev, head of the "Material- Technical Supply and Social Services" Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, has also been dismissed. Colonel Lyuben Stanev has been appointed to this post. By the same ministerial order Colonel Ivan Turnev, head of the "Personnel" Service, was dismissed. Colonel Stoyan Zakhariev, an employee at the ministry, has been appointed to this post. According to unofficial information, a decree is being prepared on the dismissal of Colonel Stefan Dimitrov, National Security Service chief.

New Sofia Police Chief Cancels Leaves

AU1411165894 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 14 Nov 94

[Report by Lyubomir Rozenshtayn]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news briefing today Colonel Georgi Georgiev, the new Sofia City police chief, announced that he had canceled all leave for police officers in Sofia until the elections. He said that the increased presence of uniformed police on the streets of Sofia will not be an isolated occurrence, but regular practice. Junior district inspectors will leave their offices to boost the strength of the mobile patrols. Georgiev said that funds had been secured for fuel and overtime payments for extra duties. Col. Georgiev also promised at the news conference that police officers caught practicing extortion or taking bribes will be immediately dismissed.

According to figures compiled by the Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs, during the last week the crime rate in Sofia fell by 10 percent.

Cabinet Approves Indexing Wages, Pensions

AU1411173494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] At a special meeting today, the caretaker cabinet adopted a decree on indexing and compensating incomes in the fourth quarter of this year.

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As of 1 November, the minimum wage is 2,143 leva per month.

From 1 October, unemployment and maternity benefits and compensations for children's allowances receive an indexation increase of 18.13 percent.

As of 1 October, pensioners will receive an additional payment of up to 150 leva per person as compensation for inflation.

From 1 November, the average gross salaries of employees in the budget financed sector will be indexed by 18 percent.

The Interdepartmental Council on the Military-Industrial Complex and National Mobilization Readiness submitted to the Council of Ministers a draft proposal to change the membership of the Supervisory Board of Metalkhim Holdings. The cabinet also approved applications for the import and export of military and special products.

BSP's Videnov Interviewed About Election

AU1411131494 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 7 Nov 94 p 7

[Interview with Zhan Videnov, chairman of Supreme Council of Bulgarian Socialist Party, by Tanya Geneva; place and date not given: "We Believe in Election Success!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Geneva] You ask for the people's trust with the conviction that your election program promises will be realized. What kind of election result is the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] looking to achieve, and how may the situation develop following the voting on 18 December?

[Videnov] The BSP is striving to achieve an election result that will give it an absolute majority, or at least a considerable lead over the other parties in the next parliament. On the basis of our program, we aim to participate directly and decisively in a stable, efficient, and successful administration following the elections. It would be best for the electors to grant a mandate to a coalition government with strong public support. Such a government will ensure a speedy emergence from the crisis at an acceptable social cost and a successful change in the interest of millions of Bulgaria, and it will not be seriously threatened with sabotage on the part of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] in the legislature and other branches of administration.

The stories claiming that the elections will be rendered void by strong-arm means are completely groundless. No one will dare to revive the era of coups d'etat in Bulgaria. These rumors are aimed at reviving the fears of 1990; it is the only environment in which the "blue [SDS] idea" can flourish. However, the gentlemen in question will be disappointed—there will be no more "velvet revolutions"!

The worst possible election result will be a stalemate, in which it is impossible to form a stable government and which will make it necessary to call new elections within a short time. This may provoke great disillusionment in parliamentarianism and multiparty democracy, and the supporters of "strong-arm tactics" will undoubtedly exploit this to impose some form of one-man government. The BSP is aware of this danger and is ready to fend it off.

We must not forget that the preparations for the presidential election campaign have already begun. The notes of hysteria in the statements of certain persons who dream of a third term in office already hint at this. If, following its defeat in the elections, the SDS toes the president's line, and if the BSP loses its strength when struggling with the country's problems following its election victory, such an attempt will be made. The better the election results that the BSP obtained, the less will be the chance of this being successful.

[Geneva] You are clearly hinting at Zhelyu Zhelev. However, these are scenarios for the far-distant future; is it not so that surely many commentators believe that the president is playing the leading role right now?

[Videnov] Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic and there is no likelihood of it becoming a presidential one. The head of state is now fulfilling his obligations connected with the elections. From this point onwards, any gross interference on his part in the election campaign contravenes the Constitution. Accordingly, I categorically reject his unbalanced tirades against the BSP, the DUMA newspaper, and Stefan Prodev. They can only be interpreted as a flagrant attempt to scare the electors, to revive the bipolar model, and to discredit the parliamentary forces and parliamentarianism itself. Particularly dangerous are the efforts of the Presidency to forge an antiparliamentarian front out of the caretaker government, the judiciary, and the state media. The BSP does not intend to stand idly by in the face of this authoritarian tendency.

I would like to know where Tatarchev [chief prosecutor] was last summer when Zhelev had to seek refuge from Sugarev's followers in the Boyana Residence? Two years ago, the president asked the political forces to replace the chief prosecutor, yet now he is casting around for ways of setting the Chief Prosecutor's Office against the politicians. This is what certain people call statesmanlike thinking....

I remind Mr. Zhelev that the chaos and lawlessness in Bulgaria led to his appointment as president in the summer of 1990. It will be difficult for him to cast the blame for this onto the BSP. The BSP did not pardon criminals, it did not entrust them with managing the largest state enterprises, it did not place them at the service of large groups that financed its election campaign. The president is bound either to prove his accusations against the BSP or offer a public apology.

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[Geneva] Zhelev's accusation against the BSP that it supports criminals was in fact regarded as an emotional excess. However, some journalists have willingly taken up his other charge, that the Socialists are discrediting the caretaker government, even to the detriment of their own election chances.

[Videnov] The present government is an interim one, and the BSP has no intention of neglecting its dialogue with the voters because of it. The cabinet's task is to prepare for the elections, hold them in normal internal and external conditions, and then hand over the baton to the next cabinet. For the time being at least, we have no grounds for accusing the cabinet of deliberately sabotaging the elections.

However, what we cannot accept are the attempts to confront the electors, the future parliament, and the cabinet that it will elect with a fait accompli situation in the social and economic sphere. The dangerous experiments with prices, the Reconstruction and Development Fund, and privatization in the infrastructure sector will not lead to any good result. Especially bad consequences may ensure from its deliberate blocking of mass privatization, which is the only guarantee against hyperinflation and a chain of related bankruptcies next year.

No one intends to blame the caretaker government with others' sins, but it should not burden the next government with its own transgressions, especially when almost all the present ministers held key posts in the Berov administration and can hardly disassociate themselves from it. If the caretaker government does not yield to the hypnotic suggestion that it is the best possible government for Bulgaria and does not join in the campaign to discredit parliamentary democracy and the multiparty system, it will receive our support in achieving its modest goals. [passage omitted]

SDS Signs Election Pact With Monarchist Groups

AU1111104594 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 11 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A few moments ago, the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] signed an election agreement with His Majesty Military Schools, the Reserve Officers School, the Tsar Simeon Officer Legion, and the St. Ivan Rilski Monarchist Club.

Aleksandur Kiselichki, chairman of the Tsar Simeon Officer Legion, noted that all those who want order, security, and freedom, as well as the restoration of the Turnovo Constitution and the monarchy, must vote with the blue [SDS] ballot.

According to SDS leader Filip Dimitrov, the SDS is not making a turn regarding the monarchist idea. It has simply become a natural attractive center to all those who cherish democracy and are prepared to unite in the name of a common goal.

Article Alleges Radiation Pollution Near Sofia

AU1111132194 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 9 Nov 94 p 1

[Report by Elin Rakhnev: "Something Worse Than Chernobyl Lies Dormant in the Ground Near Sofia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Radium 226, equal in radiotoxicity to all the cesium that fell on Bulgaria from the Chernobyl cloud in 1986, has been deposited over an area of 1,180 decares 20 km from Sofia. The check made with a radiation dose meter at noon on 8 November confirmed that the danger is not over yet.

Professor Ivan Uzunov from the Physics Faculty of the St. Kliment Okhridski University of Sofia reminded a KONTINENT reporter of the radioactive pollution in the area of Gara Yana and Bogrov—around the Yanishtitsa and Lesnovska Rivers.

The pollution had been caused by nuclear waste dumped between 1947 and 1958 from the uranium production line at the Bukhovo Chemical Plant (20-30 km northeast of Sofia) and was discovered by Elisaveta Karamikhaylova early in the 1950's. All Bulgarian uranium ore used to be processed at Bukhovo until 1966, when the Eleshnitsa Plant started operation. After extracting the uranium, the waste, consisting of sand and slurry, was drained off and allowed to settle. Over a 38-year period, various measures were tried, without any of them being fully implemented.

The radiotoxicity of radium is 600 times higher than that of cesium, because it emits alpha rays and accumulates in the bones, whereas cesium is uniformly distributed throughout the human body and discharged by the organism within a relatively short time, Prof. Uzunov explained. The biggest risk to the population is internal radiation resulting from inhaling radium and derivative radon products.

KONTINENT reporters were present at the inspection conducted on 8 November over large areas near Dolni Bogrov and Gara Yana. They saw with their own eyes that the instruments gave readings of between 100 and 500 microroentgens per hour, equivalent to 1-5 microgreys per hour. The normal background radiation is 15-18 microroentgens.

So far no increase in malignant bone diseases has been established in the region. However, it is known that the disease may remain latent for up to several decades.

The permissible life-time accumulation of radium in the bones is about 1,800 becquerels. Concentrations of around 10,000 becquerels per kg have been found in the soil in the region of the Yanishtitsa and Lesnovska Rivers.

Readings of 100-150 microroentgens per hour have been taken at the children's playground in Gara Yana. This is 10 times higher than the permissible amount. Cows were grazing within the boundary of the actual radioactive

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plot (where the readings were almost 200 microroentgens per hour), but the farmers showed no interest in the figures. In the course of their investigations, which have lasted many years, the experts warned repeatedly that cabbage and other crops were being planted in the contaminated soil, and most likely were consumed by the citizens of Sofia.

UK Firm Offers To Process Spent Nuclear Fuel

AU1411142694 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 14 Nov 94 p 15

[24 CHASA staff report: "British Will Process Our Nuclear Fuel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At an international seminar in Varna yesterday, Pavlin Peev, an expert from the National Electricity Company, announced that theB-ritish company BLTD has offered to process 140 metric tons of nuclear fuel from the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant annually. The last batch of spent nuclear fuel was sent to Moscow for processing in 1988.

Peev said the British were ready to accept the fuel immediately in their store, but processing may take until 2005. After processing, the highly active waste will have to be returned to Bulgaria.

However, a source from the Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy Institute said that the international institutions are procrastinating on settling the problem of the spent Bulgarian fuel. For this reason, Bulgaria will have to find a national site for storing radioactive waste. However, experts say that the cost of constructing the storage area will increase the price of electricity.

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Zieleniec on Lifting Bosnian Arms Embargo

LD1511105794 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0600 GMT 15 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A Czech delegation has returned from Noordwijk in the Netherlands, where a Western European Union [WEU] Council session has been taking place. Ministers Josef Zieleniec and Vilem Holan reaffirmed that some kind of dispute, which reflects Europe's changed attitude toward the United States, is taking shape. Zita Senkova reports.

[Zenkova] [Passage omitted] This is how Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec commented on the U.S. decision not to take part in monitoring the arms embargo:

[Begin Zieleniec recording] In my view, just lifting the embargo is not possible. We must realize one thing, and that is that this is not an arms embargo for Bosnia. According to the resolution passed in 1991, this is an embargo on weapons to the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia. I think that the act of lifting the embargo can be only part of a package. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Prime Minister: No Need for Foreign Investment

95CH0027A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 25 Oct 94 p 10

[Article by Dominic O'Reilly: "Klaus Says Foreign Investment Not Needed"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has never been a big fan of foreign investment in the Czech Republic.

But at the Conference Bohemiae October 11, Klaus lashed out at the suggestion that the country needs foreign capital to complete its economic transformation.

"Asking whether or not the Czech Republic needs foreign capital is methodologically wrong," he said. "It doesn't need anything. It has a market economy. Some of our friends may need foreign capital, some may not. It is up to them to decide what they require, not the government."

Klaus' audience included representatives of some of the biggest foreign-investment organizations in the West, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the International Finance Corp. of the World Bank.

But he didn't hold his punches. Klaus said that while individual companies may require foreign investment, the government itself does not need to bring in more money from the outside—either in foreign aid or to complete the privatization process.

To drive home his point, Klaus used an extended analogy, comparing the Czech economy to a patient who has moved out of the operating theater and into the fitness room.

"When I am in the fitness room, I have to do the exercise, no outside assistance can help me," he said. "It seems to me that (other post-communist countries) are in the pre-transformation state, sitting in the waiting room, dreaming of the day they can take a pill to cure their troubles rather than go under the surgeon. This is when the reformist politicians are the heroes. We are now in the fitness room, improving our muscles."

One of the government's previous attempts to bring in foreign investment—the sale of Skoda Mlada Boleslav to Volkswagen—has drawn fire recently because of Volkswagen's threat to lay off workers and reduce its investment plans.

Klaus was asked if he remained convinced that the government did the right thing in the Skoda sale.

Instead of answering directly, Klaus again relied on metaphor.

"There is no conductor of the Czech Philharmonic conducting economic reform," he said. "Some ventures are successful and some are not. We live in a complicated mixture of events and the crucial task of the government is to move forward permanently, not wait. With a bicycle, the pedals always have to be moving. It doesn't mean we will get the decisions right every time. Only history and the market will tell us that."

TU Chief Views Extent, Impact of Mine Closures

AU1111103794 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 7 Nov 94 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Cyril Zapletal, chairman of the Miners' Trade Union, by Hana Kadeckova; place and date not given: "The Method of Reduction of Mining Scares Me"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kadeckova] How do you assess the reduction of Czech mining?

[Zapletal] We are dissatisfied with the restructuring of mining because it contains a number of flawed elements. The fact is that a great number of mines had to be closed because they were not economical. I think, however, that we have had enough of that. In my opinion, we have arrived at a sound level of extraction in the state, which should be maintained. The reasons are, first of all, strategic—to prevent excessive dependence on other states. Second, the reasons are social. When a mine closes, many shops and services in the region also have to close. In other words, the restructuring of mining affects not only miners and members of their families but also people of other professions.

[Kadeckova] What are the flawed elements you mentioned?

[Zapletal] The method of reduction absolutely scares me. The mines are being filled in. This is being done so that no one will ever be able to return to mining there. And, if someone were to return to it, he could do so only at gigantic cost.

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[Kadeckova] Why, in your opinion, are the mines being filled in, making it impossible to resume mining in case of need?

[Zapletal] I, too, would like to hear a reply to this question from someone. In my opinion, coal represents national wealth of our state. Bituminous coal is an irreplaceable chemical raw material, and who knows whether it will not be needed at some point in the future for other purposes than energy generation. State representatives ought to think about those things a bit in advance. I consider the liquidation of bituminous coal mines by filling them in to be irresponsible, to say the least, because even people at the ministry cannot know what the situation will be, let us say, 30 years from now. I do not understand why the government did not approach coal mining in the same way as it did uranium mining. Although a number of uranium mining sites, too, have been liquidated, the government decided that the remaining sites would be conserved so that mining could be resumed in the future.

[Kadeckova] Is there anything else to which you object, besides the method of reduction of mining?

[Zapletal] Yes, the other thing is hidden reduction. The management says that it will liquidate only a certain part of the company, only some site, for the sake of making production more efficient. It is then very difficult to assess whether the real aim is rationalization or reduction. Anyhow, I would say that everything amounts to reduction. People worked there, money was invested there, and now everything is liquidated. The peculiar endeavor by the managements of individual mining companies to accelerate the reduction process represents another problem. In a certain phase, in the years 1992-93, the managements would receive a pat on the shoulder when they closed another mine. No one examined the economic aspects too carefully; mines were being closed in a rather wild way.

In this way, a situation has come about that companies are closing mines faster than they are getting money for it from the state. When someone reduces mining without a state subsidy, he does so at the expense of his own prosperity. The dictum that the market will resolve everything does not apply in mining. Mining requires a little strategy. For example, if I want to mine coal in some mine in the year 2000, today I have to drive access corridors and must therefore invest money there now. When I use the money I have for investment to reduce mining today, I am closing for myself the road to future prosperity.

[Kadeckova] Could you somehow document the extent of the reduction of mining?

[Zapletal] Roughly 25 million metric tons of bituminous coal were extracted in 1989. At present, we extract some 16 million metric tons annually. Brown coal output declined from 85 million metric tons in 1989 to approximately 55 million metric tons at present. But the extent of reduction could best be illustrated by the development of our members base. Whereas in 1990 our trade union had almost 300,000 members, as of 1 September 1994 it had only 147,000. And, mind you, almost 90 percent of miners are still organized in our trade union.

[Kadeckova] What, in fact, is the fate of people who must leave the mines? Are the trade unions looking after them in any way?

[Zapletal] Of course. We have worked out a social program, have concluded agreements with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, are negotiating with the managements, and have participated in establishing a job offer program, the so-called Job Shop [previous two words in English]. We are doing all we can for people to find jobs elsewhere or to be provided for in some other way. If the worst comes to the worst, we are able to pay them their average wages for a while. An agreement exists and is being honored between us and the minister of industry and trade, Vladimir Dlouhy, under which he must announce to us six months in advance the closure of any mine. This gives us time to be prepared for it. In spite of this, I am afraid that there might be some clashes in the future.

[Kadeckova] Why?

[Zapletal] Some of the people who have left mining have been absorbed by the labor market in the region, and some of those who had moved to the mining areas from elsewhere have returned home. On 1 January 1995, however, the Fucik mine at the border between Ostrava and Karvina is to be closed. Pressure on the job market may arise there because the region can scarcely so quickly absorb the more than 2,000 people who are to be laid off. What is more, the steel industry in the area is being restructured in a similar way, and there are not so many other job opportunities in the region. So far, I am not aware.

Prospects for European Union Admission Discussed

95CH0026A Prague PROGNOSIS in English 19 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Robert McLean: "Concrete EU Admission Plan Promised for Central Europe"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech Republic and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe took another step toward full membership in the European Union last week in discussions in Luxembourg with the foreign ministers of Western Europe.

The ministers agreed to formulate "a white paper" that would establish guidelines for the new democracies' entrance into the EU and also made provisions for their government ministers to participate in EU debates on a wide range of issues.

But marring the apparent progress was the failure to accept German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's proposal to make the year 2000 an official target date. And the meeting exposed deep divisions among EU member states over how and when this now powerful trading bloc should be

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expanded, a problem for the Czech government, which is anxious for Europe to put its cards on the table.

The most concrete result for Central European foreign ministers was that they gained the right for their Cabinet members to participate in EU discussions with their Western counterparts. Ministers of finance, transportation, telecommunications, research, environment, culture and education from Central Europe may now voice their countries' opinions in formal high-level debates, but will have no voting rights.

Dr. Gerhard Sabathil at the European Commission Delegation in Prague said the admittance of Central European ministers into these discussions carried not only important symbolic value, but practical value as well.

"We would like to involve (Czechs) on an equal basis to discuss these matters and to get fully accustomed to these kinds of negotiations and decision-making in the EU," said Sabathil.

Jana Burenova, head of economic relations with the EU in the Czech Foreign Ministry, agreed that the Luxembourg talks represented progress, especially since lower-level delegations would also take part in sub-ministerial talks where the agendas for the annual ministerial discussions are set.

While pleased by the plans to formulate a white paper on new member acceptance, Burenova complained that the white paper as now conceived would not be drawn up with the participation of the six countries involved (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania). "Of course, we're interested in getting involved in that discussion," said Burenova.

Burenova seemed concerned that the result of the white paper would be a series of general intentions of purpose with no real substance. "In our opinion it should be clearly stated when and under what conditions for which countries, because the timetable should be filled in by each country according to its possibilities," she said.

West European politicians almost seemed to have second thoughts in Luxembourg. French and Portuguese officials voiced concerns that the increasing EU fixation with Eastern Europe threatened to destabilize the union and blind it to fundamentalist dangers from the south. And some diplomats worried that other East European countries could begin demanding equal treatment, as could Mediterranean neighbors.

As long as internal European politicking continues—despite the official line that entry of the Central European countries is a question of "when and how" and not "if"—no concrete plan is likely to emerge, and politicking will likely continue until the EU reforms its institutional structures.

"The structures of today's EU were created for six member states. There are now 16 member states and there is a feeling of inefficient functioning," said Sabathil.

And the vision of a single economic and political superstructure appears to be rapidly vanishing, with the idea of a "multi-speed" Europe gaining momentum. Championed by the Germans, the concept would entail a core group of fully unified countries (Germany, France, Holland, with poorer members of the EU (Britain, Spain, Portugal) enjoying free trading rights but no single currency.

This monumental debate is only just beginning, and is expected to culminate in 1996 with an official intergovernmental conference.

Invited to write a think piece on Europe in a recent issue of THE ECONOMIST, Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus laid his cards on the table: "Let the European institutions resist any temptation to favor the division of Europe into two parts, a luckier one and a less lucky one, as in the days of the Cold War."

While Hungary and Poland have already submitted their formal applications for membership, the Czech Republic will probably wait until the tumultuous year of 1996.

Should Klaus remain in power, he will likely be an outspoken figure in the debate over the EU's future. He is distrustful of its cumbersome institutions and the expensive benefits handed out to West Europeans.

"It is fair to observe that the Thatcherite (or anti-Keynesian, or liberal) revolution stopped at best halfway in Western Europe and is yet to be completed," Klaus wrote in THE ECONOMIST. "Put simply, Europeans have to reconcile their rewards with their achievements, otherwise some of them will be out of work forever."

Commentary Assesses November Local Elections

95CH0026B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 25 Oct 94 p 3

[Commentary by Victor Gomez: "Town Hall Could Change Your Life"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Top government ministers may always get the serious media attention, but the little folks in town hall have the power to affect everything from the flats people live in to the air they breathe.

When voters go to the polls November 18 and 19 for the second local elections since the fall of communism, they will elect officials who will often have more influence on their day-to-day lives than do the national leaders.

The issues at stake in the elections differ from town to town, but in general they are problems that affect everyone's daily life.

In Prague, for example, the city government is running a program to eliminate coal burning in the city, which should dramatically improve the air quality. The local council also has a hand in setting up nursing homes, solving traffic problems with new freeways on the outskirts of the city and contributing to the upkeep of historical buildings.

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Local governments must deal with these issues using money over which they have little control. While the municipalities receive revenue from personal income taxes, the rates are set by the Finance Ministry. To compensate, some towns have resorted to selling off or renting out property, but the situation is worse in towns that don't have as many property assets.

Czech voters seem to be aware of their influence. For all the grumbling about high prices and corrupt politicians, most citizens still think their vote matters.

"I'm thinking very hard and deeply about whom I'm going to vote for," said Marie Spurna, a 71-year-old resident of the Moravian town Zdar and Sazavou. "I haven't come to any conclusions yet."

In stark contrast to many Western countries, where more than half the people in most cities and towns don't even bother to vote, a recent poll in the Czech Republic found that up to 71 percent of respondents said they would take part in the November 19 vote.

Like many of her compatriots, Spurna has welcomed the new era of political freedom, but she said she still believes at least a few things could have been handled better by her political representatives over the past four years.

"Even though I was very happy—very happy to see the former regime end—I expected something different," she said. "I understand that it doesn't all change so quickly; but I think that after five years it could be better." Spurna said she worries most about the increase in crime since 1989 and the political corruption stories she hears about from the media.

"The power and responsibility are there legally, but financial means are limited," said Petr Moravek, local-election coordinator for the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD).

These difficulties can become quite acute in a country where politicians and political parties represent virtually the only actors involved in questions of public importance.

Jonathan Stein, an analyst with the Institute for East-West Studies, said the Czech Republic has yet to develop a strong public sector—which would include interest groups and non-profit organizations—leaving many important decisions over how to spend public money up to relatively autonomous political leaders.

The overwhelming position of politicians in Czech society is inadvertently symbolized by the voting cards that will be used in the Prague city council elections. Each of the 27 parties or political groupings involved in the elections has put forward a full slate of 55 candidates to fill the Prague council. So, according to law, registered voters will receive a sheet of paper measuring 100 by 140 centimeters (4 by 5.6 inches) with all 1,485 candidate names on it.

Milos Kosicek, who runs a nursing home in the Moravian town of Prostejov, said he thinks politicians have grown distant from the concerns of the average citizens. He is so upset over the political situation in the country that he has decided to run for town council. "I've had enough of these false saviors who want to handle everything and then keep it all to themselves," said Kosicek.

Moravek gets visibly irked at the suggestion that local government is not as accessible to the people it represents as it should be.

"Many citizens had this growing feeling that decisions are being made behind their backs, which isn't really true in principle.... It's important for them to understand once and for all that democracy is participatory," he said.

With razor-sharp precision, Moravek pointed to laws that enable people to attend most council meetings, petition council members and generally take part in the process. "In this country, there's this general state of passivity where people say, 'someone will do something and decide for me," he added.

Moravek said he believes many people aren't aware how much of their lives is affected by municipal politics. "The local council decides who will own a house, where buses will run, where a kiosk or an auto dealership can be set up, how the streets will look and how often they'll be cleaned, how cemeteries will look,... whether there will be children's centers, painting workshops, sports clubs," he said, sounding as if he was repeating this information for the 100th time.

Some observers have noted that under the surface of the Czech people's willingness to vote is a general lack of a desire to do anything else to affect the political scene in their town or neighborhood. These ideas were underscored by the fact that some 60 towns will not even have elections this year because no one wanted to run for office there.

"We're used to not taking care of ourselves," said Prague Deputy Mayor Vladimir Riha. "People were used to living in the small world of their family life and their job. It will take many years (to change this), not days or weeks." of the founding of any new industry or any new branch there to which people could transfer. We must not forget the North Bohemian region, either. The toughest restructuring of brown coal mines will start next year. And the restructuring of this region will be even more difficult, in my opinion, than was the reduction of bituminous coal mining. There are very strong signals indicating the closure of large open-cast mines, and people in the area have, in fact, nowhere to transfer to.

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Kukan Views Prospects for Agreement With Hungary

AU1511104894 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 14 Nov 94 p 3

[Interview with Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan by Gyorgy Jozsef Farkas in Bratislava; date not given: "Bratislava Is Waiting for the Hungarian Reply"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan gave an interview to NEPSZABADSAG at the meeting of the Democratic Union in Bratislava.

[Farkas] The text of the agreement on national minority rights was adopted in Strasbourg last week. Are the principles adopted by the members of the Council of Europe in harmony with Slovak legal practice?

[Kukan] The agreement has indeed been adopted, but no one has yet signed it. This will happen at the end of January or the beginning of February 1995, when the parliamentary meeting of the Council of Europe submits the document to the member countries for signing. I must say that, just like Hungary, Slovakia has declared that it is even ready to sign the Strasbourg Agreement immediately. The agreement is effectively in full harmony with Slovak legal practice, and, therefore, we do not have to carry out any essential changes or modifications because we fully agree with the document adopted.

[Farkas] In your view, could this document on national minorities accelerate the signing of a Hungarian-Slovak basic agreement?

[Kukan] In our view, this will definitely help our negotiations with the Hungarian side because it lays down general European standards. For us, the agreement adopted in Strasbourg is more than a guideline; we are ready to integrate it fully or connect it to the basic agreement.

[Farkas] In the current uncertain political situation in Slovakia, to what extent is the Slovak Foreign Ministry able to deal genuinely with Hungarian ideas about the basic treaty?

[Kukan] I hope we will soon receive these ideas, and I think our legal experts will have to examine them first. However, their activity does not depend on everyday political issues; they will have to check the legal terminology and compare it with our proposals, and this can be carried out by any government. In addition, it is also a fact that many ambiguous or misinterpreted formulations can be avoided in the course of the experts' exchange of views, so the issue can be advanced even in this technical phase of the negotiations. Naturally, we will submit the draft agreement to parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee and other relevant forums because parliament will have to adopt it in the end.

[Farkas] Bucharest is planning to ban the use of foreign anthems and flags. In Bratislava, the Slovak National Party announced that it wants to initiate a similar law. What is your opinion about this?

[Kukan] In my opinion, the things being done in Romania and what the national parties here are planning should be viewed very seriously. I would agree with the need to prepare some kind of regulation that would make it clear to anyone what is possible and what can no longer be allowed. Such clarifications could avoid some debates or the emergence of even dramatic problems.

[Farkas] In conclusion, a personal question: Can you imagine yourself a member of a government led by Meciar?

[Kukan] I see the possibility of this exclusively in a cabinet in which all three current government parties are present, including the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. This would be the result of a political agreement among these parties and not my decision.

Kukan Denies Czechs Lack Proper Counterparts

LD1111225394 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 11 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan returned from his two-day visit to France yesterday. He attended a session of the Council of Ministers of the European Council in Strasbourg. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Kukan] From Slovakia's point of view, the most important thing was the adoption of a framework agreement on protecting ethnic minorities. This is the first legislative document of this kind. It is legally binding on those who sign it. [passage omitted]

The agreement outlines the Pan-European standards and is in full accordance with the Slovak laws. It is in our interest to sign and observe it. [passage omitted] We welcome this document. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] In the past few days, a statement by Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has attracted attention. Commenting on the situation of the government of which you were or still are a member, despite the fact that the government has submitted its resignation, he said that he had had no counterpart to hold talks with. You asked, through Czech Ambassador Filip Sedivy, for an official rendition of the statement. In an interview for LIDOVE NOVINY, Prime Minister Klaus confirmed his statement. What is your view of that? Do you really think that, since the spring, the Czech Government has had no counterpart to hold talks with?

[Kukan] Our government has established many contacts abroad. Many agreements have been signed. [passage omitted]

This is why I can only repeat that it is stunning and alarming if the prime minister of a neighboring country with which our relations are very intensive—and I know very well that ministers have had lively contacts; for

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instance, the defense minister or agriculture minister or economy minister, who kept meeting their Czech counterparts, signing agreements—in this case, I do not know how it is possible to say that there has been nobody to hold talks with. [Words indistinct] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, as well as all other government members, did hold talks with their Slovak counterparts. [end recording]

Moravcik Interviewed on Economy, Privatization

LD1111221994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 11 Nov 94

[Weekly interview with Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik by Jarmila Tosecka in Bratislava on 11 November—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] It is now 1800, and this is the slot reserved for the prime minister of the Slovak Government. Today's interview is prepared and presented by Jarmila Tosecka. [passage omitted]

[Tosecka] Yesterday the deputies discussed a check carried out on the implementation of the state budget during the first 10 months of this year, the drafting of the 1995 budget, and a report on the implementation of your government's policy statement.

Let us speak about the key point, which can be described as the most pressing one—that is, the draft state budget for next year. It has been discussed a lot. There is no point in repeating it. I would just like to ask you one question: Will you manage to fulfill your promise? I am referring to what you have said, Mr. Prime Minister. They expect us to draft a budget for them, and they will have it ready on 15 November. Next Tuesday is 15 November.

[Moravcik] Next Tuesday we would like to discuss the draft state budget. It is quite probable that the discussion will not end on the 15th but will go on. We will wait until the last moment for a new government to be formed in order to enable the new government to present the draft state budget to the National Council, as would be the natural course of action.

Only if a new government is not formed will we, at the last possible moment, do so.

[Tosecka] A lot of opposition parties' objections against Vladimir Meciar's government concerned privatization. I myself remember quite passionate discussions in parliament, and then the formation of the privatization committee, and then the scrutiny of the privatization decisions of the government, and so on. Everyone called for transparency and clarity in privatization. It therefore seems paradoxical that, despite your written message to Ivan Gasparovic, the chairman of the National Council, in which you announced that the government was stopping the privatization process on 6 September, despite that, privatization continued. This happened without parliamentary control because parliament was dissolved at the time. So what transparency are we talking about? After all, the election results were known, too. How can you explain this, Mr. Prime Minister?

[Moravcik] On 6 September we did stop, or shall I say, halted issuing privatization rulings. The coalition held a view that privatization decisions would not be made during the election campaign so as not to mix privatization and the election campaign. After the elections, we did not find this view valid any more because we realized that interrupting privatization would cause serious setbacks.

Once a privatization decision is made, it takes two or three months to put it into practice. It means that, even if the government has adopted some privatization measures, they will, in any case, be implemented by the new government and the new parliament. [passage omitted]

It is therefore rather absurd to link the election results and privatization as if the elections were to decide who had a right to privatize. That is absurd and absolutely incomprehensible. It has shown a lack of understanding of privatization [passage omitted]

[Tosecka] Was this the sense of your message to Ivan Gasparovic?

[Moravcik] The sense was as I told you. Knowing that these issues are rather sensitive, we did not want to bring privatization into the elections. That is all. [passage omitted]

[Tosecka] Your cabinet's program, Mr. Prime Minister, has included this important point: coupon privatization has to be started and speeded up in such a way that almost half of the national property becomes private property. [passage omitted]

[Moravcik] [passage omitted] I think it is necessary to complete the privatization process as soon as possible because our economy appears to be in some sort of privatization agony. It means that, while the economy is being privatized, it does not function in the way it ought to.

[Tosecka] [passage omitted] Mr. Prime Minister, what long-term positive trends has your Cabinet managed to get started, and, in general, what positive achievements has the broad coalition cabinet brought to our citizens, to Slovakia? [passage omitted]

[Moravcik] In my view, those positive trends are clear. One of the most important positive trends is the fact that the GDP is growing. [passage omitted] Another trend is that inflation is keeping to the (?expected) level. This is very positive. We also have managed to keep the deficit on a certain level and thus have created a favorable starting point for the state deficit next year. [passage omitted]

There is also an unequivocal positive trend in the sphere of privatization. In our country, it is really necessary to complete basic privatization as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

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It is also very important that we have established very good relations with international institutions. We have been favorably assessed, above all, by the International Monetary Fund. [passage omitted]

[Tosecka] And, personally, Mr. Prime Minister, what are your feelings on leaving the post?

[Moravcik] I have done all I could.

HZDS Official Comments on Economic Policy

AU1411200394 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Nov 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Sergej Kozlik, deputy chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, by Ivan Podstupka; place and date not given: "No to Sellout, Yes to Strategic Investment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The question is being asked today on which road the new government will embark. Although its composition is still surrounded by question marks, it is sure to be dominated by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. This is why we asked its deputy chairman and economic expert, Sergej Kozlik, a few questions:

[Podstupka] To what extent will future economic policy build on pre-March policy?

[Kozlik] We will build on the policy pursued until March because we do not quite want to continue what has been done subsequently. Many things that have been done over the past six months drew on the economic policy framework and on the forecasts for 1995, which the Economic Council of our government had approved as early as January. I would say that the new government unashamedly took them over and presented them as its own. This also concerns basic specifications of economic development and the budget management. We intend to push through a developmental concept of economic policy. However, this does not mean in the least that we would allow aggregate macroeconomic indicators, particularly inflation, to get out of hand. We expect budgetary policy to be austere. Developmental impulses will be provided mainly through the development of public investment, naturally in conjunction with the appropriate credit policy. However, instruments must be in place to eliminate inflationary influences.

[Podstupka] The period of registration of coupon books is coming to an end. What will be the fate of the second wave of coupon privatization? Should citizens who have not yet made up their minds register their coupon books?

[Kozlik] We have stressed more than once that coupon privatization should be part of the privatization process. We did, however, express dissatisfaction with the way in which the package of property for the second wave has been filled. A self-serving political approach prevailed here, aimed at demonstrating to the citizen before the elections that there would be enough property to go around. Typical examples are the inclusion of the energy sector in coupon privatization or the last days of Privatization Minister Janicina's activity, when he stuffed 40 enterprises with a 97-percent stake reserved for coupon privatization into the privatization pocket. This runs counter to our philosophy that coupon privatization should not have the majority share in the property of a company, so that companies have specific owners and their property is not dispersed. Mr. Meciar has called for the continued registration of coupon books, and I support his call.

[Podstupka] Nothing will change, then?

[Kozlik] We want to reevaluate the extent and the quality of property earmarked for coupon privatization, so there will be a certain delay. But we will strive for the delay to be as short as possible. In individual companies, we will reduce the proportion of property to be privatized by the coupon method, so it can be assumed that we will increase the number of companies. Hundreds of privatization projects that have not been included in the second wave are still lying on the founding ministries' desks.

[Podstupka] A burning problem these days is the drafting of the state budget. How can the looming hole in the budget be patched?

[Kozlik] We are not advocates of transferring a great part of the debt to the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic. This is self-deception. The use of internal resources will not resolve anything. Real and effective money is only that which comes from the outside, and here there exists a threat of national property being sold out. Foreign investors are interested mainly in lucrative companies. This can help in the short term, but the deficit will surface from the long-term point of view. When it does surface, we will have nothing from which to cover it.

[Podstupka] We need foreign capital. Your words suggest that you are opposed to it.

[Kozlik] No. But consider as an example the sale of the Novaky Chemical Works. The buyer of the factory, which generates a profit of 200 million Slovak korunas [Sk] annually, should pay for it only Sk80 million a year, and all annual investments would be written off from the purchase price. This is a glaring example of the kind against which we want to erect an a priori barrier. It is a different matter when a strategic investor enters a company bringing capital and new technologies and is interested in development. The commitments of the foreign investor must be consistently spelled out in contracts.

[Podstupka] During the election campaign, you said that we were not dependent on international financial institutions but that we would use a special National Bank issue to launch economic development. This caused a stir among economists. Could you explain your statement?

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[Kozlik] I have to set this right. I did not say that we were not dependent on these institutions. I made the statement in connection with the adoption of the government memorandum. What I meant was that, at the time this memorandum was adopted, we were no longer dependent on just a loan from the IMF. We could have found other financial institutions if the aim was to strengthen foreign exchange reserves. The other aspect is that a debt is a debt, whether it is internal or external. If the requirements of the impulse are fully saturated from internal resources, be it in terms of raw and other materials or in terms of manpower, it is illogical to take foreign loans for this purpose. When foreign loans are used to purchase new technology, which cannot be acquired for korunas, it is a different matter. I did not say there should be a special credit issue going beyond the normal credit framework. I expect that some credits will be set apart as a priority to finance a program of public investment. This credit package would be purpose-linked, and regulatory elements would be applied in both inputs and outputs [pri vstupoch a vystupoch] to minimize inflationary influences.

[Podstupka] Certain doubts are being expressed regarding the future government's relations with the IMF.

[Kozlik] We cannot change international agreements, but we can communicate. I believe that the government memorandum from the end of the first half of the year was not optimal either for this government as the debtor or for the IMF as the creditor.

[Podstupka] The relationship between the budget and the National Bank of Slovakia [NBS] is developing dramatically. The NBS finds the high internal debt congenial. Are you preparing any legislative changes regarding the relationship between the state budget and the NBS?

[Kozlik] I do not think this would be the right way because it would be tantamount to moving money from one pocket to another. The NBS should, however, be more economical in its expenditures. The offensive should be aimed at interlinking monetary and economic policies, while accepting the independence of the NBS. Maintaining stability of the currency cannot be the sole criterion of its success. We are considering the possibility of setting up a commission for monetary relations within the parliamentary Economic Committee, which would comprise not only deputies but also the NBS governor and experts, similar to that in the Czech Parliament.

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 11 November on page 4 carries a 500-word interview with HZDS Deputy Chairman Sergej Kozlik by Ivan Stulajter entitled "We Reckon With Two or Three Months' Delay of Coupon Privatization." In the interview, the place and date of which are not given, Kozlik reaffirms the HZDS's intention to "reevaluate the extent and quality of property" to be privatized by the coupon method and reiterates his movement's criticism of the inclusion of Slovensky Energeticky Podnik, the Slovak Energy Company, in coupon privatization. Kozlik voices the view that, for each company to have a specific owner, the volume of property reserved for coupon privatization should not exceed 30 percent of a company's shares. Kozlik concedes that the "reevaluation" will cause a delay in the second wave of coupon privatization, the first round of which was to be launched in mid-January 1995, and estimates the delay at "roughly two to three months." Asked about the volume of property to be privatized by the coupon method, Kozlik agrees that a property volume of "at least SK70 billion" should be achieved, which will make it necessary to increase the number of companies included in coupon privatization.]

TU Leader on Causes of Possible Social Unrest

LD1411182494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Alojz Englis, president of the Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions, responded today to the statement yesterday by Vladmir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. Meciar's statement concerned impending social unrest. Englis said—and I quote from an agency report—that the trade unions are ready and that the first protests will take place next week.

In a statement granted to TA SR, Alojz Englis said that, in our country, there were certainly enough factors capable of generating social unrest. These are: growing unemployment, the continual decline in the standard of living, the rising prices of basic necessities, and the drop in real wages. The trade unions are continually dealing with these problems and are using all available means of social dialogue to solve them.

The trade unions have adopted a sensitive and responsible approach when considering the use of extreme measures, including strikes, Alojz Englis said.

Meciar Against Government Without SDL, KDH

LD1411151794 Prague CT 1 Television Network in Czech 1830 GMT 13 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], has called on his political partners to join him for talks on a new Slovak government when the local elections are over. Otherwise, the HZDS refuses to assume executive power in the country.

[Unidentified correspondent] In an exclusive interview for Czech Television today, he said that he will definitely not form a minority government—that is, a government without the participation of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] and the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH].

[Begin recording] [Meciar] Our government has fallen twice, and to risk a third fall would be irresponsible as

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regards both our electorate and our Republic. It would result in yet another clash [words indistinct] We do not intend to form a minority government, and we will not form a minority government. In such a situation, we will declare that it is better to stay out of this. In fact, a paradoxical situation is emerging in Slovakia because no one wants to be in the government.

[Correspondent] When do you realistically think a government can be formed?

[Meciar] We told the president that it would be realistic to form a government by the end of this year. [end recording]

ZRS Chairman Reflects on Social Situation

AU1511075594 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 11 Nov 94 p 4

[Interview with Jan Luptak, chairman of the Association of Workers of Slovakia, by Oldrich Zabojnik; place and date not given: "Jan Luptak: They Describe Us Hatefully as the 'Lumpen Proletariat'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zabojnik] The ZRS [Association of Workers of Slovakia] was, so to speak, rocketed into parliament. This would be less surprising if we were to take into consideration the social situation in Slovakia. Is this the case in your opinion, too?

[Luptak] If so many people were not literally living on the breadline, it would have been hard to find the several hundred thousand who voted for us because they realized that they had to wake up and make themselves known. Not seeing the social situation in this country is political ignorance or, rather, arrogance. For example, I have just returned from a visit to the Nova furniture factory in Filakovo, where the people had not been paid. The company did not have any money for wages because it has a number of debtors. What we in parliament have known for a long time was again apparent—that there is no financial discipline in our country. This does not bother anyone too much, however. The wages in Filakovo were eventually paid, but this should not be associated with my visit.

[Zabojnik] Do you not think that, from a topical point of view, you are exposing yourself to the risk that workers will call on you, first and foremost, wherever they are unable to manage by themselves?

[Luptak] The issue does not involve only invitations. A number of visits are made to parliament. These are mostly delegations from factories and cooperatives, where there have been cases of major fraud and the people feel powerless. It is necessary to say openly that the ordinary person, or, as they say, the rank-and-file citizen because we have shamefully abandoned the term "workers," often does not have, despite the current judicial system and valid laws, anywhere to appeal for the truth and support. Therefore, people are trying to rely on our party, which, incidentally, was established for this purpose. We were interested not in cozy seats in parliament but in denouncing the wrongs committed against people, injustice, law breaking, and adamantly demanding rectification, something from which we do not intend to refrain.

[Zabojnik] The constantly worsening social situation is not, admittedly, being denied, but, at the same time, it is somehow being mitigated. In your opinion, what is the situation really like?

[Luptak] I visited a private company in Zvolen, where the workers had not been paid for five months. You can imagine how their families must be living when you hear what one of them said to me: "I went to get the deposit on empty bottles today so we could have money for bread." It makes one sad that this has happened to tens of thousands of our people, people who have worked in their factories for 30 or 40 years. I would like to see deputies, politicians, government officials, and bankers in such a situation. This is the reason our party, which was not established for just this electoral period, came onto the scene.

[Zabojnik] Vladimir Meciar has many enemies, but it now seems that you are public enemy number-one for certain sectors of the population. Why is this?

[Luptak] I was put here by the people who voted for me, and I will be governed by their opinions and their needs. If, until now, I have devoted myself completely to working for society, I want to proceed at twice the pace now. Denigration by certain politicians and journalists, who underestimate us and describe us hatefully as the "lumpen proletariat," does not bother us. On the contrary, it inspires me all the more in my work, activates it, and spurs it on.

Developments in National Council Criticized

AU1511074994 Bratislava SME in Slovak 10 Nov 94 p 3

[Commentary by Juraj Hrabko: "A Future in the Past or a Past in the Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first and, soon afterwards, second meetings of the NR SR [National Council of the Slovak Republic] were held a week ago. During the past seven days, perhaps all of the representatives of the political entities, commentators, observers of the Slovak political scene, and, last but not least, a great many citizens have already expressed their views on this topic. By the way, the practical measures implemented since then by the HZDS-RSS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-Farmers' Party of Slovakia], the SNS [Slovak National Party], and the ZRS [Association of Workers of Slovakia] parliamentary coalition and their hangers-on can leave few people indifferent or tight-lipped.

The contours of the objectives and plans of the parliamentary coalition forces have begun to be defined even more clearly during the past week. Quite simply, the

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brutal method by which they seized power in the parliament can no longer cause any doubts about the future development of the political situation in Slovakia. The so far more or less camouflaged signs of a parliamentary putsch or coup are becoming more definite every day. If, to date, we have distinguished between standard and extremist parties, it is necessary to acknowledge that the new parliamentary coalition has managed to create an entirely new formation—a standard extremist one.

It would be an illusion to think that Meciar is satisfied or that he intends to slow down his steps to power. He needs to rid himself of the tutelage of the 83 deputies, which, in time, could again become uncomfortable for him. Not only repeated interventions in the execution of power but also the unearthing of further postelection "culprits" from among the ranks of the current government, who will then have to be recalled, are being prepared for the third NR SR meeting. What has already happened in the NR SR is intended not just for show but also as a means of removing those who are inconvenient. The investigation commission will soon begin to "investigate," the Supreme Inspection Office to "inspect," the Prosecutor General's Office to "prosecute," the electronic media to "inform," and so on. And, lest anyone now take comfort from the fact that the new coalition does not have a constitutional majority in the parliament, this situation is probably just a temporary one. We should not forget the idea of removing the DU [Democratic Union] deputies and redistributing their mandates. The HZDS chairman at least—and that is the main thing—certainly has not forgotten this.

It is obvious from the conduct of the parliamentary coalition that it is striving to create a second center of executive power. Its paralyzing of the government's activity bears witness to its objective of governing by means of the majority of deputies and the acclaimed collective "responsibility," whereby everyone is responsible for everything and no one is responsible for anything. Because, after all—and even a little child knows this—someone will submit a bill to the 83 extremists one day, and this, perhaps, may also become apparent from the results of the local elections. If, after everything that has happened and is yet to happen before them, the new coalition gains a majority, Western countries will give Slovakia the thumbs down.

Briefly and explicitly: Either Slovakia will have the past in front of it, or the standard extremists will have their future behind them.

Commentary on Political Situation, ZRS's Role

AU1411185494 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 Nov 94 p 3

[Commentary by Martin Krno: "Echoes of a Minor Nocturnal Storm"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The individual political entities should set conditions in accordance with the results they achieved in the elections. This holds true for the parties in the current, no longer voluntary, governing coalition, as well as for those parties that will form the next coalition.

The HZDS-RSS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-Farmers' Party of Slovakia] coalition won the most support in the elections. At the same time, however, the results ordained that this coalition cannot govern alone. Governing in Slovakia is far more complicated than winning elections, and, because the HZDS in particular has had abundant experience at both, the reports about a clash between two opinions among its ranks come as no surprise.

The adherents of one opinion claim that it is more desirable to remain in the opposition and, by means of a parliamentary majority, control the electronic media, the Prosecutor General's Office, the Supreme Inspection Office, privatization, and the information service. They assume that Moravcik's Cabinet, to which they would designate responsibility, would dance to their tune, and, at the appropriate moment and in the end, they would replace this government. The other group, made up primarily of the Movement's district functionaries, ostensibly demands a more honorable solution—forming a government immediately. I imagine that this is so the ambitions of the regional chiefs can be fulfilled sooner. There is a catch in this way of thinking, however: Transferring from the opposition to a stable government requires at least 76 National Council deputies. They have secured a staunch 70 thanks to close cooperation with the SNS [Slovak National Party] and have begun to seek the remainder among the ranks of the other entities.

Part of the leadership of the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left], strengthened by the personal responsibility assumed by the party's chairman for its electoral defeat, was inclined toward this cooperation. Incidentally, just last week, the HZDS came up with an offer of four ministerial seats and two state secretary posts. It is true that this offer was for specific members of the current government (B. Schmogernova, by the way, did not figure among them). The SDL Executive Committee adopted a reserved stance. It was necessary, apparently, to wait and see how the constituent meeting of the National Council turned out. Nonetheless, what then happened during the night of 3-4 November—in particular, casting doubt on the expertise of the left-wing democrats, even on those, as is known, who are closer to Kanis and more inclined to cooperation with the HZDS than to Weiss—seems illogical, to say the least. By all appearances, the capriciousness of vengeance prevailed over reason at the decisive moment among the leaders of this "minor nocturnal storm." Or, did they wager on an intimidating maneuver with the provision that, following it, the other side would be more compliant? Who knows whether they will succeed with this tactic. It is hardly possible to expect that the coming SDL Republican Council will succumb to political blackmail and

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accept the unfilled parliamentary and government posts being dangled in front of them.

And so, despite the schizophrenic assertions about one coalition in parliament and another in the government, which would, without a doubt, be a rarity, only the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] comes realistically into consideration as a partner for the HZDS, despite its two satellites (the RSS and the SNS). Afterbeing given posts in the legislative assembly, in the supervisory and privatization bodies, the ZRS has also received its first offers of posts in the state administration. Who knows how long the Luptakites will manage to resist them. It is true that the more a person becomes entangled in the threads of so-called tacit cooperation, the more difficult it is for him to discard them later.

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Horn Views Party, Domestic, Economic Issues

AU1411120294 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 11 Nov 94 pp 1, 12

[Interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn by Peter Vajda in Budapest on 9 November: "The MSZP Will Not Change Its Coalition Partner—Gyula Horn on Interest Coordination and the Socialist Party's Internal Situation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Gyula Horn wishes to make the mechanism of coalition coordination more efficient; however, he believes that the coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] will last four years. He does not consider any other versions of the coalition timely. He will take action if he perceives any criticism of the party's stated goals. He objects to the merger of economic and political power and the emergence of ownership and publishing monopolies in the press. Our correspondent interviewed him in his office on 9 November on these and other issues.

[Vajda] The method of governing is being sharply criticized both inside and outside of the National Assembly. Lack of coordination is part of this; for example, in the Coordination Council, the employees' side has very serious reservations, and it is doubtful whether it will be possible to create a social compact. What are your views on the possibility of this?

[Horn] On the basis of an agreement with the social partners, the government prepared a draft social and economic agreement in early November. We placed this on the agenda of this week's session. We will then immediately pass the draft text over to the two social partners—sooner than the deadline we set. Therefore, there is no obstacle to placing the social and economic agreement on the agenda on 18 November when the debate on the 1995 budget will begin.

[Vajda] Do you feel it will be adopted?

[Horn] It depends on the trade unions rather than the government.

[Vajda] Regarding the dialogue with society, you keep mentioning complicated coordination processes, while the operation of the coalition also requires a dialogue. How does this work, and how can you describe personal relations?

[Horn] We have given too much work to the coalition Coordination Council.

[Vajda] What does this mean?

[Horn] I mean that originally we said—and I would like to return to this—that an issue must be referred to the Coordination Council if Gabor Kuncze, the coalition deputy prime minister, and I cannot agree. Instead, Monday morning conferences have become a regular event. Many issues should not have necessarily been referred to the coalition Coordination Council. In the future, I will act in line with the conclusions I have drawn from this. At the same time, the two legislative groups should hold more meetings. For this reason I suggested a 9 November joint meeting, the results of which are known.

[Vajda] What is the situation in your own party? Various assessments have been published on the meeting at Nanasi Street, which had been preceded by the meeting at Benczur Street. According to the Nanasi Street meeting, the privatization law might not be so important. It was also said and, has been left without a reply, that the party's legislative group does not have enough information on governmental processes. The idea of an alternative coalition partner also emerged.

[Horn] I was not there.

[Vajda] Why not?

[Horn] Because I did not know about it nor been invited. Actually, I was in the National Assembly, and between all the meetings and talks, they could have reached me.

Privatization Must Be Accelerated

[Vajda] Do I understand correctly that you were not invited?

[Horn] I was not invited, but I do not find this strange. I might not have been able to attend. As a matter of fact, meetings like this are not something unusual in the MSZP's life: In the past, people meeting under some pretext would exchange views. Ferenc Kosa, who as far as I know was the organizer of the Nanasi Street meeting, said at a recent executive committee meeting that the MSZP must establish a creative workshop and background in intellectual life. One can only agree. According to the information I received, this meeting did not actually focus on this issue.

As to the questions you raised on this issue, I categorically reject the view that we do not need a new privatization law. It is needed. We will disseminate it to the parliamentary deputies and the National Assembly. We made our decision after reviewing many views and proposals; the issue will now be brought before the government. I believe the privatization process must be speeded up. The State Property Agency must conclude the 30-odd transactions that are in progress. It is privatizing another 100 enterprises, whose preparations have been completed. Some major packages like the MOL [Hungarian Oil Inc.], the production and sale of energy resources, and the privatization case of large telecommunications enterprises will be brought before the government on 17 November. Therefore, all these decisions have been made in the government rather than elsewhere.

On the issue of relations between the government and the parliamentary group, which was raised at Nanasi Street: At the parliamentary group's meeting last week, I

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reported on the government's work and goals and we agreed that we would make our links closer. This means that, in the parliamentary group's working groups, the ministers or state secretaries have to participate in the discussion of issues that affect their areas.

However, I could not—I would not like to—accept that, after the government has made a decision on some issue, it should again take it to the parliamentary group for debate before taking the issue to Parliament. We cannot do this and cannot accept this because it would very much slow down legislation. However, we agree to having coordination talks between the parliamentary group and the affected ministries until Parliament closes the general debate on the particular draft bill. As for the alternative coalition partner, to the best of my knowledge, only one participant mentioned this and without much response.

[Vajda] However, on television we actually heard a Socialist deputy, university lecturer Zoltan Daroczy from Debrecen, state that the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] could be the alternative coalition partner if the Christian Socialist ideology was expressed more clearly in this party, and if the SZDSZ decides one day to leave the coalition.

[Horn] I do not see anything extraordinary in this statement. I and many others have also said that if the necessary change in the above direction took place in the KDNP, then the MSZP would be willing to work join forces. However, I cannot see this being timely. We have clearly been very correct partners of the SZDSZ and will continue to have the same attitude in the future. Therefore, this Socialist-Liberal coalition will not break up through our fault. I repeat that I am not dealing with this issue; however, I am interested in the fact that cooperation between the coalition partners has to be improved. This is needed and I trust that this coalition will last until 1998.

[Vajda] Sometimes, one has the impression that your party's last congress did not resolve all personnel issues, because contradictory views prevail in the party's leadership, and perhaps even personal ambitions. Aren't you disappointed?

[Horn] Obviously, this leadership also consists of humans, but contrary to all rumors, I did not influence the congress's personnel decisions. I accepted the body's decisions. It is also a fact that personal ambitions do exist in the party; rather then their mere appearance, the problem is if they are coupled with confused values and if the ambitions are too high. Naturally, we have to realize that cases exist when people's self-esteem is higher than their real worth. This is a general human trait, we can often see it and not only in the MSZP. As for the existence of contradictory views, all I can say is that if I see the emergence of tendencies that are in complete contrast to our program and understanding then I will act most decisively against these.

Merciless Against Abuses

[Vajda] In one of your much earlier interviews to NEPSZABADSAG, warning about the influence of the lobbies, you said that the intermingling of the peaks of political and economic power has to be avoided. What are your views on this issue now? Concretely, in the written media—which is a political and economic power at the same time—can you see any danger for the emergence of monopolies in respect of ownership and dissemination that would place others in a disadvantageous position?

[Horn] Let us separate the two questions. One is on the intermingling of the peaks of political and economic power. My view is that none of the governmental representatives, ministers, state secretaries, namely state officials can be allowed to have any commitments in any economic associations, be it a state or a private company. In addition to this, we should by all means end the form of lobbying that has been rather typical in recent years, namely when certain deputies and economic leaders would exert pressure on the government to achieve special favors. It is extremely difficult to prevent this—no cure has yet been found for this anywhere in the world—but this does not mean that we should not strive for this.

[Vajda] This effort does not promise quick success.

[Horn] I should say here that the biggest problem for the government is caused by the fact that it is extremely difficult to find evidence of abuse and intermingling, especially when suspicion of legal violations or the abuse of laws is raised. Lengthy investigations have to be conducted and much research has to be done before this type of case can be closed. I am very dissatisfied with the speed of these investigations although we are constantly being warned not to come to premature conclusions. All I can say is that I will act mercilessly if I meet with abuses, even within our lines, or with the use of power for individual purposes.

As for the press, the emergence of monopolies would not at all be good for the country. This applies both to ownership and dissemination because, if monopolies were formed, possibly in both areas, this would necessarily harm those outside it. Therefore, this is unacceptable. Naturally, we are living under market economy conditions. The government cannot act in cases when the laws in force are not violated, however, it can have a say and an influence, and in such cases, it has to strive with all available means tc prevent the emergence of monopolies.

New Approaches

[Vajda] Mr. Horn, allow me another question and to change the subject. In a television interview, you termed the answers you received from Western statesmen regarding an extensive restructuring loan of 2 billion units [ECU] as hopeful. From Finance Minister Laszlo

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Bekesi's statement after his return from Brussels, it transpires that the West "steeled" itself on this issue. Do you feel any disappointment over this?

[Horn] Let me stress that I based my cautious optimism on the replies of the prime ministers of the 12 EU member countries. Not a single prime minister excluded the possibility of such a loan, and even the negotiations in Brussels were mostly promising. There was a debate on the amount of aid, whether ECU 2 billion or between 1 and 2 billion.

Let me make a subjective observation. Things will not be good if finance ministers start dealing in politics. This is what happened at the latest meeting in Brussels, because they said there that this would be a rather unusual setup, one that the EU community has not yet used. I do not understand why this is a reference basis. We come across a lot of new approaches and solutions in the world, and one must deal with them and it is also worth dealing with them. Therefore, I hope that this is not the last word on this issue. Unfortunately, behind this attitude lies the fact that neither the international financial organizations nor the EU has yet decided on efficiently supporting the Central-European region. It is a fact that the signals coming from Madrid and the statements made by the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank show that this region can hardly count on large-scale support. I am deeply convinced, however, that we cannot succeed alone, and they are at least as much interested in participating. I hope that the final word on these issues will be uttered at the Essen summit on 10 December.

[Vajda] Will you be there?

[Horn] As far as we know, the heads of governments of the associate member countries will be invited and this means that I will probably be there. I have never hidden my thoughts, and I told them in Innsbruck, too, the issues in which I suggest new ideas regarding this region; at the same time, I also take into consideration the fact that the EU itself is facing internal problems and it must settle its internal debates. If I have the opportunity, I will speak about this in Essen.

Prime Minister Says EU Membership 'Main Goal'

MS1111103294 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 11 Nov 94 p 30

[Report by Virginia Marsh including comments by Prime Minister Gyula Horn and by Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, Foreign Ministry state secretary: "Main Goal Is To Join the EU"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The overriding foreign policy objective of Hungary's new Socialist-led government differs little from its conservative predecessor: to integrate the country into western European structures through membership of the European Union [EU] and Nato by the end of the century.

Mr Gyula Horn, the prime minister, says EU membership is the main goal of his government. "This is a duty, a task of the utmost importance for us... Becoming a member means we will have been able to establish a social market economy and to comply with European Union standards and regulations. The other crucial factor is the security we think we can find in the EU."

The government is building on the work of its predecessor which, together with Poland and Czechoslovakia, signed an association agreement with the EU in December 1991 and formally applied for membership earlier this year.

Hungary, in common with other eastern European states, believes it is now up to the EU to reveal its timetable and conditions for membership. Mr Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, state-secretary at the foreign ministry, says: "The European Union does not have a clear policy towards central Europe. We hope this can be resolved at the Essen summit in December. Now, we hear different points of view, from party to party and country to country. This makes preparatory work very difficult for us."

The government acknowledges that Hungary and other countries in the region must reform their economies before joining the EU. But Mr Szent-Ivanyi says the EU should apply the same political rationale to eastern European enlargement as it did to members who joined in the 1980s and set its economic conditions accordingly.

He says: "The economic requirements for our membership should be formulated so that the most advanced central European countries have a chance to comply with them... Portugal, Greece and Spain were admitted due to a strong political will to give a hand to the new-born democracies in those countries and to help consolidate them. This was a courageous and clever step."

Where the new government differs from its conservative nationalist predecessor is in its policy towards neighbouring countries, in particular Romania and Slovakia. In his first speech to parliament as prime minister, Mr Horn said Hungary's most urgent foreign policy task was to eliminate tensions with its neighbours and negotiate basic friendship treaties with the two countries. Improving relations was the best way to promote the interests of the 2.3m ethnic Hungarians living in Romania and Slovakia, he said.

In a departure from previous policy, Mr Horn said his government would guarantee the inviolability of borders in the basic treaties—a guarantee upon which both Romania and Slovakia have conditioned bilateral agreements.

Despite Hungary's overtures, the chances of a rapid agreement have been lessened by political events in Romania and Slovakia since the new government took office. In August, a nationalist anti-Hungarian party formally joined Romania's ruling coalition for the first

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time. In September, nationalists led by Mr Vladimir Meciar won Slovakia's general elections and are expected to form the next government.

Foreign ministry officials concede these events mean it is less likely that Bucharest and Bratislava will agree to Hungary's demands for improved treatment of ethnic minorities. But faced with stalemate at the political level, Hungary aims to improve economic and trade links with the two countries. Officials say the effect may spill over in other fields such as minority and human rights.

In the meantime, Hungary will continue to press the Council of Europe and the European Union to provide greater legal guarantees to protect minority and human rights. Mr Szent-Ivanyi says: "This is not just a Hungarian problem. We believe it is a hard-core issue for all central Europe, from the former Yugoslavia to the Baltic states."

Countries in the region need western European support to help build confidence and overcome the "tremendous suspicion" which exists between many of them, he says. One way to achieve this might be to link applicant states' minority and human rights record to EU membership.

Kovacs Says Minority Protection Document Binding

LD1011194094 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 10 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft convention on minority protection has been approved by the foreign ministers of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. The document is likely to be adopted by all member states in January.

Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs also attended the conference. He told journalists that this document no longer contains recommendations, but will be binding on member countries. Thus, a complaint can be lodged with the Strasbourg Human Rights Court if any of the document's articles is violated, Laszlo Kovacs stressed.

General on Plans To Reduce Armed Forces by 20%

LD1411211894 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The effective force of the Hungarian Army will be reduced by 20 percent in the following years, Colonel General Janos Deak, commander of the Hungarian Army, told the "Newsreel" program. At a festive meeting of the force the colonel general introduced the new leader, Major General (Ambrus Csalinger) to the officers serving at the headquarters of the land forces.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] According to Janos Deak, personnel changes in the Hungarian Army are necessary so that the transformation of the army will be smooth. [passage omitted]

The commander of the Hungarian Army told "Newsreel" that the experts of the Ministry of Defense and the chiefs of staff are working on the concept of the transformation of the Army. It is already certain that in the future the Hungarian Army will be smaller.

[Deak] The concept of a Hungarian Army smaller than the present one is currently being outlined with a simple leading structure and a considerably smaller effective force.

[Correspondent] According to Deak, in a few years' time the number of soldiers will be reduced by four-fifths.

[Deak] I think that in a few years, the number of the soldiers in the Hungarian Army will be at least 20 percent less than today. [end recording]

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Olechowski Likely Winner in 2d Presidential Race

WS1411143594 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 14 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by Agnieszka Kublik and Piotr Pacewicz: "President Olechowski"]

[FBIS Translated Text]*Olechowski jumps ahead, Pawlak falls behind, interest is growing.*

The Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] has carried out its second exclusive poll for our paper on who Poles would support in a second round of presidential elections. There were five candidates in an "anyone vs. anyone" scenario, providing a total of 10 possible pairs.

Two months ago, our report was entitled "President Pawlak." This fall, however, has proved unfortunate for the peasant prime minister. In early November, Pawlak lost against Olechowski by as much as 8 percent, although in September he outpaced the minister by 10 percent. The prime minister has also lost his lead over his coalition partner Kwasniewski and even fell a little behind him. Could it be that Poles are disappointed with the budget? They did not like the prime minister's trip to the United States? The restoration of Smolarek? Perhaps they blame the prime minister for the chaos that evolved over the past few months—the conflict in the Army, clean hands, soiled hands?

Whatever the case, in four races, Pawlak lost by an average of 4.5 percent each time. Andrzej Olechowski won by twice as much, despite the fact that one week before the poll his name was placed on the Cimoszewicz list [of allegedly corrupt officials], and he presented a loudly echoed resignation. Perhaps the minister aroused sympathy as an innocent victim, who acted on principles of honor. Perhaps Poles have acknowledged his success in bringing Poland closer to NATO.

The remaining three candidates defeated Pawlak and lost against Olechowski. The increased popularity of Kwasniewski, Kuron, and Walesa (two more percentage points for each), as compared with September, shows that "voters" are now more decided.

The November "elections" raised much more interest than those held in September: 5 percent fewer respondents claimed they would not vote for these candidates. Average election "attendance" rose to 66 percent, but the level of interest differed from pair to pair: 74 percent voted when Olechowski ran against Pawlak, a mere 60 percent in the case of Kuron and Walesa. If only women were to vote, Kwasniewski and Walesa would fare much better. Olechowski proved to be the most "masculine candidate." Young people prefer to vote for younger politicians, older people for older politicians.

Who Would Win the Second Round of Presidential Elections?

	Percent Distribution of Votes	
	Nov	Sep
Olechowski Would Win Against:		
Kwasniewski	38:34	(29:35)
Pawlak	41:33	(30:40)
Kuron	45:22	(36:27)
Walesa	46:14	(39:14)
Kwasniewski Would Win Against:		
Pawlak	35:32	(30:34)
Kuron	39:29	(38:26)
Walesa	44:22	(41:20)
Pawlak Would Win Against:		
Kuron	38:28	(43:20)
Walesa	42:20	(46:15)
Kuron Would Win Against:		
Walesa	36:20	(32:18)

The above shows that if Olechowski and Kwasniewski were to make it to the second round of elections, the foreign minister would get 38 percent of the vote and Kwasniewski 34 percent (the remaining 28 percent would not vote for either candidate). The same applies to the other pairs.

* * *

The poll was conducted on 3-7 November by CBOS on a random sample of 1,237 adult Poles.

OPZZ Leader on Union Issues, SLD

MM1511111994 Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 8 Nov 94 p 3

[Interview with Ewa Spychalska, chairman of the All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement and head of the Democratic Left Alliance Trade Unionist Deputies and Senators Group, by correspondent Grzegorz Ilka; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ilka] The All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement [OPZZ] is not highly visible during strike actions. Is this the fault of the OPZZ's "incorrect" parentage? Or maybe it is caused by the fear of being accused of populism and antireform action? Similar accusations were very common after 1990.

[Spychalska] I do not believe these are the most important reasons. In our view, the strike action is an extreme measure, resorted to after all of the possibilities of solving the given problem through dialogue and negotiation have been exhausted. A strike often divides work forces, and, when it has been poorly prepared or when it fails, it can result in highly negative consequences for the

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work forces. Of course, it also happens sometimes that the fear of being branded an antireform union is a fairly significant factor. But it is more important that our organization's confederation structure does not allow for issuing directives or dictating things to others. Therefore, the decision whether to take part in a strike is also made at the level of the member organizations.

[Ilka] Is it not also the question of your activists' age? When we compare the Solidarity and OPZZ congresses, we can see plainly that the OPZZ activists are on average 10-15 years older than Solidarity activists: They are more sedate; you could almost say they are more bureaucratic.

[Spychalska] It is not like that everywhere. But it is true that there is a large group of older people. However, this looks somewhat different still at the level of enterprise organization boards. But leadership is usually discharged by a person of a "respectable" age. I have often wondered about the reason for this. I believe that the matter is quite complex. It is certain that a person like that will represent a guarantee that the organization's actions are well considered and balanced, although even that is not always borne out in practice. In addition, there is also a certain problem connected with assuming a paid post in the union, especially in organizations that are statutorily entitled to this as a result of the trade union act. This is because there are no guarantees that, after the period of being seconded to union work, union activists will be able to return to their jobs. Today, people value good jobs more than being seconded to discharge trade union duties with no certainty of future employment. So this is the second reason. And the third reason is this. Often in the trade unions, but not only there, we see the phenomenon of serving another successive term of office. If the reason for a repeated election were because the given member is successful at his tasks and has many positive achievements, that would be both desirable and natural. But it also happens that, in this way, the chairman of a union removes his potential competitors.

In the case of many supraenterprise union boards, the chairman is the representative of the the organization. It sometimes happens that chairmen assume certain censorship duties and fail to pass on all information to their colleagues on the board. This is a negative phenomenon, but we do not quite know how to oppose it. In a trade union that is homogenous in character, there is at least the possibility of interference. However, in an organization that is set up along confederal lines, as the OPZZ is, there is no such possibility.

[Ilka] The Third OPZZ Congress obliged the OPZZ Presidium to create an independent OPZZ deputies circle in the Sejm. But the OPZZ deputies are still grouped within the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] parliamentary party.

[Spychalska] We established the Trade Unionist Deputies and Senators Group because, according to parliamentary regulations, it is not possible to set up a deputies circle within a parliamentary party. A "deputies circle" is a term reserved for an institution similar to a parliamentary party but with fewer members. So it was not possible to set up a trade unionists circle within the SLD parliamentary caucus.

[Ilka] But the congress resolution mentioned the establishment of a unionist deputies circle, did it not?

[Spychalska] That is right, and, during the formal debate on the subject, there was not even one official vote in favor of placing the deputies representing the trade unions outside the SLD caucus. On the contrary, there was a demand that they stay within the caucus, but with a distinct entity as a separate group. So it is really only the question of terminology, although there was a rather stormy discussion of the subject during the presidium session. They were debating whether the congress resolution was actually being put into practice in that way.

[Ilka] The left-wing orientation has been saying that the SLD leaders take more notice of their businessmen than of their trade unionists. Is that true?

[Spychalska] You could not say that it is as simple as that. The business group within the SLD parliamentary party is not large, although it is quite strong. On the other hand, the trade unionists group is quite numerous, and, for this reason alone, the leadership of the SLD caucus, to which I also belong, must take note of our opinions.

[Ilka] Do you not believe that the paths of SLD politicians and SLD trade unionists will tend to diverge? That the program being currently realized by the government is very remote from the trade unionists' expectations?

[Spychalska] It is too early to talk about that, although trade unionists have repeatedly drawn successive governments' attention to the costs of the transformation, which most markedly affect the working people and the weakest social groups. We are doing it now, too, especially during the debate on the 1995 budget proposals. Whereas, during the debate on the 1994 budget we could still accept that it was necessarily a continuation of the policy pursued by the previous governments, this time, in the case of the 1995 budget, the present government is totally responsible for it.

We also have certain reservations about the work organization within the SLD caucus, although we know that it is very difficult to manage such a large team of people. In addition, it should be remembered that the SLD is not a homogenous political party but a kind of federation of many autonomous entities: political parties, trade unions, public and young people's associations, and so on. In such a situation, it is to be expected that differences of opinion will often occur. So it is hardly surprising that deputies come out with individual initiatives because it is quite difficult to work out a single SLD caucus policy.

At the moment, there are two such initiatives submitted within our team. The first is a recommendation to revise

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the compensatory pay increases act, and the second a recommendation to revise the employment and unemployment act. Three other initiatives by our deputies are in preparation at the moment.

[Ilka] And do the SLD caucus leaders approve of this?

[Spychalska] Not always. Some deputies favor the view that we should wait for the government's initiatives. But the government often delays coming out with such initiatives because it is often obliged to coordinate things between different departments. In addition, it must be admitted that recently we have been having a legislative "bottleneck" in the Sejm.

[Ilka] At the moment, work is in progress on the new constitution. The OPZZ deputies have signed the SLD's proposal for a new constitution that would accord the unions rather meager opportunities for taking action. On the other hand, the Tripartite Commission, supported by the OPZZ, Solidarity, and the government, has prepared a draft proposal of a parliamentary act on a new constitution that converges in many points with the "social" project that was submitted by the Solidarity Trade Union.

[Spychalska] I do not agree on all points with this view. We have presented our group's position to the Sejm quite clearly: We are in favor of a "social welfare" state, with an extensive catalog of constitutional social and public rights and freedoms. On the other hand, it is vitally necessary to empower the Tripartite Commission. In this respect, we can anticipate a serious "war" within parliament itself. If the commission is to discharge its brief in all of the ways expected by the different sides, it will have to be empowered not only to pass opinions but also to make legislation. But I am afraid that parliament will do its utmost to defend its own legislative powers. Nevertheless, if our proposed constitutional amendments were to be passed, it would then be a question of reconstituting the commission and placing it within the framework of the upper parliamentary chamber.

[Ilka] So, for all practical intents and purposes, on this question the OPZZ adopts a position contrary to that taken by the SLD and convergent with the Solidarity stand, does it not?

[Spychalska] It does indeed, and that is hardly surprising. A considerable role is played here by the convergence of trade union interests, regardless of the difference of opinion between individual unions. The position of the unions is just as important to us as it is for our colleagues from Solidarity or, indeed, from other unions. On the other hand, even within the SLD parliamentary caucus, there is a difference of opinion between deputies representing trade unions and our other SLD colleagues. This is because, for example, politicians are not happy about the increased role of the trade unions. Every politician and every political party would prefer to have the trade unions at their side in a supporting capacity rather than standing as their peers or rising above them. This is a natural tendency. So many disputes and controversies are taking place over this issue, and some of these are quite heated.

[Ilka] In the Strategy for Poland program, Deputy Minister Kolodko promises a 10-percent pay raise and a 7-percent raise in real pensions. But, at the same time, the Strategy for Poland document includes a broad program of cuts in social welfare and public expenditure, although this is not highlighted in discussions about Strategy. It embraces, among other things, changes in the system of uprating old-age and disability pensions and discarding the Group III disability rating, and changes in the health-care system. Even if the wage and pension increase indexes for the next four years are as high as Kolodko promises, will that growth counterbalance the cuts in the budget's social expenditure?

[Spychalska] It will not. We have made initial calculations, and we are waiting for further documents, but already our first results indicate that the increase promised by the government will not in any way compensate the proposed cuts in social expenditure. So we must express our anxiety about the expected decrease of the population's real incomes.

[Ilka] Even despite the fact that the left-wing orientation is in power?

[Spychalska] I am sorry, but, for the time being, this is how things are looking, although we do understand the limitations and the restrictions. The matter is not closed yet. The social consultation promised by Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko may turn out to be significant here, as may a social endorsement of his policy. Let us hope that his promises were not empty ones.

UW Criticizes Government Budget Project

WS1411155194 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12-13 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by Ma.S.: "Unrealistic Document"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Freedom Union [UW] will not vote for the 1995 state budget if its final shape remains as provided for by the government project. The opposition politicians object primarily to high taxes and the irrationality of the project's basic assumptions. According to Donald Tusk, deputy president of UW, "it is becoming increasingly difficult to say who the reformers in the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] are."*

The Union postulates:

—Immediately ceasing to raise all taxes and lowering the tax for natural persons from 40 to 30 percent.

—Allocating more funds to the state sector (education, health care), simultaneously limiting the periods for which the unemployed are entitled to benefits in regions where it is not difficult to find jobs.

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—Granting more money to gminas for housing bonuses and expenses pertaining to pilot projects.

—Allocating higher funds for internal and external security—that is, to the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Introduction of the above suggestions would require appropriating funds in the amount of approximately 20 trillion zlotys (Z) on both sides of the budget balance.

According to Janusz Osiatynski, who is in charge of economy in the UW shadow cabinet, his party will "analyze in detail all obvious and hidden subsidies for enterprises" at Sejm committee meetings and attempt to decrease them. The lowering of taxes for natural persons, as suggested by UW, would cost the budget Z13 trillion. Lowering the enterprise tax, Osiatynski believes, would encourage new investments, especially because "the current growth rate is falling."

As UW experts estimate, Z4.8-6 trillion will be needed to cover the housing bonuses next year, and the budget draft provides for a mere Z2.5 trillion. Local governments may thus run short of cash.

"Although it is normal that ambitious indicators are considered when constructing a budget, the assumptions of this year's budget are irrational," stated Osiatynski. He considers the forecast that inflation will fall to 17 percent in 1995 (based on the indicator from December 1995 to December 1994) as too optimistic. "The inflation rate will be higher by at least 4 or 5 points." Therefore, the former finance minister in Suchocka's government predicts that after seven to eight months the budget would have to be amended.

According to Tusk, this year's budget "describes in definite terms, in numbers, the process of slowing down Polish reforms." The main author of the budget is Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko, who may thus no longer be considered one of the "reformers within the SLD." "It is becoming more and more difficult to say who is a reformer in the SLD." This was what Tusk replied when journalists asked him whether it was probable that UW and the SLD might cooperate within one government in the immediate future.

Prosecutor Begins Investigation of Agrobank

WS1411145494 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12-13 Nov 94 pp 1, 11

[Article by Anna Marszalek: "Agrobank: Transfers to Nowhere"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The case of Agrobank is being inspected by the Warsaw Voivodship Prosecutor in Warsaw. Over the past few days, six complaints have been lodged against the bank at the Praga Poludnie District Prosecutor's Office. The Voivodship Prosecutor has taken over the case and included it among the investigations already under way. Materials concerning Agrobank were excluded from investigations on mismanagement in the Fund for Restructuring and Debt Redemption in Agriculture [FRiOR].*

The fund had more than 4 trillion zlotys [Z] at its disposal. The money was allocated to 24,000 recipients, the majority of which are unable to pay it back. Means from the fund budget were disbursed for debt redemption and modernization credits for farms and food-processing plants. Toward this goal, FRiOR signed agreements with four large banks and nearly a hundred cooperative banks, through which credits for farmers were channeled.

The prosecutor investigated several hundred credits (the bank was allowed to grant them from fund resources in amounts up to Z1 billion) extended by Agrobank and began auditing procedures.

Agrobank replied that it has already settled the credits. Currently, the prosecutor is waiting for explanations from the Ministry of Agriculture and the fund.

After the National Bank of Poland announced the suspension of Agrobank, five private companies and one individual notified the Praga Poludnie District Prosecutor's Office that they were cheated by the bank when it transferred money from their accounts.

They gave transfer instructions and received confirmation from the bank, yet the money did not reach their destination accounts. There were, however, confirmation slips that money had been paid out.

All people and companies that feel that Agrobank acted to their detriment are requested to contact the Warsaw Voivodship Prosecutor's Office.

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Senate Changes Status of Towns to Municipalities

AU1411195794 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 11 Nov 94 p 4

[Bogdan Iacob note: "Yesterday, The Senate Enriched Romania's Administrative Map by 10 New Municipalities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, the Senate adopted the draft law on declaring several towns municipalities, in the form it has already been approved by the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, the towns Aiud, Campulung, Dorohoi, Ramnicu Sarat, Medgidia, Reghin, Caracal, Campina, Radauti, and Falticeni became municipalities.

Committees Accuse National Bank of Falsification

AU1311210094 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 1 Nov 94 p 10

[Report by Lia Bejan: "Mr. Isarescu Accused of Having Falsified Data and Violated the Legislation"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Real Inflation Rate is 300 Percent Rather Than 70-80 Percent, While the State Deficit Amounts to 500 Billion Lei Rather Than 300 Billion Lei

The Chamber of Deputies and Senate Budget-Finance Committees have examined the balance-sheet report elaborated by the National Bank of Romania [BNR] on the financial situation and deficit over 1993 and the basic trends over 1994. The report issued then by the committees is signed by Marin Stelian (PDSR) [Social Democracy Party of Romania] and Gheorghe Branzei (PUNR) [National Romanian Unity Party] and offers the point of view of the ruling parties regarding the activity of the BNR.

The committees' document states that despite all fiscal and monetary restrictions, the inflation rate has reached a yearly 300 percent, although on the basis of such restrictive policies the BNR had pledged to cut it to 70-80 percent. Industrial production continued to drop over the first seven months of 1994 as compared to the same period in 1993, while the population's standard of living dropped in 1993 by 17 percent. The document also evinces the existence of a state deficit exceeding 500 billion lei, rather than 300 billion lei as specified by balance sheet report of the institution headed by Mugur Isarescu [national bank governor]. The parliamentary committees justify the figures established in their report by asserting that at the end of 1993 there were uncovered expenditures worth 200 billion lei, which—had they been included in the 1993 state budget—would have led to a state deficit exceeding 500 billion lei.

The principal problem of the Romanian economy, as mentioned in the committees' report, is the financial blockage of the companies, which should be examined in close connection with the monetary and loan policy [of the BNR]. The report points out the existence of a financial blockage exceeding 7,000 billion lei [as published], an amount that is more or less tantamount to the entire money supply currently in circulation in Romania. This proves that there is a shortage in the money supply, which has doubtlessly led to the fact that many economic companies resort to selling and purchasing in kind.

All this has happened while the BNR, according to the parliament committees' report, over 1993 made profits eight times larger than in 1992. In order to strengthen the eloquence of the report and justify the attacks against the BNR, the authors of the report have put together a quote from the BNR report saying that over the last years of the centrally planned economy [of the Ceausescu regime] the financial burden placed on the population endangered the "biological being of the nation," and the recent finding that over the past four years the standard of living has dropped by over 50 percent as compared to the years before 1990. Obviously, the principal culprit for this is again the BNR, as the monetary policy pursued by it has led to the continuous devaluation of the national currency. The parliamentary committees did not omit to declare that the BNR has violated the legislation in connection with companies' utilization of hard currency.

The document elaborated by the parliament comes three weeks following the meeting of the PDSR Steering Delegation, during which they criticized the BNR for the profits it had made and proposed to make the loan-granting policies of Romanian banks comply with the economic policy of the PDSR.

Bank Governor Rejects Falsification Charges

AU1411115394 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 4 Nov 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with BNR Governor Mugur Isarescu by Adrian Vasilescu; place and date not given: "Did You Falsify the Data, Mr. Governor?"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Mugur Isarescu Declares That the National Bank Is the Target of Accusations That Have Nothing to Do With the Law or Reality

Two documents are being circulated by the media: One is a report of the Court of Accounts, while the other belongs to the Parliamentary Budget-Finance Commissions. Both are copies. Both lack headings and seals. Nevertheless, certain dailies have taken them and published their contents. Parliamentary officials have made statements about them. Naional Bank Governor [BNR] Mugur Isarescu is accused of having falsified data on inflation, the budget deficit, and the regulation of the account of budget expenditure. So as to inform our readers accurately, we consider it appropriate to hear the view of the person accused. Mr. Mugur Isarescu consented to grant us the interview that we requested. Before starting, we agreed that he would answer all our questions without beating about the bush.

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[Vasilescu] Did you falsify the data, Mr. Governor?

[Isarescu] This accusation surprises me. Especially since they are also suggesting a violation of the law. It is not the obligatory duty of the BNR, as stipulated by the law, to calculate or compare inflation or budget deficit figures. That is the task of other institutions.

[Vasilescu] But the data in question, which they claim have been falsified (300-percent inflation and a 300-billion lei budget deficit, which is said to amount actually to 500 billion) do appear in the text of the BNR balance-sheet report.

[Isarescu] That is correct. However, I will say it once more, so that I can be properly understood: We did not calculate those figures. The BNR merely took them over to establish the necessary correlations among macroeconomic indicators and monetary circulation.

[Vasilescu] Did 1993 inflation reach 300 percent?

[Isarescu] That is the figure reported by those legally authorized to calculate it. So far no one has contested it.

[Vasilescu] And yet you are being accused for pledging in 1993 to cut inflation to 70-80 percent. How do you account for the discrepancy between 80 and 300 percent?

[Isarescu] I personally made no such pledge. It was a pledge made jointly by the government and the BNR. It was included in the reform program presented by the executive in parliament.

[Vasilescu] It is known that this program has not been achieved. Is this no fault of the BNR at all?

[Isarescu] It was our fault, too, of course! Nevertheless, if one is to talk about "culprits" (I am using quotation marks because actually the causes were objective), the list should be headed by the government, followed by the Finance Ministry, other ministries, the State Property Trust Fund, and so on. The most substantial part of the 1993 inflation was caused by the measures taken by the government in the month of May: the application of the value-added tax, the liberalization of luxury taxes, and the elimination of subsidies for certain consumer goods. This is what led to such a dramatic leap in inflation. These were objective causes.

[Vasilescu] Do you also put any blame on the BNR, which you have already admitted, between quotation marks?

[Isarescu] No! Although there are nuances here as well. However, one thing is certain: Is it the BNR's fault that it accepted cheap loans?

[Vasilescu] Cheap loans, you say? Along the whole spectrum of the economy, beginning with large-scale state-owned companies down to the smallest private companies you are accused of making loans more expensive! As a matter of fact, interest rates have skyrocketed to over 180 percent!

[Isarescu] That started to happen in the second half of 1993. The interest rates increased gradually, and did not reach the figure that you mention until January 1994. Now I can say that it was a good measure. It was the only way to stifle inflation. It is known that in summer 1994 we managed to achieve very low monthly rates: 1.8 and even 1.6 percent. This is proof that the monetary policy, as conceived and implemented by the BNR after 1 July 1993, has achieved its goal.

[Vasilescu] Who prevented you from pursuing the same policy in the first half of 1993?

[Isarescu] I could say that life itself prevented us from doing so.

[Vasilescu] Would that be a correct answer?

[Isarescu] You can be sure that it would. Let us summarize matters. Staple foods used to be subsidized. Thus, their prices were frozen but all the other costs of producers were continuously increasing, owing to the prices of other products, which had been liberalized. If we had liberalized interest rates as well, the companies in question would have lost all their capital.

[Vasilescu] Are you suggesting that the faults of the BNR were also due to objective causes?

[Isarescu] Not all of them. We also agreed in the second half of 1993 to lend at interest rates below inflation. It was only in 1994 that we began to apply a rational lending policy, based on economic considerations.

[Vasilescu] I repeat: The banks are being blamed because their high interest rates have damaged the economy. Practically speaking, all investment has been paralyzed.

[Isarescu] It is not the interest rates, but rather inflation that has paralyzed the economy. Fearing that the national currency will depreciate, people stopped saving. Consequently investment has fallen considerably.

[Vasilescu] Mr. Governor, I believe that the ball is again in the BNR's court. You have been discussing inflation but have carefully avoided saying even a word about the principal accusation against you, namely that inflation has skyrocketed owing to your alteration of the leu-dollar exchange rate.

[Isarescu] You are right, I have not said a word about that, because the reality is something entirely different. The changes in the exchange rate was consistently caused by inflation and not the other way round.

[Vasilescu] If it was following inflation, how is it conceivable that it actually pushed inflation to even higher levels?

[Isarescu] On the contrary, the exchange rate acted as an anchor for inflation.

[Vasilescu] Can you prove that judgment?

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[Isarescu] Let us resort to figures. On 11 November 1991, the unification of exchange rates was introduced in Romania. A balanced exchange rate was established, at 180 lei to the dollar. Since then, inflation has multiplied 17 times while the exchange rate merely 10 times.

[Vasilescu] This leap in the exchange rate forces us to face a grim reality: The dollar has become 10 times more expensive. That is, the leu has depreciated 10 times. The BNR is being accused of letting the national currency depreciate in a horrendous way. What can you say to this?

[Isarescu] The exchange rate is nothing but a price of prices. If the prices in our country were to increase at the same rate as in the developed countries with which we are engaged in economic exchanges, things would be extremely simple. Exchange rates would "float" within a narrow margin. Nevertheless, the truth is that while in our country—since 1 November 1991—consumer prices have gone up 17.8 times, internationally price increases remained below 10 percent. The discrepancy, which does not favor us, amounts to 17.7 percent. [sentence as published] Of course, not all of this discrepancy is reflected in the exchange rate, because not all Romanian products or services are connected to international exchanges. Thus, the exchange rate has merely grown 10 times, as a direct result of the discrepancy between our domestic inflation (a significant one) and world inflation (a small one.)

[Vasilescu] Do you mean to say that it is not the exchange rate that boosts inflation, but rather the other way round?

[Isarescu] Precisely.

[Vasilescu] Is the BNR cooperating with the government?

[Isarescu] Of course it is. The two would not be able to get anywhere without close cooperation.

[Vasilescu] Is this specific to Romanian society?

[Isarescu] Not in the least. At the Madrid conference of the IMF and the World Bank, they emphasized that in the transitional countries it is essential that governments cooperate with the central banks. Even our accord with the IMF was concluded between them, the government, and the BNR, after which it was passed in parliament.

[Vasilescu] Let us get this straight: What do you mean by cooperation?

[Isarescu] The correlation of the work, as established by law, of each of those three bodies.

[Vasilescu] There have been voices requesting that the BNR should be put under government control. Do you think that what they intend by that is to achieve better cooperation?

[Isarescu] Let us not delude ourselves.

[Vasilescu] Do you know the view of the government in that respect? Would it like to take the BNR under its control?

[Isarescu] I do not think that the government wishes to add to its problems by taking over the BNR. The voices that you mention were heard among the members of the ruling party [Social Democracy Party of Romania]. It is a political idea, rather than an economic one.

[Vasilescu] Let us return to interest rates. What do you think the government would do if it had the full authority to grant loans?

[Isarescu] No one can play around with interest rates. The money for the loans comes from the population and from profit-making companies. Would depositors accept financing unprofitable companies? No, you can be sure of that!

[Vasilescu] What is left is the BNR's money-printing machine.

[Isarescu] To print money without an economic basis is to increase inflation. Can the government afford to take such risks?

[Vasilescu] One last point, then: the profit made by the BNR. Would that be not tempting for the government?

[Isarescu] That has also been clarified in the meanwhile. The state takes away 80 percent of the profit. The 20 percent that is left is principally used to modernize the banking system.

[Vasilescu] When will we meet again, Mr. Governor?

[Isarescu] In 10 days' time.

[Vasilescu] Thank you.

SRI Demands Cash From Businessmen Abroad

AU1111145894 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 7 Nov 94 p 1

[Report by Claudiu Harceaga: "Emissaries of the Secret Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Several Romanian businessmen living abroad have informed us that they are receiving telephone calls from individuals who introduce themselves as "SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] emissaries," and demand that "certain amounts of money (in hard currency) from their businesses should be transferred to private bank accounts." In exchange for that they "ensure protection, which implicitly means immunity in case the firm in question knowingly or mistakenly violates the laws of Romania." It is should be noted that these "SRI emissaries" request that the said amounts of money should be legally transferred to the bank accounts that they specify.

In order to witness such a conversation, we travelled to Germany, to the headquarters of the MS company,

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whose owner is accused of tax evasion in Romania. The call received here was made by an individual who did not introduce himself, saying just that he is the owner of a building company in Frankfurt am Main, after which he requested that the owner of the MS company should (legally) offer a part of his company's profits to a gentleman "who works for the SRI in the field of transportation." In exchange for such an association, all his problems with the Romanian authorities would be settled and his protection ensured. "This is how I got away with it, too," said the unknown caller. "The Financial Oversight Body checked the books of my company's branch in Romania and caught me out with irregularities. That's when I called my friend at the SRI and he came over with a couple of guys. Within a few minutes everything was settled. I have had no problems ever since. So think about it; maybe you want to get away with it, too. I will call you again within a month, and if your answer is yes I will put you in touch with my friend, who is number two in the SRI. Anyway, as you can see, the SRI does not assassinate people the way the Russian mafia does," said the caller to the Romanian businessman. Then the line went dead and the contact man was supposed to call back within a month's time. Meanwhile the Romanian company owner cannot return to Romania because he would be arrested. For security reasons, we will not mention any names. The telephone conversation was recorded on tape and it was also witnessed by two others ready to testify under oath. It is also noteworthy that the individual who called was familiar with the name of the company owner, the business that his company is in, as well as the problems that he has with the Romanian authorities. What could his source be, if not his contacts with the SRI? That institution would be well advised to find out who these persons introducing themselves as "SRI emissaries" and making offers in its name really are. Especially since it could easily be verified whether the person who is "number two" at the SRI and is in charge of transportation issues could have such connections and be involved in such practices.

If the facts correspond to reality, the situation is quite serious. It means that the practices of the former Securitate has never been abandoned and that we might soon even expect assassinations. For it is known that the Securitate used to work abroad also by hiding their "agents" under the mask of heads of various Romanian companies doing business abroad. Also known is that it never displayed any scruples in committing crimes in cold blood to eliminate "the enemies of communism." Thus, with these practices of blackmail, here is a further domain in which we are coming to resemble the Russian mafia.

Expert: Safety Measures Violated at Nuclear Plant

AU1011210694 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 2 Nov 94 p 5

[Report by Lucian Cristea: "Danger of Irradiation"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpts] Gabriel Pascu, an engineer in physics, has made a quite astonishing statement to us, upon his own authority. He claims that for more than a year nuclear fuel has been brought to Cernavoda, for the nuclear power station, under conditions that violate security and safety norms.

Under normal circumstances, says Mr. Pascu, nuclear fuel could be brought to its destination only after an insurance contract had been concluded, which also implies that rigorous checks would be carried out [by the insurance company] on Reactor 1, the first facility to become operational at that nuclear power station. In his opinion, this shipment has been kept secret owing to certain technical deficiencies. On 15 April 1994, with the signatures of Messrs. Jeff Thomson and D. Delorme, a document was issued that mentions the lack of building materials, major alterations to the blueprints, the existence of some defects of the devices sustaining certain reactor pipes, and so on. So far no measurements could be made to determine the level of radioactivity in the environment. For reasons difficult to comprehend, various responsible officials have obstructed the activity of the environment protection laboratory in that locality!

Superficiality or Sabotage?

With Reactor 1 of the Cernavoda nuclear power station becoming operational, the RA Station [environment radiation measuring unit] located in that area was specifically intended to offer concrete data about the environment. Using domestic and international methodology, the most accurate measurements ought to be made over an entire year. Following this, they should be able to assess the contribution of the nuclear power station to the level of radioactive contamination in the area. Owing to lack of technical means, this has not happened. Over the past two years memoranda addressed to the LCRM [expansion unknown] in Afumati, as well as to the Environment Protection Ministry, have been treated with total contempt. From the methodology angle, the Cernavoda RA Station should have been fully completed and validated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, in Vienna.) However, the IAEA does not seem to display any intention officially to validate the station and, implicitly, to assume international responsibility for the measurements that it makes.

Hidden Interests

Here are the reasons that, in Mr. Gabriel Pascu's opinion, led to the boycotting of the Cernavoda RA Station: "Owing to the favorable circumstances existing in 1990, the Canadians negotiated the clauses of the contract in a savage way. Because of various interests, the budget intended for radiation protection measures were affected. When they talk about the security measures to prevent nuclear accidents, the directors of the nuclear power station make no reference whatsoever to those measures that are meant to be applied during the 'clean,' that is, the normal running of the station. The

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stance adopted by the IAEA with respect to the situation existing at Cernavoda is also quite ambiguous, although that body permanently exerts pressure on the governments of all the Eastern European countries running Russian-made reactors to have them shut down. Normally the IAEA should have sent an team of experts to approve the Cernavoda station, or, in the contrary case, to draw up a list of the measures that should be taken."

A delicate problem is the importation of heavy water. "Romanian- made heavy water is very good quality. Despite this, AAC [expansion unknown] is exerting pressure on us to import heavy water from Canada, as already used in Canadian reactors. In this context, the accident at the ROMAG [heavy water producing station] in Turnu-Severin seems no accident to me. Similarly, pressure is also being exerted for us to import fuel, even though such fuel is also being produced in Romania." [passage omitted]

Progress Made at Cernavoda Nuclear Power Station

AU1011210994 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 2 Nov 94 p 3

[Report by Ioana Burada, Claudiu Pamuc: "At Cernavoda The Consequences Will Be Seen in 30 Years"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The consequences of the Cernavoda nuclear power station becoming operational will not be seen for 30 years!" says Mr. Teodor Chirica, the director of the RENEL [Romanian Electric Power Authority] nuclear power group. Thought disarming by some, realistic by others, this assertion of director Chirica raises numerous questions with respect to Romania's power independence in the short term.

The Cernavoda Nuclear Power Station—A Strategic Objective of RENEL

In the short run, the strategic goals of RENEL within the nuclear power program is to finalize the nuclear power production facilities, principally by finalizing the Cernavoda nuclear power station. "We can start pondering on the rest of the program only after the year 2000," Chirica told us. After Unit 1 of the Cernavoda nuclear power station becomes operational—which will be in the near future—they will restart work on Unit 2. At the latter unit, work was halted in 1993 owing to a lack of funds. Currently Unit 2 has been 35 percent completed, and the majority of the technical equipment, the Calandria vessel [vasul Calandria], the pressure tubing of the nuclear reactor, the vapor generators, and so on, has already been installed. At Units 3, 4, and 5 so far just the civil construction work has been done on the blankets [anvelope] of the nuclear reactors and the machine halls, and over the next three or four years they are merely intending to do conservation work.

120 Metric Tons of Heavy Water of the Necessary 300

The principal supplier of heavy water for the Cernavoda nuclear power station is the ROMAG company in Drobeta Turnu-Severin. The heavy water-producing technology of ROMAG is based on the isotopic exchange between water and hydrogen sulphide followed by vacuum distillation. After December 1989 uncertainty about the carrying out of the nuclear program and the technical failures found at ROMAG caused experts to halt all operations at two of the modules of that factory. Module 1 began operations again in 1992, while module 4 is scheduled to run again this year. Investment and modernization work is being carried out at modules 2 and 3. In September, ROMAG delivered 40 metric tons of heavy water to Cernavoda, and they are to supply another 260 metric tons by the end of October. Currently Cernavoda has only 120 metric tons of heavy water.

5.9 Billion Kilowatts Will Be Produced

Despite all this, they hope that by the year of 2000 the Cernavoda nuclear power station will produce about 5.9 billion kilowatts, that is, electricity representing 9 percent of the entire electricity production of the country. The cost assessed for 1 megawatt of electricity put out by the station is $34. That assessment is also based on the fact that the amortization of the investment is achieved within 30 years. The price of amortization represents about 58 percent of the costs. Expenses to keep the station running represent 11 percent, those for the fuel cycle [ciclul compustibil] 12 percent, while those for repairs and maintenance, as well as works to decommission the unit after its lifetime represent 8 percent of the price of the electricity produced. They also included their profit, as well as the development taxes in the calculation of the costs, which add up to about 11 percent. These assessed costs are comparable to those seen in Canada, at the Ontario Hydro company.

Despite the fact that the studies completed over the past years on the development and restructuring of the electricity supply system of the country all reached the conclusion that "the finalization of the Cernavoda nuclear power station is a necessity," they have not generally allotted all the necessary funds for the financing of that project.

Uranium Could Cover Reactor Needs for 20 Years

AU1111080594 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 7 Nov 94 p 1

[MEDIAFAX signed report: "We Have Uranium for the Next 20 Years"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The currently existing reserves of uranium ore, considering our yearly consumption, may cover the needs of five nuclear power reactor groups of 700 MW each over a period of 20 years, says a report elaborated by the Ministry of Water, Forests, and Environment Protection. Qualitatively, the ore is similar to that of uranium extracted worldwide.

Ethnic Hungarians Protest New Slander Law

LD1011221894 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 10 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The HDUR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania] protests against the amendment of the Romanian penal code. Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest.

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[Bogdan] In Romania it will be possible to sing at the top of one's voice Nazi marching songs with impunity. However, to sing the Marseilles will result in imprisonment and to sing the Hungarian national anthem—which is also a prayer—will attract a three- year sentence. According to Gyoergy Tokay, leader of the HDUR group of deputies in the Romanian parliament, this is what will happen if the amendment of the penal code which has now been adopted by the Chamber of Representatives of the Romanian parliament remains unchanged. The amendment changed the penal code's ruling on the national anthem and flag of foreign countries.

Gyoergy Tokay and other HDUR parliamentary deputies, speaking at a press briefing today, protested against the possibility that anybody who, for example, hoists the Hungarian national flag or sings the Hungarian national anthem on 15 March [Anniversary of 1848 Hungarian War of Independence] may be punished by a prison term ranging from six months to three years.

The article on slandering the country and the nation is similarly open to broad interpretation and provides scope for abuse. It too was adopted and under its prescriptions a person who, for example, makes scurrilous remarks about Romanian roads, could face a five-year prison sentence. This was said by Ervin Szekely, deputy.

In regard to all this, Gyoergy Tokay stressed that during the parliamentary debate the pro-government deputies tried to prove that the Hungarians of Romania are part of the Romanian nation, whereas the Hungarians of Transylvania [said in Hungarian—Erdely] feel and profess themselves to belong to the Hungarian nation. They also insist on their own traditional national symbols, songs, and anthem.

It was stated at the press briefing that if the paragraph remains in its present form, the HDUR will appeal to the Constitutional Court.

Army Plans To Cut Back Personnel by 77,000

AU1411193694 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 11 Nov 94 p 2

[Oana Maiuga note: "Some 77,000 Positions in the Ministry of National Defense Will Be Cut by the Year 2000"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, 10 November, during the festivities marking the 135th anniversary of the creation of the General Staff of the Army, Lieutenant General Nicolae Schiopu, deputy chief of staff, delivered a presentation on the history of the General Staff. At the end of the speech, he said that by 1995 the Army will cut back its strength by 42,000 positions. The Army's reorganization will take place by taking into consideration the special conditions of European treaties and the specific hardships of the transition period. Some 77,000 positions will be cut by the year 2000.

He added that the Ministry of National Defense is making efforts to diminish the social impact of the restructuring of the Armed Forces.

Military Leaders Interviewed About Army

AU1411131894 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 2 Nov 94 p 3

[Interview with Romania's Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca and with Colonel General Dumitru Cioflina, secretary of state, head of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, by Marian Ivancu; place and date not given: "Restructuring Increases Confidence in the Romanian Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Romania's Needs and European Stability

After the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops in 1968, Romania realized that it can only rely on its own forces, that is, its economy, diplomatic arguments, and its Army. Romania's economic and political openness toward the West and its open emergence from Moscow's orbit, closed up the Soviet source through which our Army was being supplied with technology, usually at least one generation older than those with which the other "allied" countries were equipped and at least two generations older than the Soviet equipment...

After 1968, within a few years the national defense industry managed to ensure the necessary military technology in a 70-80 percent proportion. Let us not forget that we are talking about military technology conceived and produced by Romanian experts. In this period, some Romanian achievements in the military field were at the top of foreign military technology, such as: training and ground attack planes (IAR), control stick simulator training for fighter jet pilots, recoilless gun, armored combat equipment (for mountain brigades and for infantry), motor gun boats, and the infantry equipment.

But what about the soldiers? Their lives? As Defense Minister Tinca was saying, in the nineties the Army became "a maid" used for everything, such as building roads, canals, and for land improvement works.

After the revolutions in East European countries, the cold war was over and the relaxation of relations in Europe has become a fact. "The Paris Treaty" of 1990 sanctioned a new reality, namely that the signatory European states, the United States, and Canada pledged to gradually reduce troops and weapons to the limits necessary for defense purposes. Thus, a transition was made from aggression and suspicion to cooperation and confidence. In this context there appeared the Partnership for Peace (initiated by U.S. President Bill Clinton), the "Partnership for Stability in Europe" (initiated by French Premier Balladur) and the "Partnership for Development"—a true "causa causarum"—initiated by Romania's President Ion Iliescu.

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In accordance with the Paris Treaty, Romania is compelled to reduce the number of its active soldiers and the quantity of its technological equipment. In order to prevent the Romanian Army's reaction capacity and in order to cope with new technological gaps, the military must go through a process of restructuring and modernization, just like the whole of Romanian society.

In the wish to offer credible information about the reform process in the Romanian Army, we asked for the opinions of the authorized military and political personalities, who are aware both of the specific problems as well as ways to find solutions to the respective problems.

Let Us Think of the Future

[Tinca] Everywhere I traveled throughout the country, I was enchanted by the way people appreciate the Army. I fully share these feelings. It is a source of satisfaction but also of feeling duty-bound to carry out efficiently the stages of transforming and reforming military structures. On the one hand, we feel responsible for fulfilling all the missions with which the Army is entrusted through the Constitution.

I believe that the Army has a particular significance: It emphasizes the spirit of national reconciliation and national unity. Therefore, it is in keeping with our interests to cooperate and strive to maintain stability in this region and solve problems that crop up between us. We do not have to be concerned so much with the past or those aspects that sow or preserve hatred among us.

I believe that, while learning from the past, we should think more to the future, because the coming generations should live in greater understanding. I am sure of it. This is a spirit that emerges throughout Europe.

[Ivancu] Minister, what are the future plans for the Romanian Army? A balance requires also a forecast, the evaluation of one's potential. What are these potentials and how are you going to capitalize on them?

[Tinca] The prospects of the Romanian Army are good. Together with the whole country, we have a historical opportunity toward modernity and toward re-securing an older tie, broken against our will. On the other hand, I say with the greatest responsibility: this unique chance could be discredited by our mistake, because we do not always know how to halt disputes between us. We should by no means be concerned only with small, minimal goals that are available to anybody. And for the sake of small goals we should not lose sight of the future of the Romanian people.

I think that we should be more convinced about what we constantly affirm, namely that we care about our country and we want what is best for it. I believe that we should overcome certain obstacles, in a way psychological ones, and try to work by taking into account each side's ideas, even if it involves some confrontation. But not if it involves confrontation based on hatred. Our confrontation must be based on the wish to elevate the country to a better state and modernize it.

If we succeed in achieving this goal (modernization) in all areas, then the prospects of the Army, as well as of the other institutions of the Romanian state, will become reality. A country, a nation has the defense that they can afford. The stronger the economy is, the better the budget stock is, the larger the part assigned for the Army will certainly be. Only in this way can requirements for modernization and an increase in reaction capacities be fulfilled.

[Ivancu] Minister, can you give your word that, if the sound of the trumpet is heard, currently the Army is in a state capable of fulfilling its duty at once?

[Tinca] I have no doubt about it. I think that the sound of the trumpet does not even have to be heard. If a real danger is posed to the country, the Army will do its duty. The entire Army. As one person.

We Adapt to Requirements

[Ivancu] State Secretary, how does the head of the General Staff of the Army [SMjG] regard the future of the Romanian Army?

[Cioflina] The question is very comprehensive and requires a review of the road travelled so far and a prognosis of what is being aimed at through the restructuring of the military body.

As regards this process, we have an integrative concept, approved as early as 1991. The first stage will be concluded at the end of 1995. The second stage comprises the principles and goals of the reorganization of the Army up to 2000.

In the first stage, up to the year 1995, we have proposed to achieve a new structure, a new pattern to the National Defense Ministry. In this respect, the SMjG was established, and we established General Staffs of various divisions of the Armed Forces (ground troops, aviation, navy, and anti-aircraft defense of the territory in one single command). As far as subordinate echelons are concerned, some structures have been established that the Romanian Army did not previously have, namely those that belong to the relations with parliament, with the civic society, with mass media, or relations with the other institutions of the state. At the same time, the Romanian Army has showed a clear orientation toward cooperation with the NATO Alliance within the Partnership for Peace. All these structures have already been established and are functioning. They were established with efforts that did not require an increase of troops. On the contrary, they were carried out with a reduction of 10 percent of the command bodies of the National Defense Ministry.

As far as the operational structures (we call them combat structures) are concerned, we proceeded to the reorganization of the ground troops. For example, at the level of

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motorized divisions and tanks divisions, we are attempting to turn them into motorized tank brigades, while at the level of motorized artillery tanks we are attempting to turn them into motorized tank and artillery battalions.

The aforementioned new combat structures constitute the preoccupation of modern armies, namely to reduce their dimensions but, at the same time, also to increase their mobility and facilitate the operation of leading them on the battle field. Because speed wins battles, we have to adapt to this requirement.

In line with the same idea, we also intend to establish quick intervention forces. On the other hand, we will introduce transportation and combat means (thus, multipurpose means) with increased speed and with the capability of climbing greatly inclined slopes. We wish to introduce also new aircraft and helicopters for transportation purposes, with a lower fuel consumption, with greater transportation capacities, and with a greater range of action and increased speed.

For example, the group of helicopters that we currently posses will be transformed and perfected, thus it will become a class of multipurpose helicopters (for combat and transportation). As you see, we are aware of the fact that we do not posses such a developed technology and that we cannot afford important imports of military technology. Therefore, the major effort in equipping the Army will rest with the national defense industry.

[Ivancu] Colonel General, do you believe that the Romanian Army can fulfill its duty at any time?

[Cioflina] As far as the level of training, level of organization, level of equipment that we currently have is concerned, I believe that the big units of the Romanian Army are prepared to fulfill the major mission incumbent on them under the Constitution: To defend the independence, sovereignty, and integrity of our state.

Minister on Air Force Funding, Causes of Crashes

AU1011172094 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 3 Nov p 3

[Report by Dorina Baesu, Ana Maria Vintan: "Before the Parliamentary Defense Commission Gh. Tinca Declares: 'Fifty Percent of the MiGs Crashed Owing to Pilot Errors'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During yesterday's hearings in the Defense Commission of the Chamber of Deputies on the current situation in the Romanian Air Force, Gheorghe Tinca, the minister of defense, stated that 50 percent of this year's crashes of MiG-type fighter jets were due to pilot errors, 30 percent to technical failure, while the rest had other causes. General Sandulescu, the head of the Air Force Command, said that out of the 15 aircraft accidents that occurred in 1994 four were caused by technical failure and seven by the pilots' errors. According to General Sandulescu the pilots make mistakes because they are not properly trained owing to fuel shortage. Another reason for the precarious performance of the Romanian Air Force pilots is to be sought in their inappropriate living conditions (lack of proper housing, very low salaries.)

Considering that one of the principal causes of the disastrous situation in the Air Force is the lack of funds, the members of the Defense Commission asked Tinca why he had partly returned the amount allotted to his ministry from the budget. Tinca's reply was stupefying: "I couldn't spend the money" The minister could not spend the money owing to the blockage [in the economy].

They assessed that in order to improve this situation it would be necessary that 96 billion lei should be allotted from the 1995 budget to the Air Force alone. Owing to the fact that Minister Tinca and the other Defense Ministry officials were in a hurry, they were unable to answer many questions in connection with the disastrous state of the Air Force. Neither had they time to come up with solutions. As a consequence of this it was decided to continue their hearing in other sessions of the parliamentary Defense Commission.

Two Armaments Industry Officials Dismissed

AU1411193594 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 12 Nov 94 p 12

[Iulian Bostan note: "Two Heads of Romania's Armaments Industry Replaced"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Major General Rosca Maftei, director of the Special Directorate (military technology) of the Ministry of Industry was released from his post as of 10 November 1994," authorized sources from the Ministry of Industry told us. At the same time, Colonel Vasile Badea, general director and chairman of the Management Board of the RATMIL [expansion unknown] Autonomous Corporation, was also released from his post.

According to RATMIL sources, the dismissal of Major General Rosca Maftei is the first result of investigations carried out by the Court of Public Accounts.

Colonel Vasile Badea, the former RATMIL director, told us: "I am not going to challenge this order of the minister. Not out of fear, but out of embarrassment for others."

Forecast Anticipates Long-Term Population Decrease

AU1111155694 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 4 Nov 94 p 1

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[Report by Iulia Pacesila: "Romania's Population Is Growing Old and Slowly But Surely Decreasing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently the National Statistics Commission announced that the distribution of the population according to its sex is a balanced one: Currently there are 11,213,000 males and 11,596,000 females in the country. The acute problem of Romanian demography is the age structure of the population. A process of aging is to be noticed over the past 15-20 years. Fertility, the size of the younger population has dropped, while that of people over 60 has increased by 1.4 million. The trends observed over recent years have led to forecasts anticipating further drops in the number of births and an even more accentuated aging of the population. At the same time, compared with the 1970s, it has become increasingly difficult for the active population (people of working age) to provide for the elderly and children. The very high number of pensioners puts Romania in an detrimental situation compared with other European nations. The 1991 birth rate was 11.9, whereas currently it is 11.0, that is 11 children per 1,000 inhabitants per year. The death rate has increased from 10.6 (1990) to 10.9 (1991), and 11.6 (1992 and 1993). This increase may be explained both by the growth in the number of the old and by the current living conditions.

PUSD To Adhere to Social-Democratic Alliance

AU1011211094 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 8 Nov 94 p 3

[Clementina Filip note: "The Social Democratic Unity Party Will Adhere to the Social-Democratic Alliance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Social-Democratic Alliance initiated by the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front) [PD(FSN)] will soon enlarge itself with another member, namely the Social Democratic Union Party [PUSD] led by Nicolae Dide. The action is part of the efforts to unify the social-democratic movement and comes less than two weeks after two important events that took place in the Romanian political life: The first was the visit by a Socialist International mission to Romania, and the second was the "lightening" trial started against Nicolae Dide, after the accusations of the "senator of Butimanu" [Corneliu Vadim Tudor, president of the Greater Romania Party-PRM]. In this respect, a meeting was recently held between the PD and PUSD leaders. As one of the participants in the talks told us, the PUSD leaders particularly appreciated the way in which the PD understood to side itself with Nicolae Dide in this matter.

After the meeting, the PD and PUSD representatives agreed to conduct common political actions in the forthcoming period.

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UN, NATO Reportedly Discuss Air Strikes

AU1411204194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Talks between representatives of the United Nations, UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], NATO, and the Republic of Croatia about the situation in Bihac are underway in Zagreb. Nada al-Isa reports from Zagreb:

[Begin al-Isa recording] Present at the meeting are Admiral Smith, NATO commander for South Europe; Bertrand de Lapresle, UNPROFOR commander for the former Yugoslavia, and UN Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi. The meeting is (?also attended by) Croatian President Tudjman.

(?Although) details of the talks were not released, the (?main) topic is the catastrophic situation in Bihac. Bearing in mind that the negotiators are representatives of the UN, UNPROFOR, NATO, and the Republic of Croatia, we have learned unofficially that they are discussing possibility of air strikes by NATO aircraft against Serbian positions around Bihac, ending the aggression against Bihac from the so-called Serbian autonomous region of Krajina in Croatia, and opening of humanitarian routes for Bihac. Presence of Croatian president Tudjman means, the sources in the presidential palace claim, that they are discussing ways in which the Republic of Croatia could assist in suppressing aggression from its territory against the territory of another state.

Silajdzic Urges Air Strikes

LD1511000594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnian Prime Minister Dr. Haris Silajdzic, and Dr. Jadranko Prlic, deputy prime minister and defense minister, who are on a two-day visit to London, had a series of meetings today with political and cultural personalities there.

Dr. Silajdzic [words indistinct] with Douglas Hogg and on that occasion asked the official London to reexamine its attitude to the arms embargo against the Bosnian Army. However, despite all the arguments presented by the Bosnian officials, it is to be expected that London will continue to pursue the same policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state delegation yesterday held a news conference. Speaking about the situation in Bihac, Prime Minister Silajdzic expressed disappointment with the UN Security Council's reaction to the exceptionally serious situation in the protected zone of Bihac. The Bosnian prime minister called on the international community to use NATO air strikes to punish the aggression against Bihac. He also said that he expected Croatia to take action against the forces using its territory to attack Bosnia- Herzegovina. During a meeting with the parliamentary group for human rights, Silajdzic said he could not understand the decison to reward aggression by easing sanctions against the aggressor and in the light of a process of expelling non-Serb population from the territories occupied by force while at the same time Karadzic's Serbs continue to refuse to sign the peace plan.

Owen Criticizes U.S. Position on Bosnia

MS1411160394 London BBC Television Network in English 0815 GMT 13 Nov 94

[Interview with David Owen, European peace envoy, by David Frost in London; from the "Breakfast with Frost" program—live]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Frost] The U.S cessation of arms embargo on Bosnia—which is the development of the week in a way—certainly in foreign affairs. Douglas Hurd described it as worrying, how would you characterize it?

[Owen] Well it's bad, its bad for NATO, it's bad for the cohesion of the contact group nations, but it's not disastrous, and people are getting it in proportion, it doesn't mean of itself more arms will go through to Bosnia Herzegovina, but it does mean that NATO's most important member is not fulfilling its full obligations as a NATO member. They are not breaking the law by doing this at all, it's entirely a NATO issue, but everybody would wish it wouldn't have had to happen, and I think including President Clinton. I mean President Clinton is responding to congressional pressure and an amendment that was passed in Congress by Senator (?Nunn) who is a Democrat and a very powerful member and is incidentally a great supporter of NATO. So I think that hopefully that's the end of it and they won't push the President to unilaterally abandon the arms embargo.

[Frost] Could it have been handled a little better? I mean the surprise about the cutting off, the lack of sharing of intelligence for instance, I mean that was a surprise wasn't it?

[Owen] I think people hoped that it wouldn't cover intelligence, that the normal intelligence relationship would remain, since the intelligence relationship would involve senior NATO commanders, and since the Americans had said the people—their officers that are wearing a NATO hat can still continue operating as NATO, I think it may not be as damaging as was first thought, a lot of this will depend on how people interpret it on the spot, and these are people who are still working within NATO, within the collective alliance, and I have a feeling that it won't be perhaps as disruptive as it might sound.

[Frost] Could, in addition to intelligence, could the no-fly zone be in danger as well?

[Owen] I don't think the no-fly zone. The no-fly zone is shooting down fixed wing aircraft, it had to do it on two occasions. There have been no use of the Serb fixed wing

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aircraft in Bosnia Herzegovina, but there was this incident just recently and it's widely thought that they flew in from Croatia—from the United Nations protected area, and that it must have come from a Croatian Serb airfield, but that was not picked up in time to be shot down. The one thing of course that is going on all the time is helicopters, and they have all been using helicopters, the Bosnian government have helicopters and have a rather larger number than the Serbs at the moment.

[Frost] And in terms of what happens next I mean would they in fact be doing this do you think if there were troops with UN berets on—who were American on the ground?

[Owen] I think it's impossible to be sure, but I think it's hard to believe the United States would be wanting to so completely line themselves up with one side of a dispute if they had U.S. soldiers in blue berets. I think this has been one of the problems all along, the United States is taking a very forward position on what should be done, and many people feel that they are speaking as if they haven't been members of the United Nations forces and that is the problem, they are if you like taking public positions while not having to defend their own public opinion—what would happen if somebody were shot, a French or a British commander or politician is living all the time, indeed Bangladeshi or Jordanian, or others living all the time under the possibility of a very serious loss of life.

[Frost] What's the situation—we keep hearing Bihac in the news, how serious is that?

[Owen] Well up until about Thursday people were very worried that there would be a Serb attack on the safe area of Bihac town. Since Thursday it's got quieter and yesterday there was not much fighting, the Serbs' are about seven to ten kilometers from the town. Of course what has happened is the Bosnian Government forces having had a very big victory against the Serbs a few weeks back have now lost ground—and this very often the case that the confrontation line over a long period of time doesn't change much but there are changes from week to week. I don't think the Serbs have taken back all the territory, but the fighting in Bihac is causing great anxiety in case the Serbs would suddenly move on Bihac town, I hope they won't, a lot of pressure is being put on both Karadzic and people have urged president Milosevic to intervene to stop that happening. The other anxiety is you have the Croatian Serbs on the border so they can squeeze the Bosnian Government from both sides, but of course in this particular case the offensive started from the Bosnian Moslem offensive, they have gained a lot of ground, now they have been beaten back, not all the ground has been taken by the Serbs, but the Serbs are obviously intent on taking a substantial area, it may go north and north-west into [word indistinct] which was the area previously controlled by a Moslem leader who was in dissent from Sarajevo called (?Abdij).

[Frost] And what about the affects here? I mean some people say that if the Serbs can win back some more land for their honor as it were they might be prepared to accede to the map. Other people say but now the Bosnian Muslims will be so self confident that they might withdraw their approval of the map because they have got America's support, which of these things will happen, or neither of the above?

[Owen] Well, we don't know. I think that the Bosnian Serbs have shown that they are not patsies, they are still in a strong position and they are taking back some of the land which the Bosnian government forces won through. I don't think that Bosnian Serbs were worried to retake Kupres, Kupres was always going to be given to the Croats, I think they will be happy to let the Croats keep that, Bihac has been the main area. I think if the Bosnian-Serbs do as you say recover their honor so to speak—if any such word can be used in this ghastly mess and terrible fighting, they might be more ready to come to the negotiation table having had a fairly clear warning that they can't defend that very large confrontation line without making itself vulnerable to attacks from the Bosnian Government forces who are now much stronger, whose morale is higher, and who is better equipped and has more arms, and my own view is the Serbs would be absolutely crazy not to listen to their leader President Milosevic and ignore the advice of Dr. Karadzic the Bosnian-Serb leader and General Mladec. Their interests are in having a settlement and I have felt that for quite some time, this latest fighting has perhaps rammed the message home to more Serbs and perhaps more Serbs in Bosnia.

[Frost] What about the rumors this week in LE MONDE and other places that quite apart from the fact that apparently the Americans may have military advisors on the ground, but the suggestion was that in fact the Americans have been supplying weapons to the Bosnian Muslims via drops or whatever anyway?

[Owen] Well the interesting thing is today for the first time you have the Pentagon apparently confirming in the SUNDAY TELEGRAPH that they are effectively advisors, military advisors, now this is extremely worrying for all of us because it's been said by the Serbs for months and months that the Americans have been supplying military advisors, and I must say this has been the view of some UN generals as well. Now as to supplying arms—the Americans have been very adamant that they haven't done, there have been allegations from the Serbs that they have been supplying arms because of they claim aircraft flying at night, this has never been proven but there have been some suspicious air flying at night, but I don't think that this is anything connected with the Americans. What has of course been happening is people have been flying arms into Croatia, the main conduit for arms has been Croatia, Croatia has been ready to buy arms in the markets of the world—and frankly if you have got money these days you can actually buy arms, and it has no boundaries totally fixed and you can get them through, so the main arms supplies I think has come into Croatia where Croatia has then

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passed them onto the Bosnian government forces when their relations have been good. When they had the Moslem-Croat war for nearly a year no arms was allowed through by the Croatians—quite recently they were fighting them. Now that the federation exists we are seeing more arms going from Croatia to the Bosnian Government forces.

[Frost] And what is the message to NATO about all this weeks activities in terms of European defense?

[Owen] I think the message to NATO is to try and get its collective act together as soon as possible and I'm sure it will. The wider message about Nato I think is a very clear one for Europeans, and people have been saying this for some time, the Berlin wall has gone five years down, will America come into the collective defense of Europe in the same way now that the cold war doesn't exist, and I don't think they will. We need to remember the Americans only came into the First World War in 1917, they only came into the Second World War when they were bombed in Pearl Harbor and we had already had our moment of greatest peril in 1940. I don't think we can go on relying on America, nor we should we they have got worldwide responsibilities, on having quite the same commitment to European defense, and I think the lesson of that is the Western European Union and intergovernmental defense organization—European based will have to be strengthened. I think that Britain is going to play a much wider and more deeper role in Western European Union and in European defense within Nato in a broad sense than they have ever done before, and one of the things that has come out of this awful war in Bosnia is a much closer Anglo-French relationship both politically and in military terms.

[Frost] Which will be preceded this week probably at the summit on Friday at the end of this week. In terms of British troops out there right now, obviously on the basis of this they don't have to withdraw, but when would we have to withdraw our troops or all the UN troops?

[Owen] Well that is a decision which will be made by either the UN itself or perhaps made by individual governments in Europe. It's quite clear in Europe and indeed in all the main contributory countries that if the arms embargo is lifted then the UN troops must come out, and indeed a lot of the aid workers the UNHCR and other people would have to come out as well. I think this is a very troubling situation were that to happen, my own view is that Americans will not unilaterally lift the arms embargo before the spring...

[Frost, interrupting] Not before the spring?

[Owen] Not before the spring. I personally think that if there is no peace settlement it will be almost impossible to stop the Americans supplying arms by next spring, I think the UN will come out and I don't think we will find if there's no settlement that the UN is there for a fourth winter. Frankly each winter has been harder to do, the UN was welcome the first winter, harder the second winter, each side wants to suck them in and say we are the right people, you are our friend, the UN can't be the friend nor can it be the enemy if either of the sides, it has to be impartial, they don't like this when the UN is impartial you can only see the quite unjustified criticism going for General Rose the whole time. They have to be impartial, their impartiality is very difficult to do, this winter we might struggle through, I hope we do, but frankly I don't think we can do a fourth winter.

Serb Sources Confirm Mladic 'Seriously Ill'

AU1411215094 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 14 Nov 94

[Matej Surc report from Belgrade]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to Serbian information, confirmed by the bureau of the self-styled Srpska republic in Belgrade, the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is about to disintegrate and Bihac is expected to fall in the Serbian hands in a matter of hours. [passage omitted]

Military cooperation between Martic [president of the republic of Serbian Krajina] and Karadzic [president of the Srpska republic] is definitely a new element in the Bosnia-Herzegovina war to which the international community has not yet found an answer. Zagreb is threatening aggression against the Serbian Krajina, but the Croats have their hands more or less tied as the generals from Knin would answer to a Croatian incursion with medium-range missiles aimed at Zagreb and other major Croatian towns. [passage omitted]

The bureau of the self-styled Srpska republic in Belgrade today confirmed rumors that General Mladic was seriously ill. He is suffering blood pressure problems. For this reason General Manoljo Milovanovic is standing in for him. [passage omitted]

Contact Group: Serbs 'Isolated,' Lacking Fuel

AU0811133594 Paris AFP in English 1307 GMT 8 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Nov 8 (AFP)—Three members of the international contact group on Bosnia have confirmed to NATO officials here that Serb troops in Bosnia were losing ground and becoming increasingly isolated, Alliance officials said Tuesday.

They said representatives from Britain, Germany and the United States testified Monday for about an hour in front of the North Atltantic Treaty Organization Council on interviews the contact group had over the weekend with UN officials in Bosnia.

They said the Serbs were "completely isolated" and unable to react quickly with their tanks mainly because of a lack of fuel.

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Alliance sources said those findings were "encouraging" as they may force the Serbs to finally accept an international peace plan thrashed out by the contact group which also includes France and Russia.

But the sources added that the situation on the ground was still worrisome because the Serbs "could react in an irrational manner."

The mainly Moslem Bosnian Army has made significant territorial gains in recent weeks capturing towns under Serb control.

U.S. Said To Be Airdropping Arms to Muslims

AU1411204294 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 11 Nov 94 p 4

[Report by Sl. Pesevic: "Americans Supply Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The army of the Srpska republic is continuing to score successes in the fighting around the Bihac pocket, where—according to the command of the 2d Krajina Corps—two of the most elite units of the Muslim 5th Corps, the 501st Bihac Brigade and the 505th Buzim Brigade, have been completely routed. [passage omitted]

"The Muslims have modern weapons, mostly of U.S. manufacture. All these stories about the arms embargo against the Muslims are just a farce. I would be happy if they were to lift the arms embargo finally so that at least I would know what is what." This is what Major Manojlo Milovanovic, chief of staff of the Srpska republic army, told yesterday's GLAS SRPSKI from Banja Luka.

Milovanovic added that the members of the Srpska republic army got most of their weapons and ammunition on the front along the Una River from the Muslims.

"We capture them. They are still getting supplies airdropped to them. In the village of Kuciste, I myself found a packet of ammunition for a 12.7-mm Broving in a tin box dropped from the air. It says that it is U.S. made. Therefore, the Americans are involved in this war," Manojlo Milovanovic said.

Serbs Claim NATO Planes Supporting Muslims

LD1411201494 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The enemy has carried out ferocious offensive actions on the Ozren-Vozuca front. From the direction of Zavidovici they launched a number of heavy infantry attacks in an attempt to penetrate Serb defense lines.

Muslim attacks in the area are being carried out with increasingly overt support by NATO planes and heavy artillery support from several Muslim strongholds. In the latest attacks the Muslims fired a large number of destructive shells including eight filled with poison gas. In addition to considerable fresh damage to buildings, over the last two days nine civilians were killed and several injured.

Abdic Sends Refugee 'Reinforcements' to RSK

AU1411164194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Nov 94

[Nada al-Isa report from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] A group of refugees was already on its way to Kladusa when it was intercepted by armed supporters of Fikret Abdic and forcefully brought back to Turanj and Batnoga. Then they separated all men between 15 and 45 and sent them to Knin as reinforcements to the Serbian aggressor's paramilitary. Fikret Abdic was convinced, as we have learned, that the Serbian rebels from Kordun would take Kladusa and he, thus, forced all his supporters capable of military service and even those who resisted it, to help the Serbs in their planned takeover of Kladusa. However, as it is known, Kladusa is free and will remain so.

Refugee Kladusa residents continue to [word indistinct] on the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia.

According to our information, Fikret Abdic on this (?occasion) alone mobilized approximately 3,000 men. They were all forced to take arms. Those who refused, and their families, remained without food.

Many attempt to avoid mobilization by swimming across the River Korana near Karlovac. Many drowned doing so.

As we have learned the UN Protection Force is observing this forceful mobilization but does nothing.

Thousands of Mojahedin Arrive as Reinforcements

LD1411142894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1325 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 14 Nov (TANJUG)—About 3,000 mojahedin from Islamic countries arrived in the port of Ploce at the beginning of November as reinforcements for the Muslim army, TANJUG was told by Serb military sources today.

This information, obtained by the Serb side from several sources, was also corroborated by Croats who escaped from Zepce and crossed over into Serb territory on Saturday.

Serb military sources recalled that "it is an established fact that foreign mercenaries posing as alleged Islamic warriors are engaged by the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army."

They added that the Serb side is in possession of operational data on "these warriors, their centers and activities."

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According to testimony given by the Croats from Zepce, "the contingent of the recently arrived Mujahedin was transported to the Zenica area" and enlisted in the ranks of the 3d Corps. They claim that the majority of the mercenaries joined the Bosna operational group in Zavidovici.

According to the escaped Croats, whose statements were cited by Serb military sources, "some of the muoahedin are accommodated in the elementary school building in Gostovici—a Serb village north of Zavidovici—whose inhabitants were either killed or fled at the beginning of the war."

The Serb military sources also quoted the escaped Croats as saying that "fear has settled in among the newly arrived muoahedin" because of the "ghastly experiences of their predecessors" who perished in the fighting against Serb forces and "the knowledge about the great losses suffered by the Muslim army" in the operational zone of the 5th Corps of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

The escaped Croats also said that "the mojahedin arrived in the Zenica area with arms and equipment of foreign origin." They pointed out that "there is no blockade for the Croats and Muslims on the Adriatic and there never will be."

Army Destroys Serb Tanks, Advances in Kalesija

AU1511103394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 15 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the last 24 hours, the Serbian aggressor has been attacking the free Kalesija territory. The tragic outcome of these chetnik attacks are two dead and nine wounded civilians. In a counterattack, the brave defenders of Kalesija liberated another 10 square kilometers of territory, destroyed two chetnik tanks, and liquidated eight aggressor soldiers.

Army Inflicts 'Major Losses' on Zavidovici Front

AU1511101094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 15 Nov 94

[Unidentified reporter from the Press Center of the 3d Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The defense lines of the 3d Corps were fiercely attacked on almost all parts of the front (?last night). A particularly fierce attack was launched on the Zavidovici-Vozuca front, where a dozen fierce (?artillery) attacks were launched in the course of the day. Almost every kind of artillery weapon was used. The newly liberated lines west of Vozuca and the 715 Elevation were subjected to particularly heavy artillery attacks. [words indistinct] toward the urban part of Zavidovici, which was hit by several shells fired from the direction of (?Bliza). In all these attacks the aggressor suffered major losses but is still not giving up the reserve corridor. The fighters of the 3d Corps are repelling all attacks and are pushing the aggressor back to his initial positions. [passage omitted]

Muslim Fighters Conquer Territory Near Ribnica

AU1411163694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The River Krivaja valley reverberated with explosions. It was an unprecedented artillery-infantry duel. The counterattack of the fighters of 119th, 121th, 220th, 216th, and 215th Chivalrous Brigades of the 6th East Operations Group was planned, synchronized, and swift. The usual chetnik retreat ensued. The crossroad in Ribnica was controlled by Vozuca chetniks from Bradinje and [word indistinct], and chetniks from Krajina and the Bosnian Sava Basin.

Documents found on dead chetniks show that this lot was from the so-called Novi Grad [Bosanski Novi], Prnjavor, and Bosanska Gradiska; the locals came from Kalajis, Miljevic, Predrag, and Jelitic.

The so-called Srpska republic is defended by green 14-year-olds and bloody-handed old fogies of 60 or more. Kilometers of territory, domineering installations, and several villages in the Ribnica area, have been newly liberated.

The fighters of the 119th Brigade would not allow the newly liberated territories to be measured in kilometers yet, as things are not going to stop here. Chetniks have been posted where they thought they were the strongest. The joint units of the 6th East Operations Group and 2d Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army from [word indistinct] created excellent conditions for further progress toward Vozuca. They do not wish to dig in, but say: We are going further.

We intercepted a radio message by an officer of the so-called 4th Serbian Ozren Light Brigade that graphically illustrates the full complexity of the situation in which the rebel Vozuca Serbs have found themselves. [word indistinct]

Early in the evening, the fighters of the 119th Brigade repulsed a very powerful attack of the chetnik forces. Fierce fighting in the south access to Vozuca has continued today. This was [words indistinct] reporting from Banovici for Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croatia Threatens Military Intervention in Bihac

LD1411212994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2115 GMT 14 Nov 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov. 14 (TANJUG)—Croatian Ambassador Darko Bekic said Monday Croatia would directly intervene to prevent the fall of the Muslim town of Bihac in northwestern Bosnia.

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Bekic, the Croatian ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), said this would be necessary if the international community did nothing to prevent the fall of this Muslim enclave in northwestern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Speaking at the permanent CSCE committee in Vienna, Bekic said Croatia was obliged to do this under the Washington agreement on a possible confederation between the Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia and Croatia, especially the article on mutual military aid.

The Washington agreement was forged in March 1993 as a result of pressure from the United States on the then bitter opponents—Muslims and Croats—who fought in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Bekic accused the republic of Serb Krajina that its soldiers were taking part in the fighting near Bihac. He said Croatia would try to arrive at a peaceful settlement in the talks in Zagreb on Tuesday with Krajina representatives.

The republic of Serb Krajina was proclaimed by Serbs in their ancestral lands in 1991 after Croatia forcibly seceded from the former Yugoslav federation.

Krajina, which is a United Nations protected area, and Croatia border with the Bihac pocket in Bosnia.

Bekic said it would be extremely difficult for the Croatian Government, if not even impossible, to continue to respect the articles of the Zagreb ceasefire agreement if no progress was achieved and if the fall of Bihac became inevitable.

The Muslim Army more than two weeks ago launched an offensive against the Bosnian Serb army from Bihac, an allegedly U.N.-protected safe area. The Serb forces are now crushing this offensive.

The Srpska republic was proclaimed by Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the local Muslims and Croats opted for secession from former Yugoslavia in early 1992. Bekic said he hoped the international community would make it unnnecessary for Croatia to provide direct help to the Muslim Army.

Some 12,000 Serb Troops Surrounding Bihac Region

AU1511094794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 15 Nov 94

[Report by Mirza SAdikovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] From their strongholds on Mount Pljesevica in the so called SAO [Serbian autonomous region] Krajina, the chetniks fired 12 Volhov missiles at the Cazin and Bihac areas and the newly liberated settlements in the Bihac municipality between 1600 and 2200 GMT last night. Material damage is enormous and a large number of civilians were wounded and killed. The information on casualties is still incomplete.

This is indeed the crown of the chetnik bestiality and their forceful response to everything that the international community is supposed to be doing to stop the killing of civilians in the UN protected area from the territory of another state.

Artillery, tank, and infantry attacks by Karadzic's and Martic's chetniks on the defense lines throughout the 5th Corps theater of operations continued all through yesterday, and especially overnight and this morning. The chetniks are trying intensively to breach the defense lines with their infantry from the direction of Bosanski Petrovac and Bosanska Krupa. They are also intermittently attacking from the so-called SAO Krajina, where they are being helped by Fikret Abdic's rebels.

We have learned from very reliable sources that local residents of Licko Petrovo Selo and Plitvice even tried to organize a protest rally against the attacks by Martic's chetniks and increasingly open participation in attacks on the Bihac region, something the local leadership is trying to conceal without much success.

Captured chetniks and documents clearly show that this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina is currently being attacked by some 12,000 chetniks from Zvornik, Bijeljina, Herzegovina, and the entire so- called SAO Krajina. The operations are personally being overseen by war criminal Manojlo Milovanovic.

The war drama unfortunately continues in the Bihac region.

NATO Rejects Humanitarian Air Drops for Bihac

AU1411201094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Air drops of humanitarian aid to Bihac are not possible for security reasons, Chris Janowski, spokesman of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] for Bosnia-Herzegovina, said at today's news conference, even though urgent delivery of humanitarian aid to the residents of the Bihac UN protected zone from the air had been agreed during the meeting between Ejup Ganic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and Federation vice president, with Yasushi Akashi last weekend.

According to Janowski, the NATO command for the southeast Mediterranean assesses that the security situation is not good enough to carry out this operation, [word indistinct] Serbian air force (?from) the air space of the Republic of Croatia.

'Crucial Battle' Underway

AU1411144794 Paris AFP in English 1311 GMT 14 Nov 94

[By Francis Curta]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 14 (AFP)—A "crucial battle" was underway in western Bosnia Monday as Serb forces closed in on Bihac after recapturing 80 percent of the territory earlier lost to Moslem-led forces, according to reports here.

Fighting raged on the Grabez plateau high ground just east of Bihac town with Serbs Monday morning shelling one of the town's suburbs, in violation of its UN-declared safe area status, UN Protection Force spokesman Lt.-Col. Tim Spicer said here.

"Significant" shelling targetted the suburb of Orljani, two kilometers southeast of Bihac town, between 4 a.m. and 8 a.m., UN officers said.

There were no immediate reports of casualties and it was not known whether the shelling was carried out by Bosnian Serbs, or their ethnic Serb allies from Croatia, just across the border.

An UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] spokesman in Zagreb said Monday that two unidentified aircraft flew over Bihac Sunday and that explosions were heard after they went over. But Bangladeshi UN troops on the spot were unable to determine the origin of the blasts.

On Sunday, the UN Security Council called on the warring parties to refrain from any action that could trigger an escalation of fighting around the Moslem-held enclave in western Bosnia.

The council also stressed "the significance of its resolutions on safe areas" and demanded that all concerned make their implementation possible.

Sunday evening, there was also heavy shelling of the Grabez plateau.

Moslem-led government forces broke out of Bihac enclave three weeks ago, rolling back Bosnian Serbs forces and capturing 250 square kilometers (100 square miles) of territory.

But the Serbs, who have launched a strong counter-offensive, have since nearly returned to the previous confrontation lines, Spicer said.

Asked what UNPROFOR's response would be to further Serb advances in Bihac, Spicer said that "in military terms, as long as they don't attack the safe area, actually not a lot, apart from persuasion and protest."

UNPROFOR would however seek to "discourage" Bosnian Serbs from crossing the Una River.

Bosnian government forces currently control the eastern side of the Una River in the Bihac area.

Another UNPROFOR officer said that while attacks against civilians inside Bihac town, defined as an 80 square kilometer area, would be in violation of the UN safe area, there was nothing to prevent Serbs from fighting their way into the town if they were only battling Moslem-led forces.

There are some 208,000 civilians in the Bihac pocket, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, but it was not known how many were in the Bihac town safe area.

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic Friday said he did not recognized Bihac as a safe area.

"Bihac has never been a safe area according to the rules of war," he said, adding that Moslem-led forces had been using UN-declared safe areas as launching pads from whch to attack Serbs.

"We shall disarm the 5th Corps and create our own safe area" in the area, he said, adding: "There will be no more Moslem armed forces in the Bihac pocket."

Bosnian Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic said Bihac was "a crucial battle" for Bosnia.

The Serbs have launched their greatest offensive since the beginning of the war 31 months ago, fielding 20,000 men, he told AFP Monday.

Speaking of Sunday's security council meeting, he said his government had "not noticed any concrete measures" by the UN to deal with the situation.

But he said he expected the Security Council to take additional steps, notably to prevent Serbs in neighbouring Croatia from invading Bihac.

UNPROFOR, he added, was willing to extend the no-fly zone over Bosnia to the Serb-held Krajina region of Croatia, he also said, adding that this would have to be decided by the Security Council.

However the Security Council has not yet responded to a Croatian request for Krajina to be included in the area liable for NATO air- strikes.

Croatia was willing to help the Bosnian Government, but "not by concrete military action", Ljubijankic also said.

The Bosnian Army Monday said Serb forces were only five kilomters (three miles) from Bihac town and accused Croatian Serbs of pursuing attacks on Bihac in support of their Serb allies across the border.

Bangladeshi UN troops in Bihac reported heavy fighting Monday and said they were unsure how long they could hold out. The 1,220 Bangladeshis have been blocked in Bihac for two weeks and are running out of food and fuel.

Cazin Reportedly Hit by Missiles From Krajina

LD1411221094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a fresh report from Bihac by Mirza Sadikovic:

[Sadikovic] Before the very eyes of the world public the chetniks [word indstinct] from UNPA [UN Protected Area] zones of Croatia or rather the so-called SAO [Serb

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autonomous region] Krajina have shelled Cazin, hitting the town's wider area with three missiles of the (?warthog) type and the outlying areas with another two. Enormous damage has been caused and, in brief, Cazin can be described as: ruins, civilian casualties, and burned houses. It is still impossible to obtain any more detailed reports.

At the same time that Cazin was rocketed, a heavy artillery and tank attack was carried against Bihac and the outskirts. This attack was repeated several times during the early evening. Artillery-tank and infantry attacks against the defense lines did not stop throughout the day. Thousands of shells pounded the forward defense positions with infantry attacks coming in waves. The heroes of the 5th Corps are managing to resist the aggressor inflicting losses in his ranks. That the Bihac district, the UN protected zone, is currently being attacked by over 10,000 chetniks from Zvornik, Bijeljina, Knin, and the whole of the so-called SAO Krajina and parts of Herzegovina has been confirmed by captured chetniks and documents found on them.

Several people from Licko Petrovo Selo [in Serb-held Croatia] have also made claims about direct attacks from the so-called SAO Krajina. They also spoke about attempts to organize meetings to protest against the participation of the army of the so-called SAO Krajina in the attacks on Bihac.

Shortly before this dispatch the chetniks renewed their artillery attack on Bihac. The wider area of the (?municipality) has also been attacked by missiles. This has prevented us from obtaining any more extensive reports on it.

All in all, the drama of Bihac district will continue during yet another, perhaps the most difficult night, of the war.

UNPROFOR Reports Missiles Fired at Cazin

AU1511085494 Paris AFP in English 0843 GMT 15 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 15 (AFP)—Ten surface-to-air missiles slammed into the Moslem-held town of Cazin and surrounding area in western Bosnia amid continued heavy fighting around Bihac enclave, a UN Protection Force spokesman said Tuesday [15 November].

The SA-2 missiles, used as ground artillery, were fired Monday evening from an area to the east of town, controlled by Bosnian Serbs, Major Mohamed Bashir-Ugdin reported from the UN Bangladeshi headquarters in the enclave.

Sarajevo radio said there had been many casualties, but this could not immediately confirmed.

The missiles badly damaged at least one building and shattered numerous windows.

Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic has asked his ambassador to the UN, Mohamed Sacirbey, to inform the UN Security Council of the attack so that it might take action.

Bashir also reported one shell landing in the UN-declared safe area of Bihac town Monday. It was not known whether there had been any casualties.

Meanwhile, heavy fighting has continued for control of the Grabez plateau, on the eastern outskirts of Bihac town with at least 1,000 shells landing in the area Monday.

It was not immediately known if the Bosnian Serbs, who have been counter-attacking in strength over the past week, had regained full control of the positions from which they were forced out three weeks ago.

Mladic Protests Ammunition Plant in Gorazde

LD1411221994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2102 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 14 Nov (TANJUG)—General Ratko Mladic, chief of staff of the Srpska republic army, today sent a protest to the Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy for the former Yugoslavia, and Michael Rose, UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] commander for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. In it he writes that in Gorazde, a protected zone, the Muslims have an ammunition factory, "Pobeda," which contravenes the Geneva conventions.

According to these conventions, he stresses in his protest, protected zones must not have any kind of military facilities or major industrial facilities, particularly not of a military nature, and individuals within such a zone must not carry out any activity directly related to military operations or war production.

According to the general staff's statement, Mladic says that he has reports that UNPROFOR in Gorazde "has given the Muslims generators and is helping them with water supplies which are being used, among other things, to meet the needs of the ammunition factory."

"In view of these facts, which constitute an evident and flagrant violation of provisions of these international documents on the part of the Muslims, we express our sharp protest and dissatisfaction with your lenient attitude," the protest note says.

"I demand that you should take necessary and effective measures to address these facts which are in contravention of provisions of international warfare law," Mladic stresses. He cautions, "otherwise, we cannot regard this area as a protected zone, so we cannot be held responsible for the consequences brought about by evident noncompliance with the conditions and obligations envisaged in such situations."

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Karadzic Interviewed Following Fall of Kupres

LD1411231994 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 2010 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The United States has, in principle, suspended the enforcement of the arms embargo imposed on the Bosnians and Croatians. By doing this, it intended to put increased pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, who still do not want to accept the international plan for settling the conflict. The crew of Panorama [weekly foreign political program on Hungarian Television 1], Ferenc Szaniszlo and Tibor Nagy, have managed to get into the Pale headquarters, where they interviewed Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] At any event, deputies have been urgently summoned to the Pale headquarters, to the large hall of the local machine factory, for this is the place where the Bosnian parliament holds its sessions. The deputies are threatening a declaration of of war and a general counteroffensive. We have been waiting for Karadzic for about five hours. [passage omitted] Here is Radovan Karadzic, the poet-psychiatric who became a president, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent's question in Serbo-Croat superimposed by his own Hungarian translation] Good morning, Mr. Karadzic. War or peace—what would you chose?

[Karadzic in Serbo-Croat superimposed by Hungarian translation] We are seeking peace. As far as the introduction of a state of war on the entire territory of our republic is concerned, it all depends on how the deputies assess the situation and on the extent of the new Muslim attacks. It is the international community that should stop the Muslims, because if it is us who stops them, they will lose everything.

[Correspondent] What will you do if the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia is lifted?

[Karadzic] Then we will certainly introduce the state of war and will not observe any of the Security Council resolutions. In this case we will regard the UN Security Council as something that does not exist.

[Correspondent] How do you explain the military successes of the Croats and Muslims.

[Karadzic] I do not explain it. They have not even had any significant successes. First of all, they are far more than us, and they have already been well armed, as we also are. They even have modern weapons. They have achieved certain successes, but only because we have withdrawn our forces for tactical reasons, to prevent further human losses. There have been unexpected attacks in the region of Grabez and Bihac. Bihac is an internationally protected zone. They should not have launched an offensive from there. However, we have taken almost everything back from them and we will punish them for what they have done to us. [Indistinct passage omitted] They have only taken advantage of our weakness. This is why they occupied some territories—provisionally. But we will reoccupy these territories in the coming days.

[Correspondent] I think that Serbia's embargo imposed on you is also one of the factors of your weakness, is not it?

[Karadzic] Not only that. Now we have simply settled for a normal life and did not get used to the war any more.

[Correspondent] What is your opinion about Milosevic's embargo?

[Karadzic] [Indistinct passage omitted] If the Muslims do not want a political solution and do not choose peace and talks, we will announce the state of war and will gain a final victory over the Muslims. This war has to end. If it cannot happen in a political way, it has to be done by military means. But in that case the victory is ours. Returning to the question of the arms embargo, the best thing would be if the United States lifted the arms embargo and by that it would become clear that the United States has got mixed up in the Bosnian civil war. Washington has already been mixed up in it. This is another moral catastrophe for America and this is a very bad thing. Let me repeat it, this is another moral catastrophe for America and it is bad. [end recording] [passage omitted]

RSK Foreign Minister Urges Sarajevo Division

AU1411174694 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Nov 94 p 1

[M.M.-attributed report: "We Could Talk if Sarajevo Was To Be Divided"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka—Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the Srpska republic, told GLAS SRPSKI that Sarajevo is "the key to peace." "If the Contact Group puts forward a proposal on the division of Sarajevo and the Sarajevo district, then we could talk," he said, adding that "the demarcation maps are the stumbling block."

Aleksa Buha repeated that the Contact Group took a wrong approach toward solving the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina by first proposing the demarcation plan according to maps that are completely unacceptable to the Srpska republic, and then—once the map is accepted—open the discussion on constitutional arrangements according to a document that has been kept secret. The first sentence of the "secret document," according to Buha, says that "the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of the Bosniak-Croatian federation and the Srpska republic," which certainly means that "the sovereignty of our state is implicitly recognized," Buha said.

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"A union as a purely mechanical connection of sovereign states is acceptable to us, since it is absolutely clear that everyone would go his own way out of that union very quickly," the foreign minister of the Srpska republic said, stressing that the maps on offer were the main obstacle to the continuation of the peace process, and not the document on the constitutional arrangements.

UNPROFOR Locates Serb Tank in Sarajevo

AU1411200994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Members of the Canadian UN Battalion yesterday informed the command of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] for Bosnia-Herzegovina about the presence of a chetnik tank south of Visoko, UNPROFOR headquarters for Bosnia-Herzegovina confirmed at a news conference today.

The tank is situated within the exclusion zone and according to UNPROFOR spokesman Tim Spicer the investigation is underway. This is treated as a violation of the exclusion zone and a protest has already been issued to the Serbian side in connection with this, Tim Spicer stated.

Serb Attacks Halt Sarajevo Trams, Utilities

AU1511095694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 15 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The tram service in Sarajevo was halted at 0720 this morning owing to renewed aggressor's attacks on our capital city.

The situation regarding electricity in Sarajevo is worse than in the last few days. Power reductions are being reintroduced. As we have been informed by the Electricity Board, the plan for reductions has not been finalized yet.

The supply of natural gas to Sarajevo has also worsened today, and the consumers in many parts of the town will not be supplied with gas. Only minimal amounts are arriving in the city. [passage omitted]

As the Information Service of the Water Authorities reports, water was this morning delivered to the districts of Kosevsko Brdo, Ciglane, Sokolje, parts of the city around the Zrak enterprise, and the Clinical Center. Water from the Mojmilo Spring is being fed to Dobrinja and the districts above the city's bypass all the way to Aneks. [passage omitted]

Bosanski Samac Muslims Describe Serb Camps

AU1511182394 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 10-17 Nov 94 pp 16-17

[Report by Dragan Stanojlovic: "900 Days of Inferno"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Before the war, travelling from Bosanski Samac to Sarajevo meant four hours of a comfortable trip by modern railroad, or somewhat less by a car. Mujo Halilovic and Fuad Skenderovic needed 900 days to "travel" from their birthplace to Sarajevo where they were recently exchanged for war prisoners. These two-and-half years in their lives sadly attest to the unbelievable scope of human endurance in prisons in Samac, Bijeljina, Vlasenica, and Batkovic.

All the suffering that Mujo Halilovic and Fuad Skenderovic, as well as thousands of their fellow citizens, have endured from the spring of 1992 until today, had only one cause: They are not Serbs! This is the testimony of Mujo Halilovic and Fuad Skenderovic on the golgotha that the Bosniaks—Muslims and Croats—from Bosanski Samac still endure.

Who Are Our Interlocutors?

Mujo Halilovic, nicknamed Lindov, was born in Bosanski Samac in 1964. He lived in a socially owned flat with his mother Sadeta, his wife, and brother Salko. With hardly any education, he fought through life with difficulty, most often working as a tradesman, worker, and waiter. He had two brothers and a sister living in Bosanski Samac. He said that the street taught him about life.

Fuad Skenderovic was given the nickname of Carouser when he was still very young. He was born in Bosanski Samac in 1956 and before the war lived there in a socially owned flat with his mother and wife. By profession he was a carpenter and a very skilled one at that: He was a real artist in wood carving. Due to poor eyesight, he did not serve in the Yugoslav People's Army. [passage omitted]

Immediately after they took the town, the Serbian occupiers began the arrests, physical torture, rapes, and murders. They were arresting men according to a list they had found in the offices of the Party of Democratic Action. For the Muslims and the few Croats left, it was the beginning of a tragedy unprecedented in the long history of Bosanski Samac.

"They Have Raped My Wife"

According to our interlocutors, all Muslims and Croats detained in Bosanski Samac were considered rebels and snipers. The Serbs living in the town became a privileged people: They enjoyed full freedom of movement and, at the authorities' recommendation, wore a white ribbon on their sleeves as a sign of recognition. By the way, the Serbs from Bosanski Samac who did not actively participate in the attack on the town and its occupation nevertheless received these wild mercenaries from Serbia, and members of the Yugoslav People's Army, without a word of protest. Halilovic and Skenderovic say that "to be honest, one has to say that several prominent people from Bosanski Samac, ethnic Serbs, could no longer stand the evil that their fellow nationals were perpetrating on their neighbors and friends of other nationalities and hanged themselves. Unfortunately,

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there were very few such people in our town, but their names will be remembered."

Muslims and Croats whose names were found on the lists of the Territorial Defense were the first to be arrested and led to prison, and members of their household were—after bestial torture—put into a concentration camp. Their houses and flats were totally plundered and settled with Serbian refugees from Knin and the Bosnian krajinas, Zenica, Tuzla.... The same fate awaited other Muslims and Croats as well. In the first wave of arrests, victims were predominantly Croats: Their property would be taken away and they would be taken to the Secondary School Center, turned into a camp, for exchange purposes. [passage omitted]

Fuad Skenderovic was arrested on 25 May. Long months and years of prison hell began for Mujo and Fuad, but the situation outside, in the town itself, was hardly better. Fuad Skenderovic tells the story:

On 1 October 1992, they raped my wife in our flat. That was organized by my acquaintance Hazim Durbic, called Mis, whose mother lived on the third floor of our building. Although a Muslim, Mis wore a "White Eagles" [chetnik paramilitary group] uniform. He brought four of his pals with red berets, as well as Dragan Djordjevic Crni, member of the Seselj's [head of the Serbian Radical Party] group, to "a party" in my flat. The six of them raped my wife. I was told this by Mis himself when he visited me in prison. [passage omitted]

Terrible "Investigation"

Beatings took place every day, and the repertoire that chetnik "investigators" used was terribly diversified. They were mostly carried out at night, between 2000 and midnight, when chetnik leaders would have gone from the prison building to the building of the occupiers' territorial defense: While a few prisoners were being beaten, others would have to sing chetnik songs aloud "so that chetnik leaders would think that everything was all right in the prison." Mujo Halilovic told us the following:

"They would force us to beat each other: To slap each other's faces or hit each other with fists and feet. My brother and I did so. Then we agreed not to hit each other. It is better to be beaten up by them...." [passage omitted]

[Box, p 16]

Names for The Hague

According to the testimonies Mujo Halilovic and Fuad Skenderovic made, the following people were leading in persecuting, beating up, and killing Muslims and Croats in Bosanski Samac: Stevo Todorovic- Stiv, head of the chetnik Ministry of Internal Affairs; Slavko Trifunovic called The Dentist [Zubar]; Makso Maksimovic called Toothless [Krezo]; Spasoje Bogdanovic-Sole (from the village of Skarici); Slobodan Tubonjic-Tubonja; Slobodan Vakic-Zvaka; Slobodan Rakic-Celo; brothers Slobodan (called Rej) and Vlado Kuresevic; Slobodan Jacimovic (self-proclaimed Serbian inspector); Dragan Todorovic; Dragan Djordjevic-Crni (commander of Seselj's mercenaries); Cvijan called Krezo (the baton is his favorite weapon); a certain Icindija, former Osijek policeman (his main helpers were brothers Sead and Resad Juhic); and brothers Naser and Jusuf Mustafic. Although Muslim, the Juhic's and Mustafic's rank among the most infamous chetniks in Bosanski Samac.

[Box, p 17]

Chetnik Prisons Full of Serbs

According to Mujo Halilovic and Fuad Skenderovic, there are three prisons for Serbs in Bijeljina: the penitentiary near the railroad station, in Vanek's mill, and in the army barracks nearby. Apart from that, Serbs are kept in an improvised prison in Janja. Halilovic and Skenderovic assess that about 400 to 500 Serbs are kept in Bijeljina prisons. The most frequent reason are fights among them, robberies, arbitrary shootings with firearms in town. There are quite a few murders, most often due to drunken quarrels, disputes between neighbors, and because of women. As a rule, murderers are sent to Sremska Mitrovica prison.

However, many Serbs have been sentenced for selling weapons to Muslims or for deserting the front line. About that, Halilovic and Skenderovic say the following:

Deserters from the front would be detained, beaten up, and sent back to the front. They run away again and so it goes on again. The local, Bijeljina Serbs often pay refugees to go to the front for them. When chetnik commanders discover the trick, they arrest those who paid the refugees and sentence them, usually to three months in prison and immediately afterwards send them back to the front. Then these people find some refugees again, pay them.... That applies to people with money.

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Sarinic Wants Pact With Krajina Serbs by 21 Nov

LD1411210294 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 14 Nov 94

[Excerpt of interview with Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the Croatian negotiators, by Tihomir Ladisic on 14 November; place not given; from the "Image Versus Image" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tomorrow's negotiations at Pleso [Zagreb airport] between delegations of the Croatian authorities and local Serbs may be decisive as regards any kind of further cooperation. On the eve of the talks, Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the Croatian negotiators, talked to Croatian TV in an interview for tonight's Image Versus Image program. We have selected the following from his interview with our colleague Tihomir Ladisic:

[Begin Sarinic recording] We have already said, in the course of our last meeting in Knin, that we cannot continue these negotiations indefinitely. This and the fact that there were delays is why we set a deadline—21 November. This is when an agreement has to be reached and signed. If it is not signed by then, the Croatian side will surely no longer be willing to continue negotiating.

Rest assured that Croatia, the Croatian delegation, will again stick to its view that these negotiations must lead to general normalization and that we cannot bypass the political problems. To us this is a whole, this is a matter of normalizing relations and a matter of gradually reintegrating the occupied areas in the state and legal system of the Republic of Croatia. By no means can this be—as some representatives of the Serbs from Knin are now describing it—negotiations with us on economic matters while discussing political matters with the east Serbia, and so forth. This is something the Croatian delegation will certainly not accept. [end recording]

Bekic: More Bihac Attacks Will End Cease-Fire

LD1411154794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Darko Bekic, Croatian ambassador to the CSCE, addressed the permanent CSCE committee in Vienna today on the latest developments in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly on the situation in the Bihac area.

Bekic warned of intensified attacks by the Bosnian Serbs on the Bihac area stressing that rebel Serb forces from UN protected areas in Croatia have been taking part in these attacks. According to our reports, around 2,500 members of the Serb paramilitary forces from UN protected areas in Croatia have crossed the Bosnia-Herzegovina border, joining Bosnian Serbs in their offensive against the Bosnia- Herzegovina Army and Croatian Defense Council in the Bihac area, Bekic said.

He went on to say that the attacks represented a violation of the UN Security Council resolutions on safe areas and that artillery operations carried out by the rebel Serbs from Croatia contravened the Zagreb agreement signed in March this year.

The Croatian Government has thoroughly examined the latest developments, concluding that the tactical goal of the Croat and Bosnian Serbs is to drag not just the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, but also the Croatian Army, into a conflict of wider proportions, and thus thwart efforts made by the international community aimed at finding a peaceful and fair solution, Bekic said among other things.

Successful implementation of the UN Security Council statement adopted yesterday is decisively important for further developments, Ambassador Bekic said, adding that, in the new round of talks which is to take place in Zagreb tomorrow, the Croatian Government will again try to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis. But if no progress is reached and if the fall of Bihac becomes inevitable, the Croatian Government will find it extremely difficult, even impossible, to continue observing the Zagreb agreement on cease-fire [with Serbs in Croatia] and the order in UN protected areas. The government will be forced to fulfill its obligations toward the neighbouring country—Bosnia-Herzegovina—which stem from the Washington agreement, particularly from provisions that speak about the military alliance and mutual assistance between the two countries, Bekic stressed. Therefore we hope that the international community will act and thus render unnecessary the Croatian Army's assistance to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

Krajina Serb Army Denies Entering West Bosnia

LD1411160894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1458 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 14 Nov (TANJUG)—The information service of the general staff of the Serb Krajina army issued a statement today saying that conflicts between members of Fikret Abdic's people's defense of the autonomous province of western Bosnia and members of the Muslim army's 5th Corps have erupted in the border areas of western Bosnia.

The same sources have said—quoting reports broadcast on Abdic's Radio Velkaton—that units of the people's defense of the autonomous province of western Bosnia include men who have left refugee camps in the republic of Serb Krajina and soldiers who have defected from the 5th Corps.

The general headquarters of the Serb Krajina army also says that Krajina units have not entered the territory of western Bosnia and that their activities have been limited to the protection of the republic of Serb Krajina territory.

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Tudjman, UN Leaders Discuss Croat-Serb Problem

LD1411192394 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a statement from the president's office on talks between President Tudjman, the UN secretary general's special envoy Yasushi Akashi, and UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] commander, General de Lapresle.

President Tudjman reiterated Croatia's well-known views on negotiations with the Serbs from Croatia's occupied territories. Attention has been drawn to the negotiations because UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia depends on the outcome of these negotiations. The president stressed that the Republic of Croatia favors a peaceful resolution of the crisis but that it is not prepared to allow endless and lengthy procrastination in finding a solution.

Referring to the situation in the federation and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the prospects for further normalizing Croat- Serb relations, President Tudjman called for a more active role on the part of UNPROFOR and the international community.

Akashi Comments

LD1411194394 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy, made a statement for Croatian TV following his talks with President Tudjman:

[Begin Akashi recording in English with Serbo-Croatian voice over] We have just held a very useful and constructive meeting with President Tudjman and his close advisers. We talked about the difficult situation in Bihac and we shared our grave concern about the shelling of Bihac by the Krajina Serbs from the UN-protected areas. We exchanged information and I told President Tudjman of the problems encountered by the UN Protection Force and about the obstruction of our convoys to Bihac. We also discussed close air support by NATO and about the wider issues of links between Krajina and Pale Serbs and the role that Belgrade can play in helping to improve the situation. We also talked about the economic issues to be discussed during [Croat-Krajina Serb] negotiations due to begin at Pleso [Zagreb airport] tomorrow. We agreed that rapid progress was urgently needed over economic issues. [end recording]

UNPROFOR Requests NATO Air Support

AU1511124694 Paris AFP in English 1229 GMT 15 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 15 (AFP)—The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) is calling for an extension of NATO close air support for its peacekeeping troops in Serb-held areas of Croatia, a spokesman said here Tuesday [15 Nov].

UN special envoy to the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, met Monday with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to discuss the issue, which was also raised at talks in Zagreb between UNPROFOR commander General Bertrand de Lapresle and NATO commander-in-chief for southern Europe, Admiral Leighton Smith, UN spokesman Paul Risley said.

There were also "technical" talks between a representative of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Croatian officials, he added.

"We very much consider it important that close air support be extended to those areas of Croatia that are close to the Bihac pocket" for the protection of UN personnel, both inside the Moslem- held enclave and in neighbouring Croatia, Risley said.

Extension of close air support to the Croatian Serb-held region of Krajina, which borders Bihac enclave, would require approval by the UN Security Council and by NATO leaders.

UN, NATO: 'No Proof' Krajina Serbs in Bosnia

LD1511113594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1054 GMT 15 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 15 Nov (TANJUG)—General Bertrand de Lapresle, commander of the UN peace forces for the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, has said that the UN peace forces have no proof that Serb forces from Krajina had crossed to the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and taken part in the fighting around Bihac. Talking to journalists, Gen. de Lapresle stressed that Vice Admiral Leighton Smith, the NATO commander in chief for southern Europe, last night confirmed to him that NATO also has no proof of this.

Gen. de Lapresle said that during his meeting with Vice Admiral Smith in Zagreb yesterday they discussed "the situation in the Bihac safety zone" as well as "the possible extension of close NATO air support to the territory of the Republic of Croatia."

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Gligorov Urges Negotiations With Greece

AU1111192494 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 11 Nov 94 p 2

[Report by J.M.: "The Solution of Minority Problems—In the Institutions of the System"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] yesterday received Max van der Stuhl, CSCE high commissioner for national minorities.

The discussions were also attended by the head of the CSCE mission in our country, Ambassador Norman Anderson. The high-ranking CSCE commissioner wanted to know about the results of the elections, particularly the prospects for the promotion of national minority rights in our country, as well as other issues of an internal and foreign nature. He informed President Gligorov that in his contacts with some Albanian parties he had personally supported the idea that interethnic relations and concrete requests of the national minorities should be solved within the institutions of the system.

After briefing him about the election results, President Gligorov emphasized that they would first of all enable a more efficient implementation of the reforms and the promulgation of laws in the Assembly based on European standards, with the cooperation of the CSCE, the Council of Europe, and other international institutions. The elections have also opened up possibilities for a more successful finalization of the negotiations with the IMF and other international financial institutions, which will have a positive effect on economic stabilization in the country.

According to Gligorov, the problems of national minorities and the construction of democratic interethnic relations will continue to be resolved on the basis of the announced principles and constitutional regulations, as a lasting policy principle. In this context, we expect the active participation of the minorities in the institutions of the system, the Assembly, the government, and so on, in order to contribute to the formation of the policy and thus take on the appropriate responsibilities.

Van der Stuhl was also informed about the most topical questions and engagements of the Republic of Macedonia on the international political stage and relations with neighboring countries. In this context, President Gligorov particularly stressed Macedonia's interest in finding an early solution to the current problems in relations with Greece, as a great contribution to a good neighborhood and to peace and stability in the Balkans. President Gligorov said that results in this area can be achieved through negotiations with the mediation of the United Nations, but the basic issue is to negotiate on a principled and equal footing. Macedonia has always made such efforts, especially because it is suffering direct economic damage from the dispute and the Greek embargo and it is facing problems internationally, such as its admission to the CSCE, its cooperation with the European Union, and so on.

President Gligorov also reviewed the position of Macedonian national minorities in neighboring countries. He recalled the constitutional obligation of the Republic of Macedonia to take care of Macedonians outside the country, as well as the determination that their status, as well as the problems faced by them, must be solved in conformity with international norms. On this, President Gligorov said that he expected greater engagement on the part of the CSCE high commissioner for national minorities, recalling the role of the CSCE in this field in terms of bolstering cooperation, peace, and stability in the region. All this appeared in a statement issued by the Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Macedonia.

After the discussions with President Gligorov, van der Stuhl said: "I have come to your country to study the development of democratic relations. I have read the international observers' reports on the course of the elections. At this moment, there is still the question of the formation of a new government, and I am trying to introduce peaceful tones among the different political forces for the formation of the future government, particularly concerning the question of different minority and population groups in your country. I have just had a meeting with President Gligorov, I have also held talks with Assembly Chairman Stojan Andov, and yesterday I had a meeting with the foreign minister. We discussed several questions, including the Greek embargo, the misunderstandings between your country and Greece, as well as the economic and financial difficulties faced by your country. This visit will help me better understand the position and the situation in which your country is now. I appreciate the openness of the people to whom I talked."

Asked about the position of the Macedonian minority in the neighboring countries and whether we could soon expect a report on this, he said: "This is a question that was also raised during the discussions. At this moment, as you know, I am engaged on it and my task is of a confidential nature. At this moment I do not have any comment."

Foreign Minister Interviewed on Policy, Tasks

AU1411071594 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 11 Nov 94 pp 14-15

[Interview with Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski by Eleonora Karanfilovska; place and date not given: "Political Constant"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Karanfilovska] Mr. Minister, we have a number of concrete subjects that we would like to discuss with you, but having in mind that this is the period after the elections and before the constitution of a new government of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM],

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we should certainly keep our discussion to your future function. Will you still be heading the foreign affairs field of activities?

[Crvenkovski] It is too early to answer this question, because negotiations on the government have not started yet, and therefore I am not able to give you an answer at this stage.

[Karanfilovska] Are you avoiding answering the question that I just asked first of all because of some speculations in the public that Minister Crvenkovski will be traveling to Washington as the future ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia?

[Crvenkovski] We have not yet established diplomatic relations with the United States, and therefore we still cannot send an ambassador there.

[Karanfilovska] The question will remain for the future. Now let us talk about what happened in Geneva this week; that is, the continuation of the Macedonian-Greek negotiations and the meeting of Gligorov and Butrus-Ghali that you and Mr. Vance also attended. Do you expect that the negotiations will continue in New York?

[Crvenkovski] The meeting in Geneva was practically a continuation of our policy related to the dispute that we have with Greece, and it has its continuity. There are no changes in our position and that could be seen from what was said after the meeting. There also is no change in the fact that we are ready to continue negotiations if they are conducted in a positive climate and without any pressure or illegal actions like the embargo.

[Karanfilovska] The statements made after the meeting were interpreted in different ways. Can you explain whether Macedonia will insist on basket discussion or is the problem with the name separate?

[Crvenkovski] Our insistence is to have discussions on entire bilateral relations, and not on a basket of two to three or more solutions. The aim of the negotiations must be to reach long-term good relations between the two countries and normal communications in order to have normal relations with European countries.

[Karanfilovska] I shall once again go back to the beginning of our discussion and to the reason for asking this question, because we should now talk about the future directions of Macedonian foreign policy, although its main principles have been known since independence. However, how does Macedonia view the future with respect to the following circumstances: destabilization in Albania, changes in the ruling structure of Bulgaria and its upcoming elections, Serbia's road to transition, the stalemated relations with Greece?

[Crvenkovski] The basic determination of equal distance with the neighbors must not by any means be changed, because it is a long-term policy. Although I do not like this word, I shall say that this is in the strategic interests of our state, because it is the only way to convince our neighbors that it is in their own interest to protect and assist the independence of Macedonia. The position of Macedonia, as a crossroads in the Balkans, creates a normal interest with all our neighbors to make this crossroads free for normal traffic. None of our neighbors can easily accept the fact that another neighbor has greater influence. If the policy of equal distance is well placed and if it is well understood by all neighbors in the long term, each one of them will have an interest in helping Macedonia remain independent and free of pressure from the others. This is an essential determination that can yield a more peaceful future for Macedonia in the surroundings that we cannot alter. The fact that many things are happening in the Balkans and that there are still many sources of regional instability at this moment can work to our advantage. Macedonia is proving to the world that it is a source of stability in the region and perhaps the country with the fewer internal risks for destabilization.

[Karanfilovska] The public statements of world officials and obviously also the whole policy speak in favor of a direction toward maintaining this stability. However, if we go back to the meeting in Geneva and the six hours of discussions that were held there, to the statement and behavior of President Gligorov after the discussions, to what Mr. Butrus-Ghali said after the meeting, it becomes evident that Macedonia was under great pressure to offer concessions. What were the grounds for thinking that this ruling structure that got a mandate for the next four years could make any concessions?

[Crvenkovski] I must say that the discussions did not last six hours, more like an hour and a half, followed by a working lunch—hardly six hours. There is a great interest in the outcome, particularly in the United Nations, the European Union, and in the United States to resolve this dispute as soon as possible, because they all think that it has lasted too long and that it is disruptin the economic and on the political progress of the whole region. We have always said, however, before and after the elections, that the election results will have no effect on negotiations with Greece and on our position. The way we approach the solution to this question is not a daily political need that can be changed in case the relationship of the political forces is changed. Our position is based on the essential interests of the Republic of Macedonia and on its survival, as well as on the survival of the Macedonian nation, and that cannot be altered due to any results of the elections. We, and all the others, want to solve the dispute as soon as possible.

[Karanfilovska] Mr. Minister, I shall be more direct: What is the nature of the pressure on Macedonia for offering concessions?

[Crvenkovski] The pressure on Macedonia is the same as on Greece. It is not a question of exerting pressure for reaching concrete solutions in favor of the one or the other side. It is not at all a pressure with the aim of

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imposing solutions on the one or the other side. Nevertheless, permanent pressure for a faster solution of the dispute is put on both sides.

[Karanfilovska] Let me cite a few examples: There is a stand-by arrangement with the IMF board, there are negotiations pending with the World Bank, some concrete actions have been announced for economic assistance from a number of countries, and President Clinton in his statement on Gligorov's election directly referred to it. Can there be any pressure on the plan of economic relations?

[Crvenkovski] As far as the stand-by arrangement is concerned, that is something that has been fully agreed to even before the elections. Now we have to fulfill a precondition for signing the agreement; that is, we must cover our debts to the Paris Club. Many countries have promised to help us pay this debt and that is something that should be done in the next two weeks, and we do not expect any greater postponement here. The question concerning economic assistance and cooperation of other countries is a process with its own logic and by its nature it is a slow process in every country. In our case, since it has to do with enormous damages due to the UN sanctions, and we always insist that this element must be taken into the account, we do not ask the international community to assist a country that cannot solve its economic problems, but we ask for a kind of a compensation for the damages that we have suffered since the implementation of the UN policy.

[Karanfilovska] The Greek embargo is also contributing to our economic difficulties. Are there any thoughts about submitting a draft resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly?

[Crvenkovski] The possibility of our addressing the Security Council and the General Assembly on the Greek embargo exists, but the key question here lies in the European Court's decision which we hope will soon be handed down.

[Karanfilovska] However, two years may pass....

[Crvenkovski] The process can last that long, but we hope that the Court will not use the maximum length, because a lot of time has already passed.

[Karanfilovska] You have mentioned several times the interest of the United States in the situation in this region and in the Republic of Macedonia, but the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Washington is still open. What will the impact be on bilateral relations if, I would say, there is a change in the ruling structure of the U.S. Congress and Senate, if the Republicans take over, and particularly if a few Americans of Greek origin win?

[Crvenkovski] U.S. foreign policy cannot be easily changed due to some changes in the Congress and the Senate, or to some changes in the administration. As a whole it is quite stable. I would only like to note that U.S. support for Macedonia was clearly expressed during the previous administration, which was Republican, as well as by the present Democratic administration. I do not expect great changes in relations with Macedonia. I think that U.S. determination to support the independence and stability of Macedonia has been clearly expressed. As far as the influence of Americans of Greek origin on U.S. policy is concerned, I think that excessive attention is being attached to it by the public, because U.S. policy is based on some general principles and not on the political influence of a few people.

[Karanfilovska] Nevertheless, the influence of the Greek lobby is seen in many moves in Washington. On the other hand, the activities of the Macedonian patriotic organizations in the United States have often, particularly recently, been mentioned as a burden on the relations between Washington and Skopje.

[Crvenkovski] First, I think that the relations between Skopje and Washington are not a problem at all. On the contrary, they are exceptionally good, and we have nearly daily contacts in various areas. The latest example was the visit of a delegation to the U.S. Defense Department and the discussions that were conducted here on many concrete types of cooperation. I do not see why we should be displeased with the level of bilateral relations at all, on the contrary.

The question related to the activities of some organizations in the U.S., particularly the MPO [Macedonian Patriotic Organization], is certainly a serious question, because it leaves a wrong impression about our policy and position with certain circles in the U.S. A number of observers are not very well informed about the of the activities of the Macedonians around the world and the organizations of our migrants. Therefore, there is confusion, particularly since there is such an aggressive organization as MPO, which represents itself as a Macedonian organization, while all its activities since its foundation have been on an open anti-Macedonian platform. Recently, this organization has been very active in sending letters, resolutions, and complaints that at first sight are in support of Macedonia. Instead, their material is full of elements that create an inaccurate impression, and do not support our international policy.

They often expose stances in which you can find some territorial aspirations toward the neighbors, a kind of an aggressive propaganda that is completely opposite to the principles of the Macedonian Constitution and that can easily be, and they are, used by the Greek side as a proof that Macedonia is conducting an aggressive policy of territorial pretensions and non-recognition of borders. Arguments that cannot be found in our policy and in the activities of the Republic of Macedonia and of the real Macedonian organizations in the world are now found by Greece in the activities of the MPO. That is why it is important to identify the activities of some Macedonian organizations throughout the world because the activities of such organizations have a long history of anti-Macedonian positions.

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[Karanfilovska] To a certain extent, the Republic is also responsible for such a relationship because very little has been done toward clarifying such activities and also because Macedonia allows itself to be involved in certain situations. I want to note that Mr. Lebamov who, just before the elections in Macedonia, was suddenly brought here by Mr. Frovik, the previous head of the CSCE mission in Skopje and now executive director of an organization "Search for Joint Soil" that is active in the Republic. With the assistance and influence of Mr. Milcin and the Soros Foundation, Mr. Lebamov was invited to a television station in Skopje. He spoke in a Bulgarian-Macedonian language without an interpreter and began to speak, saying: "We, Macedonians."

[Crvenkovski] As regards the relationship of some particular organizations and groups here with Mr. Lebamov and the MPO, it is true that the public, and everyone else concerned, should seriously consider the complete situation. Mr. Frovik's role as a representative of a nongovernmental and informal organization should be absolutely separate from the role that he had previously as the U.S. official in Macedonia.

[Karanfilovska] The end of this discussion will be similar to the beginning. Although I received no answer at the beginning on whether Minister Crvenkovski will still be in charge of foreign policy, the principles of the policy have been established—you know the tasks of the ministry, the ruling structure that led the country in the past two years will remain for another four years, and therefore I shall ask you to review the future work of the ministry. I shall remind you that in a discussion that we had toward the end of last year, you said that 1994 would be a year in which the ministry would be mainly engaged in organizational problems and economic relations with the world. Nevertheless, Minister Crvenkovski was quite busy solving diplomatic conflicts and questions, and therefore your tasks have remained unfinished.

[Crvenkovski] The organizational questions of this ministery, and of other ministries as well, will certainly be a high priority in the work of the new government. It is absolutely necessary to restructure the administration of the Republic of Macedonia. As for foreign affairs sector, we must finalize the negotiations with GATT and with the World Trade Organization in order to place Macedonia definitely in the global economy. We must also start negotiations with the European Union on cooperation and I hope that later we shall begin talks on association. However, the key matter for the next period will be the domestic policy that will actually influence foreign policy; that is, the adaptation of all laws to European standards and to the standards of the European Union. The Macedonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs must become fully involved in the future work of the new government in order to persuade all other ministries that their first priority will be to adapt all laws under their competence to the administrative system of the European Union. This is indispensable if we want to be included in Europe as soon as possible and as painlessly as possible.

[Karanfilovska] Mr. Minister, was it on purpose or by pure chance that you "changed" the name of the Ministry for Relations With Foreign Countries to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Crvenkovski] The unnatural name of this ministry has often caused us problems in the past two years, but to change the Law on State Administration that regulates this issue it is necessary to have a two-thirds majority, and that is why we could not change it. However, this change must be done. I also think that the other names of the other ministries should be adapted to what the world can understand, contrary to the clumsy names of some ministries that cannot be easily translated, and therefore understood.

Daily Publishes 'Unofficial' Results of Census

AU1511075494 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 13 Nov 94 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Macedonia Has a Population of About 2 Million"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The responsible state bodies have not yet revealed the official results of the census that was held in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] this year. The reason is partly because of the unfinished operation of defining the total national and social structure of the population, but also because of some political reasons. *PULS* published some data related to the ethnic composition of the population in our state in its latest issue, in spite of the fact that the official results have not yet been revealed.

According to what was unofficially published in *PULS*, 1,924,247 people were counted in the census that was implemented in Macedonia in June and July. This number included 11,266 persons who were counted twice, 1,808 who were incorrectly counted abroad, and 18,045 who were incorrectly included in the census. There were also 5,029 persons who were counted in a commune other than that in which they are officially registered, 20,485 who were counted in Macedonia and who have been away from the country for more than a year, and 2,753 persons who were counted abroad and who have been away for less than a year. After a proper calculation, we arrive at a number of 1,925,011 for the population living in the Republic of Macedonia at the time of the census.

Of the total number, according to *PULS*, 1,288,330 were Macedonians, 434,033 Albanians, 74,267 Turks, 43,732 Romanies, 39,624 Serbs, 8,407 Vlachs, and 34,960 "others" (Muslims, Montenegrins, Croats, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Russians, Romanians, Greeks, Jews, Ukrainians, Poles, Italians, Germans, etc...), while 1,962 persons did not say to which nationality they belonged. In percentages, there are 66.93 percent Macedonians, 22.55 percent Albanians, 3.88 percent Turks, 2.27 percent Romanies, 2.04 percent Serbs....

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Nevertheless, *PULS* concluded that 1,925,011 was not the final figure of the population registered in the census in Macedonia. Those that originate from here and that have been away for more than a year are missing. Their number is evaluated at between 80,000 to 150,000, and the majority are Albanians and Macedonians. The results on these persons have not yet been processed. One of the reasons is that it is impossible to claim for sure what is the percentage of this "gray mass" that can be counted as people with Macedonian citizenship. The journalists speculate that if these people were included, the national structure could be changed considerably. This can, first of all, affect the Albanians, and if a thorough calculation is made, their participation in the total population will be less than 20 percent, that is around 17 percent.

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Commission Protests Italy's EU Entry Opposition

LD1111152994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1308 GMT 11 Nov 94

[By Vlatko Vujovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Rome, Nov 11 (TANJUG)—A Slovenian parliament commission has protested to European governments, including the E.U. Council, against Italy's opposing its accession to the European Union.

The Slovenian parliament's Foreign Affairs Commission president, Zoran Taler, demanded in the letter that Europe's 'democrats' duly punish Berlusconi's 'nondemocratic' Italy, which, he said, increasingly resembled Mussolini's.

The most circulated Italian daily CORRIERE DELLA SERA has described Taler as the man who enjoys the trust of Prime Minister and ad interim Foreign Minister Janez drnovsek. Taler requested that Ljubljana's traditional allies, primarily Germany and France, stop supporting Italy and join Slovenia in the name of peace and justice.

Drnovsek, meanwhile, through the Slovenian media, called his counterpart Mario Berlusconi to resume talks, but this time on Slovenia's terms for a change.

The stumbling-block in the once cordial neighborly relations is Rome's categorical demand for Slovenia to return real estate and other property to Italian war and post-war refugees from Slovenia.

Slovenia stalled on the issue for a year, and Italy several times vetoed putting Slovenia's pleas for joining the European Union on the agenda of the European Council. Foreign Ministers Antonio Martino and Lojze Peterle then signed a 'statement of intent' which was to have been binding for the two governments' relations. The document positively responded to Italy's ultimatum, and Rome pledged to support Slovenia's aspirations to join the Union.

However, a cold shower poured down from Ljubljana. Drnovsek's government rejected the binding agreement. This gave munition to Italy's right-wing, which has much greater claims on Slovenia than the confiscated immovables of Italian refugees.

Italian political experts believe Drnovsek's request for the meeting was a game he had to play in Slovenia, as a meeting in which Slovenia was setting the terms would indeed bolster up the 'strong man from Ljubljana' and strengthen his position for the elections.

Italy and the former Yugoslavia signed an agreement in 1975 which envisaged reimbursement in money to Italian refugees from the Istrian Peninsula totalling 137 million U.S. dollars. The debt was frozen with Slovenia's 1991 secession from Yugoslavia to 96 million U.S. dollars, but Slovenia plans to pay off 40 percent of the amount, in instalments. Italy, however, wants real estate and not money.

Delegation Briefs Journalists on Israeli Trip

AU1011182494 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 10 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister Jelko Kacin, Defense Ministry State Secretary Bojan Suligoj, and Captain Renato Petric, commander of the Maritime Sector, gave a news conference today, at which they spoke of their recent visit to Israel. Robert Skerjanc reports:

[Begin Skerjanc recording] During the visit, which Minister Kacin divided into a political and an expert part, the delegation held talks with Prime Minister and Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin and Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres. Both hosts expressed sympathy for our state and promised assistance in lifting the arms embargo. They also agreed that the two defense ministries prepare and ratify an agreement on mutual cooperation this year.

On behalf of the government, Minister Jelko Kacin invited the Israeli prime minister to pay an official visit to Slovenia.

The Slovene delegation also visited numerous units and installations of the Israeli Army and acquainted itself with their arms and military doctrine. Suligoj described this expert part of the visit as a program of implementation of the law on fundamental development programs in modernizing the Slovene Army. Namely, during the visit they chose concrete offers for the purchase of arms and equipment, which would only be possible after the lifting of the arms embargo.

They primarily inspected and tested electronic-optical systems, telecommunications systems, infantry weapons, and several Israeli speedboats. Captain Petric said that the aim of their visit to naval bases was not to purchase vessels but to become familiar with Israeli experiences in patrolling the sea.

Petric also briefly spoke about a recent visit of a French battleship to Slovenia. He said that the French were extremely satisfied with the visit and expressed a wish that their boats would sail into our harbors more often. [end recording]

Peterle: SKD in Coalition Through Election

AU1111154794 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 11 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Vida Cadonic Spelic, secretary general of the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD], indirectly confirmed at a regular party news conference the opinion of SKD President Lojze Peterle that it is not likely that the SKD would leave the government coalition before the end of local elections. [passage omitted]

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Federal

Yeltsin's Special Envoy Zotov Arrives in Belgrade

LD1411160794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1537 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 14 Nov (TANJUG)—Aleksandr Zotov, the Russian president's special envoy and Russian representative in the contact group, arrived in Belgrade from Moscow today.

Zotov is expected to be received by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic during his brief working visit to Belgrade. [passage omitted]

Car Bomb Explodes Near Turkish Embassy

LD1511111194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1150 GMT 15 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 Nov (TANJUG)—At 1055 today a "kasikara" bomb exploded in a car with Swiss registration plates at 9 Knez Milos Street, near the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade.

TANJUG learned in the Interior Ministry's information service in Belgrade that the explosion wounded one person, who was immediately taken to the casualty department.

Driver Killed

AU1511110394 Paris AFP in English 1058 GMT 15 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov 15 (AFP)—A booby- trapped car exploded Tuesday [15 Nov] near the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade, killing the driver of the vehicle, officials at the embassy said.

A diplomat at the embassy, who asked not to be named, said he did not think the embassy was the target.

Chances for Trial of War-Crime Suspects Viewed

94P20152A

[FBIS Media Note] As the prosecutor at the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague compiles a list of war crime suspects from the territory of former Yugoslavia, some who see themselves as potentially facing charges are preparing their defenses, according to news reports.

Expecting to be placed on the list of war criminals, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has hired Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz as his attorney, the Ljubljana daily DELO reported on 29 October in an article based on a report published in the Belgrade magazine INTERVJU. Reviewing previous cases handled by the "experienced American attorney," the DELO article observed that the trial of Karadzic for war crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina could prove to be Dershowitz's "toughest case" yet.

Interviewed by Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVOSTI of 29 October, Mirsad Tokaca, secretary of the State Commission for Gathering Evidence on War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, said that Bosnian Serb leaders know that "we are gathering evidence against them... and they are preparing their defenses in case of arraignment." According to Tokaca, the leaders' fear of being arrested helps explain mysterious news of "sudden disappearances" of disloyal associates, of crime witnesses being liquidated, and of money being transferred to countries "willing to accommodate war criminals on the run."

The 29 October DELO further reported that Zeljko Raznjatovic-Arkan, leader of the Tigers, a Serbian paramilitary organization, had been placed on the list of war criminals and that Interpol had issued a "red warrant" for him and 40 other Serbian and Montenegrin war-crime suspects. Budimir Babovic, a former long-time chief of the Yugoslav bureau of Interpol, was cited as having said that Arkan's photographs have been posted at all international border crossings and that he is not able to leave Yugoslavia. DELO quoted Arkan as claiming that Croatia had issued a warrant charging him with "fictitious war crimes." He said that he did not recognize the Hague court "because it will put the entire Serbian nation on trial." "Although I believe that I am not a war criminal," he said, "I am prepared to be tried in any court in Serbia and Yugoslavia." DELO noted that Arkan and his Tigers had been granted "indulgences" by a high Serbian Orthodox Church official of the Pokajnica Monastery.

DELO also reported that chetnik leader Dr. Vojislav Seselj, presently serving a three-month prison sentence for disorderly conduct in the Federal Assembly in Belgrade, would likely be brought to court in The Hague. According to DELO, Seselj told a reporter of the Belgrade daily BORBA that he was "anxious to go to The Hague." "I am convinced that there is no evidence against me," he said, "because I have neither committed a crime nor ordered anybody else to commit one." The Belgrade press agency TANJUG reported on 14 July that Seselj was ready to appear in court in The Hague if accused of war crimes, although he "does not recognize the court."

Based on statements coming from Belgrade, the DELO report concluded that the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) Government is not as solidly opposed to cooperation with the international War Crimes Tribunal as it once was. In the view of the paper, it is likely that a list of war crime suspects is being prepared by the government that contains the names of lesser known figures such as Mirko Jovic, Dragoslav Bokan, and other leaders of volunteer groups that had "pillaged and plundered throughout Bosnia and Croatia." DELO cautioned, however, that Belgrade would find it much more difficult to deliver to the international court generals of the former Yugoslav People's Army who have since become high officers in the Serbian-Montenegrin Army, such as Veselin Sljivancanin, destroyer of the Croatian town of Vukovar.

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Serbia

Milosevic Discusses Issues with Russian Envoy

LD1411183094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1820 GMT 14 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 14 Nov (TANJUG)—Republic of Serbia President Slobodan Milosevic this evening received Russian President Boris Yeltsin's special envoy Aleksandr Zotov.

The talks centered on the current political situation in the region and joint efforts aimed at strengthening the peace process, the Serbian president's office has announced.

The meeting was also attended by the Russian ambassador to Belgrade, Gennadiy Shikin, and the head of the president's office, Goran Milinovic.

Government: SRS No-Confidence Vote 'Malicious'

LD1511113994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1138 GMT 15 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 Nov (TANJUG)—The Serbian Government informed the republic's Assembly today that the proposal by the group of deputies of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] for a confidence vote in the government "is a malicious, tendentious, and irresponsible act."

In a statement sent to the republic's parliament the government stresses that this SRS proposal is an abuse of the instruments of parliamentary democracy at the time when the government is concentrating on preserving and consolidating the economy and ensuring overall stability in the country.

Role of Romany Minority in Serbia Defended

95BA0018A Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian 17-30 Sep 94 pp 4-5

[Article by Miro Jovanovic of the Democratic Political Party of Romanys of Serbia and Yugoslavia: "Jevtic's Genocide Against the Romanys"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *We Romanys have not forgotten what is in our pants. That is why Romany women give birth to five children apiece, and so, esteemed Mr. Jevtic, there are not 120,000 of us, as you roughly estimate fRomany Belgrade, where 150,000 of your Romany compatriots can refute you, but instead there are 1,011,000 of us in Serbia, not counting guest workers abroad. We are not the seventh largest people, but rather the second—for the time being.*

The Democratic Political Party of Romanys of Serbia and Yugoslavia is irritated by the incorrect and chauvinist statement by one quasi-patriot, Miroljub Jevtic, published in DUGA, No. 534, on 20 August. We have called a news conference in order to inform the public of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the real situation of Romanys and of our party.

1. First of all, let us clear up the issue of the number of Romanys in Serbia.

Gentlemen, there has been a great deal of manipulation of the real situation regarding how many Romanys there are, and thus recently Minister Margit Savovic stated at the opening of a certain Romany blacksmith shop that there were 120,000 Romanys in Serbia and that they were the seventh largest in Serbia. That is incorrect information, and there is a tendency to downplay the real situation, because the fewer Romanys there are, the more there are of others. We assert, quite responsibly, that there are 1,011,000 Romanys in Serbia. Specifically, in Serbia proper there are 668,000 and in the provinces there are 343,000, which amounts to a total of 1,011,000. Consequently, anyone who wants to refute us can challenge me to a duel in front of the TV cameras. For the sake of illustration, in Belgrade alone there are about 150,000 of us, and in Kragujevac there are 16,500; any other solution that is cited is aimed at supporting artificial and imposed "assimilation," which is strictly prohibited by international laws and the CSCE charter, as well as article 20, paragraphs 1 and 2, article 45, and article 50 of our constitution.

2. Jevtic also claims that the Romanys in Serbia will be Islamicized.

We Romanys belong to different religions, depending on which area we live in, but we are all exclusively Romanys, and there are no divisions among us based on religion.

As far as the Orthodox Romanys are concerned, you can be certain that they will always be Orthodox, and celebrate Orthodox feasts and holidays, and Christ. They will baptize their children in Orthodox churches, because there is no Romany who has not been baptized, but we doubt that you, Jevtic, have been.

Furthermore, you, Jevtic, keep calling us Gypsies, but not even the Germans use that term anymore, just Romanys. You state that if the "Gypsies" identify themselves as Gypsies, then the percentage of Serbs will be reduced by 5-6 percent and that it will no longer be 62 percent, but instead 56 or 57 percent. We ask you, who allowed you to agitate and encourage the "assimilation" of Romanys in this region? Why is it our fault if there are enough of us and if the white plague [population decline] is not present among the Romanys? Probably everyone is allowed to plan his own family. You also have to take national interest into account, however. Serbia is not China, or India, but rather a population with an increasingly lower birth rate. Allow me to illustrate with a fact about the Romany population. While others give birth to single children, our Romany women give birth to five, and so we Romanys are very satisfied with our birth rate, because in spite of the exodus in World War II, the

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Romanys have achieved an enormous increase in their population, and we think that by 2050 there will be over 2.5 million of us.

In contrast to others, we Romanys are very modest, and we do not want our children to be Rockefellers, Onassises, or princes and princesses, but instead we will urge that our children be decent people.

3. Romanys' rights and whether we will seek intervention to protect them.

You write that we wrote to Margit Savovic that we would appeal to the CSCE; not that we had written, but rather that we said it when we visited the minister, Mrs. Margit, and that in view of the way we were being treated there were prospects that we would soon contact not only the CSCE, but also Amnesty International in London and everyone else. The Democratic Political Party of Romanys, the community of Romanys in Yugoslavia, is not, as you claim, Jevtic, a newly formed "Gypsy" party fRomany Kragujevac, but instead one of the first ones to be formed back in 1990, when the Law on the Formation of Parties allowed it, and not as a Gypsy party, as you say, Jevtic, but rather a "Democratic" one that legitimately represents Romanys on the entire territory of Yugoslavia, and which has been respected until now, as confirmed by the very visits to all the leaders, starting with Branko Kostic and all the others, and so we signed the Yugoslav convention and were also a collective member of the top leadership of the National Front and participated in the elections, but our headquarters is in Kragujevac.

4. Are Romanys being treated in accordance with the legal and constitutional provisions?

Let me at once say no.

Many injustices and humiliations have been committed against us and are being committed now, which is evident in our party, because Romanys fRomany various areas are contacting us and requesting our assistance. Although we contacted the Ministry of National Minorities, unfortunately that ministry has not solved a single problem, so that we got the impression that the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] has a Ministry of Human Rights and National Minorities that serves exclusively as a "decorative ministry for external use" (a council for national minorities has been formed in Montenegro, which is not the case in the Republic of Serbia, although Minister Margit informed our party two years ago that such a body would be formed). We read in the newspapers, however, that they had drafted some law, but they were really being held back by how to define Romanys, so let me help you, when you did not find it appropriate to consult with us, because you, I am sure, exhausted the knowledge of the entire world—I am thinking of those academic associates of yours who are not worth half a pipe of tobacco, because I have had opportunities either to contact them or listen to them. Consequently, allow me to help you to resolve that enigma: Call us Romanys "Martians," which suits us most, because that is exactly how we are being treated.

And let us say at once that if you do not allow us, through that law, to have our own representatives, from the local communities up to parliament, we Romanys will never accept that law or implement it. Our Democratic Party of Romanys, which represents the million-strong public of our Romany people, although it participated in the elections, could not achieve the minimum of 5 percent of the votes, because we do not live in one area but are scattered throughout the entire country, so that this electoral law of yours does not benefit us, in contrast to the Hungarians, for instance. There are 50 percent fewer of them than us Romanys, but they live in one restricted area.

And with respect to the representation of Romanys, we also have to say the following: Romanys are represented in almost all the parliaments of Europe, where a large number of them live. The Romanys in the FRY, however, are a fluid people and no one ever mentions us in parliament, as if we did not exist.

There are 30 million Romanys in the world; there are 5 million in the former USSR, 2 million in Romania, and 30,000 in Bulgaria, followed by Hungary and Poland. The Spanish Romanys, who live mostly in the province of Andalucia, have gone the furthest. We are in all of Europe and America; we are all over the world, and the Romanys are not Martians there, but people whom the state takes into account.

Kosovo

Agani Rejects Talks if 'Repression' Continues

AU1411215294 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12-13 Nov 94 p 6

[Report by R. Barjaktarevic: "Albanians Do Not Want Secession"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina—Fehmi Agani, deputy chairman of the Democratic League of Kosovo, yesterday strongly condemned the announcement by Serbian Commissary for Refugees Bratislava Buba Morina that the Serb refugees from Bosnia and Croatia would be permanently settled in Kosovo. He said that this announcement would not have been so bad were it not for the fact that this was the official policy of Serbia and Belgrade. On the other hand, there has been information about some Serbian program for moving factories from Kosovo to Serbia, so nothing could be ruled out.

Asked by BORBA whether the Albanians would accept the offer of talks by the regional committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia for Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija] on concrete issues, as proposed by its chairman, Vojislav Zivkovic, "if the Albanians give up secession," Agani said:

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"We do not want secession, and our demands do not concern secession. We are talking about the fact that the Yugoslavia we lived in no longer exists, and that Serbia has unconstitutionally imposed on us a status we do not want to accept. We want to constitute ourselves in this process of the disintegration of the former state. Therefore, this is not a question of any kind of secession. As for the talks, we are always ready for talks that are well prepared and promising. We are not for talks that would represent an abuse of dialogue, and which would be only for the sake of talking and not agreeing on issues. That would only create an illusion. However, certain preconditions have to be met before talks are held. These are not conditions, but they would create an atmosphere for talks. Still, so long as there is repression in Kosovo, there are no conditions for talks," Agani said.

The second BORBA question was whether the expelled Albanians would be soon returning to Kosovo from Geneva, and in what numbers. Agani said: "Switzerland and Germany have announced that a number of Albanian emigres that have not been given asylum would be returned. We have told the countries of Western Europe that, if they can, they should postpone the return of the Albanians since there are no security or other preconditions for their normal return. Everything else would only further complicate the situation in Kosovo. We have asked the Western countries not to give our Albanians permanent residence, but to let them stay there until conditions for a normal life have been created here. Therefore, we are not expecting any mass return of the Albanians," Agani said.

Milosevic Said Ready for Talks With Rugova

AU1411191894 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Nov 94 p 24

[BETA-attributed report: "Milosevic Favors 'Face to Face' Meeting with Rugova"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina—In its latest issue, the Pristina independent weekly KOHA in Albanian writes—citing reliable sources in Geneva—that cochairman David Owen has told Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is ready to meet Rugova face to face.

According to KOHA, Owen gave Rugova this message during the latest Geneva meeting between Rugova and Bujar Bukosi, prime minister of the parallel Kosovo government, with international cochairmen Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg.

Milosevic set two conditions for a meeting with Rugova: That it should take place somewhere near Belgrade, and that it should not involve any mediators, KOHA says, citing the same source.

The weekly does not say when this meeting could take place, nor how Rugova reacted to this proposal. The leader of the Kosovo Albanians, according to KOHA, has repeated his demand for talks with the mediation of international representatives.

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